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Abstract 
Vehicle management may be considered to consist of traflic managcml.!nt, 
usage control, maintenance, and security. Various regulatory authorities 
undertake the first aspect, fleet managers will be concerned with all aspects, 
and owner~drivcrs will· be intere~ted mainly in maintenance and security. Car 
theft poses a universal security problem. Personalisation, including 
navigational assistance, might be achieved as a by-product of an improved 
management system. Authorities and fleet managers may find smartcards to 
be key components of an improved system, but owners may feel that the need 
for improved security does not justify its cost. This thesis seeks to determine 
whether smartcards may be used to personalise vehicles in order to improve 
vehicle management within a forseeable time and suggest when it might 
happen. In the process four broad questions are addressed. 
• First, what improvements in technology are needed to make any improved 
scheme using smartcards practicable, and what can be expected in the near 
future? 
• Second, what problems and difficulties may impede the development of 
improved management? 
• Third, what non-vehicle applications might create an environment in which 
a viable scheme could emerge? 
• Finally, is there a perceived need for improved vehicle management? 
The method involved a literature search, the issue of questionnaires to owner-
drivers and fleet managers, discussions with fleet managers, the preparation of 
data-flow and state diagrams, and the construction of a simulation of a 
Ill 
possible security approach. The study concludes that although vehicle 
pcrsonalisation is possible- and desirable it is unlikely to occur within the next 
decade bt:causc the environment needed to make it practicable will not emerge 
until ;.i number of commercial nnd standardisation problems that obstruct all 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Inspiration for the topic • smart cards in cellular 
telephones 
1.1.1 Personal communications and personal mobility. 
Within the last century there have been dramatic improvements in personal 
communications. One hundred years ago only the rich had telephones and usage 
was limited tb local calls: long distance messages were sent by telegraph. Today, 
with a cellular telephone, it is possible to communicate with another person almost 
anywhere in the world; however, minor nuisances such as unwanted interruption and 
disturbance for others nearby have accompanied this improved convenience. In 
contrast, there have been lesser improvements in personal mobility. The vehicle, the 
principal personal mobility device, is less convenient and has become more of a 
nuisance. Can we enhance its convenience and overcome the nuisance factors of 
security risk, wasteful usage, pollution and crowding? Perhaps, in the distant future, 
in potentially hazardous traffic situations such as major intersections, an automatic 
system might assume control of all vehicles within a specified zone and regulate 
their speeds and distances to improve efficiency and safety by the temporary 
suspension of the human factor. As an ultimate example, might we, one day, match 
the convenience of the cellular telephone and have our car at our fingertips, 
summoning it like a magic carpet from elsewhere, by pressing buttons, and 
dismissing it in the same way? 
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1.1.2 Electronic control and smart cards 
Th~ magtc carpet concept is lent a tinge or credibility hy the world·~o'lidc trl·nd 
towards electronic control ami delivery in commerce. This trend is appan..:nt in 
lln;mcial, telephone, transportation, utility, entertainment, health, and welfare, 
systems. An example is the application of Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards 
in Global System for Mobile communication (GSM) cellular telephones that has 
shown how useful a smart card may be in personalising a device for the individual. 
It is possible that, just as a person inserting his/her SIM card into any compatible 
cell phone makes that phone his/her own, a smart card might contribute to 
personalising a motor vehicle for its owners or drivers. In this thesis the term "smart 
card" is reserved for cards that conform to Parts l to 6 of the International Standards 
Organisation (ISO) standard 7816 and may serve as both a source and a repository 
of data, and/or as a highly portable processor. Standard ISO 7816 is discussed in 
more detail in section 4.3.2. The smart memory card, whose processor merely 
controls its memory with "hard wired" logic, is excluded. 
1.1.3 Communications and mobility contrasted 
Although the need for vehicle personalisation may be similar to that accepted at 
present for cellular telephones, there are differences between personal 
communication systems and personal mobility ones. Telephone channels are owned 
privately, or by a government agency, and the owner has almost absolute control 
over them, but Australian roads are genera(ly publicly owned and control is mostly a 
matter of prohibitions. The reasons for the differences are practical, rather than 
logi~.:;.\1, and it is possible that one day a national gowrniHl'nt might privatise more 
roads, and th~.: new owners impose a toll or traversal fee, as is th~.: practice in 
Singapon.: and in some places in the US and FrancL'. today. Another possibility 
might be that thl! lntcrnl!l absorbs till! global tcll!communication network, with most 
intelligence and ~.:ontrnl becoming resident in the terminals mthcr than the network 
nodes. So. we may sec a convergence between the communication and mobility 
systems. In the author's opinion. pcrsonalisation will probably remain a<; a major 
attraction for users. and smart cards appear to be the best tool for its implementation. 
Whatever happens, smart carJs might play an increasing role and the following 
discussion examines this possibility. 
1.1.4 Vehicle ownership in WA 
Before defining vehicle management, its scope should be estimated. At the 1998 
census, Western Australia (WA) had about half a million cellular telephones and 
about 1.1 million passenger and light commercial vehicles, of which the vehicles 
constituted a vastly greater asset (Yearbook Australia, 2000, p. 602). Included in the 
1.1 million are both fleet and owner-driven vehicles. For fleet vehicles, 
accountability for their efficient employment usually rests with someone other than 
the driver. Of cars and light commercial vehicles, a majority are personal transport 
and owned by the driver or driver's family; whereas, the remainder, about ten 
percent (see Appendix!), might be regarded as fleet vehicles, where the driver(s) arc 
not necessarily the owner(s). This fleet versus private distinction is not clcm·-cut, as 
many cars arc family transport and driven by more than one member of the family. 
Since the drivers of fleet vehicles may have no direct stake in efficiency, a more 
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formal and controlled management style is required for such vchidcs than for those 
driven by their owners. However, it seems likely that any management system that 
gains widcspn:ad acceptance will have appeal to the private, as well as the tlcct, 
owner. 
1.2 Components of Vehicle Management 
Vehicle management may be considered to consist of traffic management, usage 
control, maintenance, convenience and security. These components nave associated 
problems that are described next, and that might be ameliorated by a smart card 
supported system. 
1.2.1 Traffic Management 
Traffic management presents probiems in behaviour, congestion and pollution, and 
in the provision of parking spaces. These problems are now examined in the light of 
trends in vehicle management and usage: furthermore, potential business 
opportunities are highlighted. 
Behaviour control includes determination of regulations, registration of vehicles, 
licensing of drivers, monitoring and enforcement. Even with the increasing 
employment of multi-novas (speed cameras that are operated by police auxiliaries) 
for speed control, the surveillance that results is inte.rmittent and currently, in 
Australia, monitoring of roadworthincss is not compn~hensivc. Recently, a 
subsidiary problem, the identification of those who exceed speed limits, has captured 
media atll:ntion ("Priv.:tcy IC:tr", 199tJ). A system that automatt.:d monitoring and 
ensured idcntifil:ation might improve behaviour. 
Snmc congestion, with accompanying pollution. is incviwhlc, as the utilisation of 
cars in W A is neither static nor declining: for example. there was a steady rise in the 
number of registcrd vehicles throughout 1995-1997 (Yearbook Australia, 1998, p. 
600). Naturally, this rise adds to the congestion and pollution problems, as thr; 
Australian Federal and State Governments cannot provide, in the short term, for the 
increasing number of vehicles by constructing extra roads due to private land 
ownership limiting the availability of appropriate space. The Federal and/or WA 
State Government response may exploit the general trend in fiscal policy to make 
the user (especially, the motorist) pay. The trend has been given prominence with 
the High Court ruling concerning •he right of Australian States to impose a tax on 
petrol (Sources of State Revenue, 1999). The issue of road pricing, as an effective 
means of both managing road traffic demand and raising additional revenue for road 
construction, is on the political agenda of many European governments (Blythe, 
Burdon, Clark, Givens & Rourke, 1994, p. 42). For example, in some cities, such as 
3ingapore, a charge is made on every motorist who enters the central business 
district. Australian governments have not ignored the trend. National and State 
projects are described in section 7.5.2. Congestion might also be reduced if smart 
cards were used to encourage car-pooling and facilitate cost sharing between vehicle 
occupants. 
Motorists expect to pay for parking in congested areas, and there is a perception that 
user payment is the fairest way to allocate a scarce resource: this perception is 
r~infon:cd by the ne~ds of local hodies. Parking ft.:es and fines resulting from 
parking offences me an important source of revenue for civic authorities, 
particularly as th~ir imposition may also advance the socially desirable objectives of 
reducing pollution and congestion. Australia wide, in 1995, parking was an SO 
million-dollar industry (Guimmarra, G. & Luk, J, 1995). Currently, coin-operated 
kerb-side devices or ticket dispensing machines collect the fees and, in either case, 
wardens must monitor the system. Mechanical meters arc vulnerable to vandalism 
and theft. have unreliable moving parts, and provide no information about the cash 
collected (Luk, J.Y.K., 1995, p. 1). 
For both behaviour control and parking, the present method of collecting traffic 
management charges is labour intensive, expensive and, therefore, wasteful: hence, a 
system that could collect the charges automatically and accurately would be 
desirable. The introduction of any automatic system would depend on the existence 
of a "critical mass" of motorists prepared to pay for the necessary roadway and "in-
vehicle" devices; however, until there is a mass market for the devices, their prices 
would continue to remain high and the "critical mass" might not eventuate. An 
example of this possibility is the "City Link" project in Melbourne which is reported 
to be functioning satisfactorily (City Link Project, 1999). Prices might fall and the 
transition to widespread automatic collection systems be facilitated if fuel 
companies, road authorities, and financial institutions, cooperated to standardise the 
collection method. In this regard, smart cards might provide the facilitating 
mechanism for such a standard automated "user pays" system. Standardisation is 
considered in more detail in chapter four. 
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ThL·n: may he problems in developing an automatic syswm, hut there an.: also 
business opportunities. The number of fuelling and other transactions in vchich.: 
usage is second (lnly to point-of-sale trans:.~c\i(JJls in the f<md industry (Arazi, 1991, 
p. 646). Arazi is probably referring to the US, and Australia docs not collect a 
comparable statistic, but this admitlcdly dated reference is not inconsistent with 
statistics from the Household Expenditure Survey, Australia, Catalog No 6535.0. 
Since vehicles operate day and night, the gradual adoption of automatic vending 
would seem to be inevitable. Other opportunities include insurance sales and 
support, navigational information and, on a futuristic scale. a city hire car system 
along the lines of the Praxitcle pilot scheme now under trial in Saint-Quentin en 
Yvelines, France (Arensonas, 1996). 
1.2.2 Usage 
In contrast to traffic management, usage is of more concern to owners, especially 
fleet owners, than to authorities. Owners are concerned about cost, and the 
operation of 1.1 million registered light vehicles is a significant cost. The Royal 
Automobile Club ofWA (RAC) web site gives estimates of the cost per kilometre to 
run a vehicle as varying from about 80 cents for a Long Wheel Base (LWB) off-
reader to 38 cents for a small city runabout ("Car running costs", 2001). An average 
figure might be about 50 cents and an average annual kilometres per vehicle might 
be about 15,200 (Yearbook Australia, 1998, p. 602). Therefore, the estimated cost 
of vehicle usage in W A might be about A$8.4 billion. The ten percent of vehicles 
that are in fleets, in practice are newer than those owned by individuals and are more 
X 
heavily used: consequently, the cost of their operation is likely to be more than ten 
percent of the totaL 
Although owner-drivers might welcome some assistance in controlling usc of their 
vehicles. the desire for assistance is unlikely to amount to a compelling motivation 
to purcha~e even a cheap device because the owner is entitled to "waste" resources 
in his/!ter vehicle if convenience so dictates. 
For tleet owners the situation is different, since profit considerations require that the 
fleet provide the maximum benefit foo: the minimum cost. A one percent 
improvement in the management of a "A$1 bn plus" annual expenditure of resources 
is a substantial sum that, although insignificant when compared to W A's Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of A$50b, might justify pressure to improve control 
(Australian Economic Indicators. p. 92). Control requires accurate records of what 
journeys a vehicle has made and why. Without some form of automation this is a 
tedious chore and the results are often not accurate, but automatic onboard loggers, 
whilst available, are expensive. At present fleet managers usually issue fuel cards to 
drivers knowing that the chosen fuel company records the details of cards that are 
tendered and, from a central database controlled by that company, wili provide 
reports to the managers. Drivers may be required to keep additional details, such as 
the reason for the journey, in logbooks. The potential for automatic recording of 
these additional details in the convenient portable data stores provided by smart 
cards is obvious, and is considered in chapter three. 
') 
1.2.3 Maintenance 
Control of m:..tintcn:.mcc, unlike traffic management and usage, offers little scope for 
exploiting pcrsonalising smart cards because maintenance relates to the vehicle 
rather than the user. The maker predetermines most of the maintenance activities. 
Nevertheless. a smart card system could provide reminders about periodic checks, or 
reports of incipient failure. Moreover, repairs under warranty and (to a lesser extent) 
maintenance depend on accurate recording of previously performed work and the 
reporting of defects. When vehicles are moved from one location to another a smart 
card system might help to ensure that records are available in the new locations. In 
the USA, the Environmental Protection Agency has regulations establishing 
requirements for on-board diagnostic (OBD) systems on light vehicles manufactured 
after 1993 ("Frequently asked questions", May 1997). These systems notify the 
driver of faults by means of a dashboard light. A non-owner driver might be tempted 
to ignore the light, but if the diagnoses were recorded on smart cards that were 
returned to the owner's office at prescribed intervals, it would be possible for the 
owner to arrange remedial action. 
1.2.4 Security 
Vehicle security, the final component of vehicle management, must be examined in 
the context of the crime environment as a whole. Crime statistics may be interpreted 
in different ways so the environment has been discussed in more detail in Appendix 
2. Suffice to say here, that motorists should not be tolerant of vehicle-related theft 
merely because· their insurance covers them against loss. 
I 
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Before considering possihlc security measures it is scnsihlc to examine the nature of 
the crime and seck answers to the following questions. 
• Who steals cars and why? 
As a generalisation, car thieves probably fall into two fairly equal categories: 
young impulsive thieves and older cunning professional thieves {Biles & 
Willing, 1987, p. 42). 
• What kind of car is most frequently targeted? 
The only clear trend is that older cars appear to be more frequently targeted 
(Devery, 1993; Motor vehicle theft in SA, 1995). 
• How many are taken and where from? 
In WA, about 19,000 vehicles at a cost of A$80m to A$ 100m are stolen each 
year; therefore, the security aspect alone is worth study. Cars seem to be stolen 
impartially from all places lo which the public has access (W A Police Annual 
Crime Statistics Report, 1995/96). 
• How are they taken? 
Methods vary but human carelessness is a frequent contributory factor (Geason 
& Wilson, 1990; Devery, 1993). 
More detailed responses to the above questions have been provided in Appendix 3. 
A fairly simple and cheap method of security would probably foil impulsive thieves, 
but a more sophisticated defence would be needed to prevent a professional theft. 
Therefore, a basic system should be modular and extendible so that owners can get 
the level of security which they require. Ideally, retrofitting a system to older 
vehicles should be possible and the chosen system should compensate, as far as 
II 
possible, for human carelessness. How smart canis might he part of sud1 a system 
and also facilitate the tracking of stolen vehicles, is discussed in chapter thrcc. 
1.3 Perception of the need for better management 
Whether a better system of vehicle management emerges may depend upon the 
public's perception of the need for improvement: but perceptions depend upon 
viewpoints. Although there may be a need for better management to promote 
individual control of mobility and remove, or at least reduce, currently experienced 
nuisance factors, the recognition of that need is not universal. For example, many 
people advocate a greater use of public transport; arguably the equivalent of a return 
from the telephone to the telegraph office. It will be argued that this lack of 
recognition is the major reason for the lethargic manner in which the problems 
obstructing progress, including problems of standardisation, have been addressed. 
Generally, if vehicle ownership and usage continues to increase at the present rate, 
management will become both more difficult and more important whatever the 
awareness of the need. The management of traffic is fragmented amongst various 
authorities; usage control and maintenance seems to be an imp01tant issue only for 
fleet owners; and, security is probably the main concern of owner-drivers. 
Moreover, employed drivers are likely to be unenthusiastic about any proposal that 
adds to either their chores or their responsibilities. This fragmentation of viewpoints, 
contributing to the Jack of any perceived need for improvement, is possibly the 
greatest obstacle to the development of a better system. Inharmonious motivations 
merely exacerbate the difficulties. Adopting a positive perspective, this thesis 
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argues that intelligent people should ovcrl'omc obstadcs rather than surrcmkr to 
them: but, it accepts the reality that, whilst any technology that promises improved 
cfncicncy will probably be investigated, identified technical enhancements may not 
be implemented. ll would help if "in-vehicle" devices were modular in design so 
that motorists could get just those aspects for which they fell the grcatc:-;t need. 
Another positive factor might be that, as a by-product of automatic systems, more 
infom1ation might become available to authorities, vendors and owners (e.g., times 
and places of payment). The recipients might welcome feedback, but drivers might 
regard it as an invasion of privacy. Since it is argued that perceptions are crucial in 
assessing the likelihood of developing a more personal mobility system, their 
assessment will be left to chapter seven. 
1.4 Thesis approach 
This thesis seeks to detennine whether smart cards will be used to personalise 
vehicles, thus improving vehicle management within a foreseeable time frame. To 
improve the focus of the study, and explain what at first may appear to be omissions 
in the investigation, a number of assumptions are made and factors that impede 
smart card research generally arc mentioned briefly. 
1.4.1 Assumption - political will 
A political will to attack road and traffic management more vigorously will be 
needed, but it is emerging only slowly. Attention has already been drawn to the fact 
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that the highway used by a vehicle differs from the "highway" used by a cell phone 
in that: 
• a non-commercial organisation usually owns a road, 
• users do not usually need the approval of the road owner, 
• vehicles are approved for road usc by an organisation other than the road owner, 
and 
• road management is less thoroughly covered by international agreement. 
Amongst the consequences of these difft!rences is that, unlike a cell phone SJM card 
system, a personal mobility system using smart cards probably cannot stand alone. 
First, Federal, State and local body road owners and regulatory authorities must 
cooperate to create a suitable road network. Second, the mobility system needs 
more technical support than a communication system, it would cost more, and 
individual motorists might not be prepared to meet this cost. Third, to provide more 
value to justify the cost, smart cards used in vehicles would need to be useable in 
card readers other than those in the vehicles. After considering these consequences 
the assumption has been made that, despite the technical possibility of managing 
roads in a manner similar to the management of telecommunication links, the 
environment to facilitate such management is developing only .slowly. Progress may 
depend, in part, upon political decisions, but politicians are wary and wait for 
pressure from the electorate. 
1.4.2 Assumption ·· "killer application" 
The nature of the environment, within which a smart card supported vehicle 
management system might emerge, depends on commercial factors as well as the 
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political ones already mentioned. With this dependence in mind, a second 
ussumption has been made: namely, that the usc of smart cards might explode if a 
"killer application'' emerged to form the core of a multi-application card, who'iC 
acceptance might then achieve critical mass. Just as the word-processor and the 
spreadsheet were the commercial applications that brought the personal computer 
(PC) onto muny desk~. so some equivalent application may be needed to put a smart 
card in every wallet. 
1.4.3 Assumption • multi-application smart cards 
A smart card system would be unlikely to be used solely for vehicle management, 
therefore there would need to be space on the card for other applications and any 
associated problems in creating a multi-application smart card would have to be 
solved. Continuing the analogy with the PC, people may have bought a PC 
primarily for use as a word-processor but they became aware of its other uses, which 
they quickly began to exploit. For general acceptance a smart card, likewise, is 
assumed to need an extension potential. 
1.4.4 Factors impeding smart card research 
When experiment or direct observation cannot obtain answers to questions posed, 
for example queries involving the future behaviour of people, a review of literature 
is often the only possibility of enlightenment. When dealing with smart card 
research, even with this method there are difficulties due , ' commercial 
confidentiality. Two examples follow. 
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• Information obtained from the records of cornmen.:ial organis<ltions, or by 
market surveys, is valuable hut costly and is sddom is n!leased universally until 
it is severely dated. 
• Technically comprehensive reports, based upon market research usmg 
commercially collected statistics, arc expensive. Examples arc "Smartcurd 
Technology" by SJB Services and "Smart Card'i in Transport" by Dean, Arnold 
& Harrop. In 1997 these texts each cost over AS 1000 and still cannot be 
obtained from booksellers or borrowed from libraries. However, 
CardTechnology, an online magazine published by FaulknerGray, now releases 
some tigurcs when they are no longer commercially valuable. 
The World Wide Web has proved to be the most useful source of up-to-date 
information. Unfortunately, much of the information on the \Veb is anonymous and, 
as a source, is contaminated by hype and inaccuracies. Moreover, when informative 
and apparently authoritative Web pages are found, frequently they are posted only 
temporarily. 
Journal articles, both those published on the Web and those located by Internet 
searches, tend to be either non-technical or non-specific in their treatment of 
commercial possibilities. 
In addition to the literature sources described above, inquiries were made of the 
Police Department, the Crime Research Bureau of UWA, Wcstrail. the Insurance 
Council, the RAC, Main Roads WA, the Perth City Council, five major fleet owners 
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and a numhcr of vehicle immohiliscr vending nu.:rcilants. These organisations 
formally responded with caution to unwarranted requests for specific information. 
1.5 Research questions 
Four broad questions arc addressed and, in the following subsections, these arc each 
stated brietly and elaborated. 
1.5.1 Necessary technological advances 
Whm advances in technology are needed to make any improved scheme using smart 
cards practicable, and which of them may be expected within the time frame? 
This main question can be divided into the following four subordinate questions. 
• What general improvements might be needed in smart card chips to make them 
practicable and acceptable for a wide range of applications? 
Potentially improvable features are memory (especially RAM, EEPROM or 
other rewritable, non-volatile memory) power consumption and processing 
power. 
• What do different levels of vehicle management (authorities, fleet operators. 
owner-drivers and users) demand in increased card memory capacity? 
• What improvements might be needed in biometrics identification systems? 
Four potentially improvable aspects might be: 
• reductions in False Acceptance Rate (FAR), in False Rejection Rate (FRR), 
in invasiveness, in scanner size and in cost, 
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• increases in rcli;~bility and llcxihility (ranging from high security through to 
adequate deterrent). 
• easier cnrolmt::nt of persons to be idcntifil:J, and 
• improved and swndardiscd testing. 
• What vehicle modifications might be needed'! 
• What infra:Hructurc (external to both card and vehicle) developments might be 
required? 
In this thesis, in chapter 6, in pursuit of answers, a possible vehicle management 
system is modelled and data flow diagrams with supporting repository are prepared 
to enable an assessment of both the onwchip data storage required and, specifically 
for vehicle applications. the necessary rewritable non-volatile memory. In addition 
to these assessments, in section 6.~. a further estimate is made of the extra memory 
needed for other associated applications. To clarify the vehicle security requirement 
a state diagram is prepared identifying the different security states (locked and 
immobiiised, unlocked but immobilised, ready and valet mode) and the transitions 
between them. A simulation of partial security aspect:-; of a vehicle smart card 
system seeks to demonstrate the technical feasibility of such a system and the 
enhanced security it might provide, and hints at the prerequisite modifications and 
possibilities for smart c..:._d vehicle management. A search of the Internet and 
journals is carried out to assess the commercial and public expectations of biometric 
identification methods. 
An attempt is also made to estimate within what time frame these technical advances 
(changes or improvements) might be expected. 
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1.5.2 Problems impeding development 
What problems and difficulties might impede the development of personal mobility 
comparable to existing personal communications? 
The envisaged problems and difficulties seem to be mainly non-technical and 
include excessive costs, inadequate card performance, flawed system security, 
unacceptable biometric rejection rates, failure to achieve standardisation, and 
political attitudes and fears. The political factors have almost total influence upon 
regulatory changes that might affect the environmental options, such as whether 
road pricing might conceivably be introduced and whether surveillance of motorists 
and enforcement of regulations should be intensified (possibly, to the extent 
currently the case with aircraft pilots). Inevitably, therefore, uncertainty exists as to 
what measures, if any. are likely to be taken to improve driving behaviour, to reduce 
traffic congestion, and to minimise pollution. 
The problems of vehicle management are described in more detail in chapter 3. The 
general thrust of several discussion papers issued by the W A Department of 
Transport and a Web page issued by the NZ Government are outlined in section 3.2. 
1.5.3 Potential 
What potentially c!-Ianging public attitudes and commercial developments might 
create an environment in which a viable scheme could emerge? 
The thesis argues that changes, not diredly related to vchidc management, might 
impar.:t on the environment. Candidate developments im:Judc innov<~tions in: 
• finance (e.g .. the electronic purse), 
• transporl<.ltion (e.g., public transport ticketing), 
• telecommunication(c.g., for pay phones and c-commcrcc), 
• authentication (e.g., for welfare benefits), 
• storage of information (e.g., for health records), and 
• other minor areas. 
The possibility that any of these developments, or a combination of them, might 
result in smart cards becoming ubiquitous is evaluated and an opinion is fonnulated. 
1.5.4 Perceptions 
What is the public (political. commercial and individual) perception of the need for 
an improved personal mobility, in:luding better vehicle management? 
The investigation seeks to determine if there is a perceived need for improvement in 
vehicle management by regulatory authorities, fleet owners, individual vehicle 
owners, and/ur drivers; and, if so, whether the perception in any way contemplates a 
system using smart cards. What owners (tleet or individual) might be prepared to 
pay for beuer vehicle management is accepted as an indication of perception. The 
extent that authorities might be prepared to impose a higher standard of behaviour 
on owners and drivers, and (in their turn) fleet owners upon drivers, is assessed, as 
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;llsn are vd1i1.:le owner p~.:n.:cptions of what 1s a cost-c!Tcctivc level of vehicle 
security. 
It was decided that the best method for obtaining an indication of perceptions would 
be by questionnaires reinforced by direct interviews where possible, with opinions 
being suught from regulatory authorities, vehicle fleet owners, and owner-drivers. 
However, public officials cannot be expected to complete questionnaires which have 
not been approved by their superiors; so, necessarily, the determination of the views 
of regulatory authorities was confined to the informal discussions that were held 
\ ... ith officials in the WA Department of Transport, Main Roads W A, and Perth City 
Council. The position of commercial managers is different and five Perth major 
fleet owners were contacted by telephone, sent a questionnaire, and asked for their 
opinions. All responded to the questions, but only verbally. For owner-drivers the 
situation is different again. To survey the opinions of visitors using the student car 
park at Edith Cowan University (ECU), Mount Lawley (MTL) campus, a 
questionnaire was distributed to almost 300 vehicle drivers. The form was placed 
under windscreen wiper blades and returned ailonymously by various means. The 
questions specifically ask about desirable levels of security, and endeavour to obtain 
the views of individuals as to the cost-effectiveness of different levels, but a 
subsequent reinforcing interview would not have been feasible. What is known, is 
that ECU students include more part-time and mature students than other Penh 
Universities (Student's (Preliminary) Selected Higher Education Statistics, 2000, p. 
27); therefore, the responses arc likely to be fairly representative of the opinions of 
citizens in general. A search of trade magazines seeks to reinforce the views 
obtained by the questionnaires. 
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1.6 Thesis structure 
It is now possible to describe the structure of the thesis. Chapter two examines the 
current state of the technologies that might promote better vehicle management and 
chapter three considers how these technologies might be applied. Chapter four 
examines problems and difficulties of a general nature, such as the obstacles to 
standardisation, costs, security and political and individual concerns; and, chapter 
five analyses commercial factors that might influence the adoption of any system. 
Chapter six describes investigations undertaken to answer questions that are not 
addressed in the literature: including an analysis of a possible system to estimate the 
card memory needed, a study of the opinions of fleet managers and owner-drivers 
and a simulation to demonstrate an approach to enhancing security. In chapter 
seven, conclusions are drawn, not only from the preceding discuss;on of positive and 
negative influences, but also from the opinions of authorities who are abo trying to 
predict the future of smart cards. Finally, the seven chapters are supported by a 
number of appendices incorporating relevant technical and statistical detail. 
22 
2 CURRENT RELEVANT TECHNOLOGIES 
2.1 introduction 
This chapter examines the current situation in smart card technology and the 
associated area of biometric identification; it briefly considers the alternatives for 
access control, such as transponders and passwords or PINs; and, il explores the 
possibility of developments that might lead to more widespread, perhaps even 
ubiquitous, use of the cards. 
2.2 Smart Card Capabilities 
A discussion of smart card technology should begin with a consideration of what the 
devices do, therefore potential general application categories are summarised before 
describing smart card, associated, and alternative, technologies. A report (Butler, 
1996, p. 2) prepared by the New Zealand Futures Trust states: 
"There are three kinds of applications of smart cards: 
Authentication. 
This allows cardholders to gain access to buildings, facilities, databases etc. 
In general, these applications are convenient, secure and efficient and pose 
few problems for eii:her users or providers. A number of such applications 




Here a smart card can be used as an clct:tronic purse, which may also he 
n::loadablc. Before there is wide acceptance and usc of stored-value cards for 
financial transactions, ... the public... will need !() be convinced of: ... (a 
number of features) ... 
Store of information. 
The third main usc of smart cards is as portable records, to store information 
which needs to be independent of fixed locations, e.g. as a patient's health 
card, or for vehicle or equipment maintenance. As with stored-value 
transactions, questions of standardisation, privacy and security must be 
resolved before there is general acceptance". 
Other authors, for example, Myers and Baker, broadly confirm this statement and 
although, seven years ago, Baker gave greater emphasis to security as the most 
important characteristic of smart cards, Baker's altitude is probably not inconsistent 
with the general application categories described above (Myers. 1996; Baker, T ., 
1992). Amongst electronic payment systems supported by smart cards, distinctions 
should be drawn between open and closed systems, and between electronic purses 
and stored-value cards (SVCs). A closed payment system is one in which the issuer 
of value in digital form is also the sole redeemer of that value: for example, a 
prepaid telephone card system. By contrast, in an open system a range of 
organisations and individuals may accept the digital value and provide goods or 
services in return without the prior knowledge of the issuer. At o:1e time the terms 
SVC and electronic purse were regarded as synonymous, but, increasingly, a 
distinction is being made between SVCs that cannot be reloaded, and arc commonly 
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used in closed systems, and reloadablc purses that arc more suitable for usc in open 
systems. This distinction makes .'icnsc, because, in ordinary parlance, a purse is a 
device into which we can put money for subsequent spending where we choose. 
Vehicle management, as described in the introductory chapter, has candidate 
applications in: 
• authentication (e.g., security), 
• stored-value transactions (e.g., vehicle related payments), and 
• stores of information (e.g., record keeping). 
The possible applications are explored in more detail in chapter three, whilst this 
chapter considers present day technology, both supportive and alternative, and the 
potential for improvements and refinements. 
2.3 Present Smart Card Technology 
2.3.1 Definition 
There is some confusion about the definition of a smart card, but any card that 
incorporates a microcontroller is clearly a chip card. Chip cards can be divided into 
memory cards and smart cards. 
• Memory cards have more memory than magnetic-stripe cards, and "hard-wired" 
programs to control that memory, but no processing capability. 
• True smart cards have a facility that enables the chip to be partially 
reprogrammed after manufacture, and they have both read only memory (ROM) 
and other non-volatile memory; the latter usually stores the "smartness" of the 
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card in programs to calculate, encrypt, manipulate, and record, data. Also, the 
progr;.uns and data arc stored in a typl! of non-volatile memory that can be read 
yr:ars Iiller, andean be over-written many thousands of times. Jn turn, trw.~ smart 
c;.mls can be divided into contact and contactlcss types: hoth arc defined, in some 
aspects a liHic laxly, by international standards which arc introduced in the next 
section. Contactless cards can be "close-couplcd"/proximity/vicinity type which 
are readable at lmm/!Ocm/lmetre, respectively. 
The terms hybrid, dual-chip and combi/dual interface are now u';ed by authors, but 
not always consistently. A hybrid card has a magnetic stripe as well as smart card 
features; a dual-chip card, obviously, has two chips, one of which is accessed 
through a contact plate and the other using remote communication features; and, the 
combi/dual interface card has a single chip that can be accessed by contact or 
remotely. 
2.3.2 Standards 
Standard ISO 7810 prescribes the size of smart cards, and standards ISO 7816/l 0536 
the nature of communications wilh contactl"close-coupled" contactless cards. A 
draft standard ISO 14443 for "remote-coupled" contactless cards has yet to be 
finalised and there is a proposal for standard ISO 15693 for vicinity cards. Initially, 
smart cards were designed for closed systems, such as prepaid telephone card 
systems, and their electrical properties were relevant only in so far as cards had to he 
compatible with their associated readers. Today, multi-application cards arc 
considered to be desirahle, and these types of card, eventually, will have to be 
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capable of forming a matching pair (on a "one to one" hasis) with many diJTcrcnt 
terminals and l'l~aders. Th!! need lOr wide compatibility became apparent with the 
growth of the GSM mobik telephone network. The electrical properties defined in 
the European Telecommunication standardisation Institute (ETSI) GSM 11.11 
standard for the SIM card have become a model for semiconductor manufacturers 
and, in effect, have extended the conditions defined in standard ISO 7816~3 (Rank! 
& Effing, 1997). A list of ISO and other standards and specifications relevant to 
smart cards has been prepared by the Smart Card Forum and can be found at 
http://www.edtn.com/embapps/fancher~97-tl.htm. These and other standards are 
discussed in the chapter dealing with problems and difficulties (see chapter 4 section 
3). 
:- .3.3 Contact cards 
The integrated circuit chip on a contact smart card requires some input from the 
outside world and, generally, this inp.Jt is an electrical voltage to power the chip and 
a clock frequency to synchronise chip activiti~s. Another requirement is an 
input/output path for the transmission of data which, for the contact card, is created 
by direct connections established between card and reader. The integrated circuit on 
the chip is connected to a contact plate on the surface of the card and when the smart 
card is placed into a reader device, the card's contact plate is mated with connections 
in the reader to complete an electrical circuit. Clearly the contact plate must be in 
position as defined by standard ISO 7816-2. 
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2.3.4 Con tactless cards 
The contactlcss smart card dispense!-> with the contact plate on the surface of a smart 
card and instead uses some form of electronic coupling. Generally, contactlcss smart 
cards will be placed in close proximity to a reader and an inductive (tram;formcr) or 
capacitive coupling is used to transtCr energy and power the card. The clock may b.:;· 
intemally derived and data transferred by modulating the power supply. Standard 
ISO 10536, mentioned earlier, is a fairly loose standard since different n:tanufacturers 
use different methods, including either capacitive or inductive coupling, that arc 
incompatible with one another ("Smartcard technology", 1994). It is still too early to 
assess the effect of standard ISO 14443, the planned standard for "remote-coupled" 
contactless cards. 
2.3.5 Card population 
In 1996, about lOO million smart cards were estimated to be in use. (Note: The 
comparable figure for chip cards was well over 500 million, but most, for example 
phone cards, were merely memory cards and did not meet the definition of true smart 
cards given above). By 1998, the number issued could have been over a billion. 
Bauer of Siemens claims that Europe currently holds the lion's share of the world 
smart card market (50%); but, according to estimates by its Semiconductor Group. 
the US may account for 25 %of the market by 1999. By the year 2000 Southeast 
Asia and Japan are expected to reach a 25 % market share (Bauer & Hamman, 
1996). A table of forecasts is presented later, as Table 9, in chapter seven. 
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2.3.6 Card manufacture and system development 
s~vcral manufacturing industries h.:tvc an interest in the smart card market Firstly, 
chipmakers face challenges in making suitable chips; secondly, cardmakcrs have 
problems in integrating the chip and the card into a marketable product; and thirdly, 
a number of minor players arc working to develop supporting devices, such as 
readers. However, card issuers arc probably the stakeholders that are most important 
in detem1ining the general acceptance of smart cards. Banks and other financial 
institutions must decide whether or not to exploit smart card technology; but, even m; 
active participants, they may have difficulty in persuading users to accept their 
preferred products. Finance is a likely, but not the only possible, application field. 
For example, some authorities claim that by the end of the decade, about 50% of all 
smart cards will probably be used for transportation, either in contactless toll 
collection systems for expressways, or as combined entry and billing systems for 
public transit users, or as automobile entry systems, (Bauer & Hamman, 1996; 
Higgs, 1996). Discussion of the attitude of financial institutions and other potential 
issuers is deferred to the section dealing with commercial factors. 
2.3.7 Manufacturing process 
The process of manufacturing chips for smart cards is not greatly different from that 
used in manufacturing any other chip, except that special .security precautions must 
be obstrved. More specifically, the design of the chip usually includes features to 
frustrate rever~e engineering; all chips, both functional and faulty, must be accounted 
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for: and, the delivery process is similar to that used fnr bullion (Paterson, I 99 I, p. 
36). Manufacture involves using a series of masks to etch circuitry onto silicon 
wafers and, usually. one of these masks includes circuitry that hardwircs part of the 
opcmting system - a practice that leads to difficulties in standardisation which is 
discussed later (see section 4.3.4). There is no simple way to compare one card chip 
with another, as their description involves several parameters including power 
consumption, clock speed, memory size and types, geometric density, physical size, 
cost, robustness and security. 
2.3.8 Cost and cost estimation 
There are constraints on the technology that can be used in the manufacture of chips 
for smart cards, which are discussed later in section seven under the potential for 
improvement. New and cheaper methods of manufacture might affect the extent to 
which all concerned accept the cards, but the estimated cost of a card depends upon 
what economies of scale are anticipated, and what components are included in the 
estimate. The card is always part of a ht:~er system that includes at least a reader 
and supporting software (Noakes-Fry, 1994, p. 204). According to Svigals, the value 
of the card itself is likely to be between US$2 and US$25 (Svigais, 1994, p. 112). 
An alternative estimate, from Lam, is from A$5 to A$40 (Lam & Low-Shang, 1994, 
p. 8). Neither of these figures includes the cost of readers or other supporting 
devices. The variance among these dated references shows the uncertainty at the 
time and the hopes that mass production would reduce costs. More recent figures in 
section 4.4.3 show that the reduction has been :, ss than expected. Most J.uthors 
30 
claim that, like other electronic devices, the cost of smart cards will fall as a mass 
market develops, but others argue that it will not fall indefinitely because the 
demand for improved capabilities will outweigh the demand for lower prices 
(Haykin & Warner, 1988, p. 34). More detailed ligures arc given in the chapter four 
dealing with problems and difficulties. 
2.3.9 Present day cards 
To date almost all contact smart card applications use one of six chip families, 
• Motorola 6805, 
• Hitachi H8, 
• Siemens SLE44xx, 
• STMicroelectronics ST8 or STI6, 
• OK! 627xx or 
• Philips/Intel 8051. 
Baker, in 1992, wrote of 30 types of chip but it is not clear what he regarded as a 
type (Baker, 1992). In 1994, a smart card had an 8,bit microprocessor working at 
5MHz, and the memory available for all applications was seldom more than 8K. 
According to Zoreda, such limited capacity could be found in a PC 15 years earlier 
(Zoreda & Oton, 1994). Io those 15 years, 64 bit, !66MHz microproce,.ors had 
become available and user memory was expressed in megabytes, but for the smart 
card chip there had been little change. Today a contact smart card used in an 
application typically has: 
• a relatively slow 8-bit processor (5 to 14 MHz), 
o RAM 256 bytes, 
o ROM 8 to 20 Khytcs, and 
o EPROM or EEPROM 8 Kbytcs (Rank! & Effing, 1997, p. 49). 
Duffy claims cards with 128 kbytcs of RAM arc made hut it is not clear whether or 
not these are true smart cards (Duffy, 1994, p. 104). The chips used in contactlcss 
smart cards arc, in all likelihood, proprictury extensions of chips designed for contact 
cards. but, for commercial reasons, details arc seldom made public. 
2.3.10 Conclusion 
A reasonable conclusion from the foregoing is that whilst those smart cards now 
being used in applications have only limited memories and slow processors, more 
powerful cards are being developed by commercial concerns in secret and any 
investigation into their use should anticipate improvement. Some possibilities are 
set out in sectio.n seven of this chapter. 
2.4 Biometric Identification Technology 
2.4.1 Identification in general 
It can be argued that good security begins with accountability which,-_in mrn. 
depends on irrefutable, unfakeable identification. The argtimcnt, that unjustifiable 
identification is an invasion of privacy, is discussed later (sec chapter four section 
nine). A person is identified by something they: 
I 
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• have (a token), 
• know (a password or PIN), 
• arc (a biometric feature), or 
• can do (a .signature or keystroke pattern). 
(The term biometrics strictly related to the statisti<;al analysis of biologic~! 
phenomena and measurements, but has become widely accepted within the security 
profession to describe technologies used for personal identification (Shennan, 1992, 
p. 128)). A smart card can integrate two or three of these identifiers because it is a 
token and can respond to any of a password, a biometric feature, or some action. 
2.4.2 Identification and verification 
An identification system may be designed to establish an individual's identity by 
checking that his/her details are recorded in a database of many records, or merely 
verify that a claimed idenlity is correct. Identification systems are those in which it 
is necessary to prove either that the individual's details are in the database or that 
they are not. Both identification and verification can be illustrated diagrammatically. 
Identification is a much more demanding process than verification and either process 
might be necessary in vehicle management. For example, identification might be 
necessary to prove that an individual has a license (say at the time of a traffic 
violation) or has no license (say before issuing one) ("Best practice", 2000). 
Research to find improved methods of identification is being undertaken by 
authorities worldwide in law enforcement, health, welfare and other areas and the 
scope of the subject spreads beyond the focus of this thesis. As the main concern of 
this discussion is the case of a person seeking access to a vehide, the complexities of 
identificuti01l. have been left for others to investigate. Since i.IOY car is likely to have 
a limited number of drivers (a few dozen at the most), the vehicle-related 
upplications for identification would be the identification of a driver. or a 
driver/vehicle pair. Returning to the verification process, an owner or driver seeking 
the use of a vehicle, and presenting a ~mart card together with a pa<.;sword, token or 
biometric feature, merely requires that the item (of, in the la.'it ca<>e, the temtllate 
extracted from the feature) be verified as being identical, or acceptably similar, to 













































Figure I Validation and vcrilicution 
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2.4.3 Smart card identification 
Authorisation is the process or determining that an entity may do what it seeks to do. 
A smart card authorisation system can be considered to have two aspects: user 
authorisation and card authentication. Both identification and verification may form 
part of user authorisation and have been discussed in the previous paragraph; but 
card authentication involves authenticating the smart card to the tenninal. In the 
GSM cellular telephone system a symmetric challenge/response method is used 
because the reader is always on-line, but in off-line situations an asymmetric method 
is necessary. In the latter cases a challenge, provided by the terminal, is encrypted 
on the card using the issuer's private key and returned to the terminal, which 
decrypts it using the issuer's public key. In this way, at some cost in card computing 
resources, the terminal is assured that the card is a genuine issuer's card (Leach, J., 
1995). 
2.4.4 Biometric performance 
Well known biometric features of individuals are fingerprints, retinal patterns, voice 
patterns and back-of-hand vein patterns, but there are others. Biometric techniques 
promise the best standard of user authentication, since they depend on something the 
owner is, rather than something he/she carries (and can lose), or something he/she 
knows (and can disclo!'c). However, in the author's opinion, at least two weaknesses 
must be acknowledged, "comparison threshold>~ and 11tcmplate vulnerability'', 





Equul error or crossover point 
False rejects ~~---------
Threshold Lax 
f1gure 2: Receiver operating ~::urvcs 
2.4.5 Comparison threshold 
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The first weakness results because all the techniques involve a companson of 
presented and recorded features (commonly images) and the two can never be 
identical but only similar to a ~_;reater or lesser degree. The required degree of 
sirriilarity is known as the threshold. If a comparison detects a similarity better than 
the threshold it is termed a "hit". Occasionally a comparison will record a hit when 
it should not and fail to record a hit when it should: these results are termed false 
acceptances and false rejections respectively. If a graph is drawn with the values 
that could be chosen for the threshold along the abscissa and the proportion of false 
results as the ordinate, then receiver operating curves (ROC) can be plotted as in 
Figure 2. The need for an appropriate threshold is discussed in section 4. 7. I and the 
possibility of a variable threshold in section 7 .3.6. 
I 
2.4.6 Template vulnerability 
A second weakness in the promise of biometric techniques is that whilst "what we 
are" can be neither mislaid, nor stolen, and is difficult to counterfeit, the same cannot 
be said of a template (e.g., a bit string derived 'he-m an image of a human feature). 
The technique requires a scanner to be used to take un image of a biometric feature 
such as a fingerprint or back-of-hand vein pattern; and from this scan, it derives a 
template for storage on a smart card and, possibly, in a database of authorised 
templates. If the template was captured by a rogue terminal and written by a 
fraudster onto a counterfeit card, the counterfeit could then masquerade as a 
legitimate item, unless asymmetric card authentication is also used. 
2.4.7 Biometric features 
Of human identifying features, the fingerprint is the best known, whilst the 
voiceprint is the cheapest, and the retinal pattern the most expensive, to capture. 
There are a number of others including the "back-of-hand" vein pattern. These four 
features each represent a possibility for use in vehicle management, and are now 
considered in more detail. 
2.4.8 Fingerprint 
Fingerprints are usually processed in one of four 'Nays: specifically, 
• capturing the image optically and then converting it to digital form; 
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• capturing the image directly into digital form using capacitive sensing ("UniBO 
Finge1vrint Cap<Lcitivc Scn:-;or", 19f.J7); 
• sensing the heat differences between the ridges and valleys of a fingerprint and 
then c.:onvcrting the gradients to digital form: an approach being developed hy a 
French company, Thompson-CSF (May, 1998), 
• capturing the image optically and then processing it with an optical computer, 
without digital conversion. Il is claimed that, with thi~ method, the work is done 
using parallel processing and is fast ("Mytec Technologies: Technology", 1996, 
May 13). 
Following this processing, in most systems a template is derived. As yet none of the 
last three alternatives has an established track record in industry. Of the several 
human features that can be used in biometric identification, there is a wealth of 
experience only in fingerprint collection and use (Ruggles, 1998). Fingerprints are 
almost certainly unique to each individual, their capture is non-invasive, and a 
scanner could be designed to collect fingerprints without being exposed to either the 
weather or casual attack. The genetic process by which fingerprints arc generated is 
believed to be random, since, so far as is known, those of relations, even identical 
twins, are not similar. However, because of its association with crime, the technique 
may not be acceptable to the public (Millar, 1994). 
2.4.9 Voiceprint 
Another identifying feature is the voiceprint, which is commonly used because the 
captured pattern and the recorded template are more easily compared. However 
JH 
voiceprints are probably less reliable than the fingerprints, in that both the l~tlsc 
acceptance rate (FAR) and the false J·:~jcction rate (FRR) arc higher (Ruggles, /998). 
Furthermore, it may be difficult to mount a microphone inside a vehicle (out of tlw 
weather and vandal proof) and still be able to capture the voice pattern. 
2.4.10 Eye retina 
Retinal patterns are known to be unique, but the scanning and matching techniques 
are expensive, thought to be regarded by the public as invasive, and may provoke 
antagonism amongst people who are sensitive about their eyes (Miller, 1 994). 
2.4.11 Back of the hand 
The back of hand vein pattern has been investigated because it does not have the 
stigma of a fingerprint and because the image/template comparison may be a little 
simpler. A disadvantage is that vein patterns arc not so certainly unique as 
fingerprints (Mehnert, Cross & Smith, 1994) and require either a rather large scanner 
external to the vehicle, or a fist-sized hole in a panel. 
2.4.12 Comparison chart 
The chart in Figure 3 provides a simplified but visually convenient display of the 
relative merits and .shortcomings of the features mentioned above. Symhols for 
meritorious feafures are placed towards the periphery of the chart, but this 
:w 
positioning is only the author's current intt:rpret<Jtion of the descriptions provided in 
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Figure 3 Visual indication of biometric system merits 
2.4.13 Scanners 
An optical scanner may be used to capture the image of a biometric feature such as a 
face, back-of-hand vein pattern, or in one system, a fingerprint. At present, 
commercially available optical scanners use Charge Coupled Devices (CCDs) and 
occupy a volume between 250 and IOOOcc. Scanners arc expensive now but, 
according to Dan Maase, vice-president at ldentix, like other electronic devices, they 
can be expected to improve in performance and fall in size and cost {Abate, 1997). 
The optical types usually employ technology similar to that found in a digital camera 
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and can capture images in hoth the visual and the infrared pmtions of the c/cctro-
magnctic spcc.:trum. The aforcmclllioncd alternative fingcrprint scanner, hascd on 
capacitive sensing, although now being marketed in at least one model, is still being 
investigated; but it may have advantages in both size and cost (Abate, 1997). 
Generally, each of the biometric identifiers requires a different type of scanner. At 
present retinal scanners arc the most expensive and "back of hand" scanners the 
cheapest, whilst fingerprint scanners fall in between, ranging in price from US$100 
to US$1000 (Miller, 1994 ). 
2.4.14 Pattern recognition 
Having captured the image, its pattern must be recognised, a process defined as the 
identification of images by their shapes, forms, outlines or other attributes (Weik, 
1989). In biometric identification, two or more images may he compared, or a 
template extracted and compared to other stored templates, to detennine similarities 
or differences. The following sequence of steps may be required. 
1. Preprocessing which may include enhancement, segmentation, skeletonization 
and smoothing. Briefly, 
• enhancement seeks to remove noise, especially the background to the image, 
• segmentation, or thresholding, seeks to convert a grey scale image in which 
features have fuzzy edges to one in black and white (a binary image), 
• skeletonization, or thinning, is used to reduce all lines to a common width, 
since the pattern of an image rarely depends on the thickness of the lines with 
which it is drawn 
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• smoothing, usually directional smoothing, and/or fihcring is used to remove 
anomalies, or spikes, that may he introduced during skclctonization 
(Mehnert, Cross & Smith, 1994). 
2. Feature extraction which identifies significant items, or features and Ignores 
redundant data (Ratha, Chen and Jain, 1995). 
3. Image registration, which is concerned with variations. Inevitably images arc not 
captured at the same time, with a single sensor, from one viewpoint and, 
consequently, there are always variations which can be any of three types: 
• misalignment due to the acquisition method, 
• variations due to intensity or perspective, and 
• variations that are of interest. 
Image registration seeks to eliminate or identify the first two variations 
(Gotlesfeld-Brown, 1992, p. 325). 
4. The derivation and storage of a template or bit-string representation of the 
significant items of the image. 
In the process of biometric verification smart cards could have any of three roles. 
They could: 
• merely store and make available the template derived from the feature of the 
enrolled person, or 
• perform as above, but in addition, compare the stored template to the template of 
the supplied image which has been derived elsewhere, or 
• derive the template from the supplied ima·gc and compare it to the stored image. 
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Only the first role has been implcmcnlcd. In the author's opinion, the restriction to 
the first role is proh<lbly because the work of pattern recognition and comparison is 
computationally intenSive and, as yet, beyond the processing capal?ility of any smart 
card used in a major application. 
2.4.15 Conclusion 
From both management and usage viewpoints there is a need to verify drivers' 
identities and authenticate them to the vehicle they drive. Fleet managers and traffic 
authorities need to know beyond dhpute who is driving a vehicle at critical 
moments, whilst the average owner will wish to deny others access to what is his/her 
second most valuable asset (after a house). The possible further need for authorities 
to validate applicants for licenses and, perhaps, identify drivers suspected of 
offences, requires more demanding processing but, even so, biometric identification 
might be used in this area. Whilst biometric technology promises an eventual high 
standard of identification, as yet it has weaknesses and requires unacceptably 
subs-,tantial computational resources. If, eventually, these drawbacks are overcome, 
fin:gerprints are likely to be the chosen feature. However, as a technology, it may 
al~ays be suspect because of the miniscule, but undeniable, uncertainty of 
comparisons and, paradoxically, the more nearly infallible it becomes the more 
vocife.rous will be the protests of those who believe identification to be an invasion 
of privacy. Until, if ever, public opinion matures to the point where identification is 
accepted and widely used, cost and unfamiliarity are likely to render biometric 
methods unpopular, even in what is merely a niche application. 
2.5 Transponders and access tokens 
2.5.1 Description 
An alternative to identifying people by personal features is to cqu1p tlicm with 
transponders (small versions are called tags) as access tokens. The difficulty of 
using biometric features to identify individuals, and the present cost of scanners 
could be by-passed by equipping authorised individuals with one of these devices, 
which would respond to a radio frequency challenges from within the vehicle with a 
unique bit-string signal in order to authorise access. The possibility of identification 
in this way might be facilitated if the Bluetooth communication specification wao;; 
widely adopted ("Short description", Nov 2000). (Note: A contaclless smart card 
can be thought of as a sophisticated transponder, since current versions are capable 
of on-card processing before responding with a signal.) Although a transponder 
could be counterfeited, or the owner could lose it, or be robbed of it, modern tags are 
small and could, for example, be incorporated into something, such as a watchstrap. 
that rarely leaves the owner's body. Furthermore, after gaining access to the vehicle 
using the tag, the driver could be required to enter a PIN at a keypad. A thief who 
either stole the tag, or simply forced entry to the vehicle, would still have to 
overcome the need to supply the PIN before moving off. A secondary advantage is 
that transponders located in the vehicle can be used as tracking beacons as well as 
for identification. Owners of valuable animals, such as stud animals, sometimes 
improve their protection against theft and the probability of recovery, hy attaching a 
transponder to the creature: oflen by inserting a tag under the skin. Heavy haul.:lgc 
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carriers, both rail and road types, abo usc these devices to keep trm.:k of containers 
and wagnns: then:forc, as the transceivers that communicate with the transponders 
become more common, it is possible that filling them to vehicles will increase the 
chance of recovering those stolen. 
2.5.2 Vehicle tracking application 
A paper presented to a colloquium on vehicle security in Britain in 1993 proposed a 
system based on this idea of tracking beacons and Geason describes a similar 
system, the Massachusetts Lojack System (Geason & Wilson, 1990, p. 32). The 
Lojack system appears to be a commercial success because, despite the obvious 
drawback of its high cost, now (admittedly almost ten years after its first launch) it is 
used in 12 US states, in Moscow and in South Africa - all high-risk areas for car 
theft. A less widely known system, QuikTrak, briefly described in section 3.5.6, is 
marketert in Australia, but has not achieved general popularity. However, Home!, 
apparently considering car theft from a social rather than technical point of view, 
quotes Clarke and Harris ( 1992) as considering tracking devices may merely change 
the target, but do not significantly deter thieves (Hamel, 1994 ). 
2.5.3 Disadvantages 
,. 
The social aspects will not be considered here, but technical drawbacks in usinu 
' 0 
transponders, either as tracking beacons or as access tokens. must be acknowledged. 
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• The response of a transponder can 1arely be detected through metal, a factor 
which limits the possible loc<.~tions for this type of beacon in a vehicle.:. 
• A reasonably competent technician with the necessary equipment could easily 
scan an item for any affixed transponders. 
• To be effective and justify police effort, a high proportion of vehicle owners 
would have to participate, and probably neither they nor the insurance companies 
would be prepared to meet the cost. 
The possibility of facilitating tracking using smart cards is discussed in section 3.5.6. 
2.5.4 A different system 
A somewhat different access token system, named Vehicle Anti-theft System 
(VATS), developed by General Motors used a small resistor pellet embedded in the 
ignition key. The pellet had a specific electrical resistance, like an electrical code. 
Installed elsewhere, in a hidden and inaccessible part of the vehicle, was a decoder 
with a complementary resistance. When the key was turned in the ignition lock the 
car would start only if the decoder's resistance and the key's resistance matched 
(Biles & Willing, 1987, p. 50). Nevertheless, the system docs not seem to have been 
widely used. 
2.6 Passwords and PINs 
Passwords, of which PINs are a sub-set, are an ancient technique for identification, 
and their drawbacks arc well known (Lynch, 1998). If the same password is used by 
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more than one person and is discloscJ, responsibility for its disclosure is difficull to 
determine. Another problem is that if passwords arc changed frequently, 
memorising the correct password can be a chore, so, to relieve the strain on memory, 
thc passwords arc too often written down. Obviously the practice of recording a 
script copy seriously degrades the protection they afford: therefore, to make recall 
easier, authorised persons arc sometime(; permitted to choose their own passwords. 
Sadly, studies have shown that password guessing is more likely to succeed when 
holders are allowed to choose (Fak, 1991). 
2.7 Potential for Improved Smart cards 
2.7.1 Design constraints 
The engine of any smart card is its chip; therefore the potential enhancement of the 
card is heavily dependent upon chip improvement, which in turn is constrained 
because the card's chip requires unique features that militate against the use of some 
leading edge chip technology. 
• Probably most importantly, to reach a mass market, chips must be cheap, which 
requires high volume production, and this precludes some of the more exquisite 
manufacturing techniques (Fancher, 1997). 
• Furthermore, in many applications, smart card chips must be reliable and, hence, 
tend to exploit only proven technology (Rankl & Effing, 1997). 
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• In addition to hcing cheap and reliable, the chip must hl! small enough so that the 
card may llcx norm:.lily, he thinner than the card and no higgcr (and preferably 
smaller) than 5mm by 5mm (Danids, 1995). 
• The chips may not draw much power, because of the problem of disposing of the 
resulting heat, and must work even when dirty (Owen, 1995). 
• Generally, financial institutions consider that the chip component should be a 
single chip. or separate unconnected chips. and not a cooperating multiple, 
because multiple chips would need connections that would be vulnerable to 
hacking and to damage through card flexure (Paterson, 1991; Owen, 1995). 
• Since it has power only when in or near a reader, the chip data memory must be 
non-volatile. be capable of being rewritten many thousands of times, and be 
readable for sr.veral years. 
• Finally, a smart card chip must be extremely resistant to any attack on its 
security, must be virtually impossible to counterfeit and, like a patriotic spy with 
a cyanide capsule, must self-destruct rather than divulge its secrets. Although 
smart card chips approach this security ideal, it is likely that, given .suflicient 
resources (well into the millions of dollars) and world-level expertise, they could 
be "cracked" (Anderson & Kuhn, 1996). 
In short, the makers of .smart card chips are faced with a challenging requirement. 
2.7.2 Leading manufacturers and products 
Technical detail about the chips used in smart cards is seldom released to the puhlic. 
However, in 1997 each of four m:.~or manufacturers gave some information about a 
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chip incorporating a cryptographic: co-prm:cssor, and each claimed their product was 
the most s~1itablc for smarl card installation. The incorporated crypto-controllcr 
circuitry act:dcratcs public key encryption, and is a hardwired part of the ROM; a 
feature that suggests financial institutions were the target market. The available 
information is set out below and summarised in Table I. 
• In March, Motorola published details of a new chip, claiming it to be the fastest 
of its kind ("Motorola", 1997). The RAM and ROM of this crypto chip arc 
greater than that of most card chips, but the EEPROM is only half that of some 
others. 
• Hit.achi, also in March, announced the "launch" of a 16/8-bit card chip, the 
HS/3109, a version of the H8 family specifically customised for Mondex cards. 
(Mondex, owned and sponsored by MasterCard, is a major potential electronic 
purse card issuer). The meaning of the term 16/8 was not explained by Hitachi, 
but possibly indicates that processing, and data transfer and storage, employ 
different word sizes, one being 8-bit and the other 16-bit. Hitachi does not list a 
sheet for the HS/3109 amongst the data sheets that are published on its web site. 
• In August, Siemens promulgated some information about a chip designed for 
smart cards, the SLE 44CR80S, which was also, promoted as a high-security 
chip and, therefore, presumably intended for financial sector applications. The 
statement particularly stressed the chip's small size, given as 15mm 2 
(Hochholzer, 1997). 
• In October, 1997, at Cartes '97, Philips, a smaller manufacturer, introduced the 
MIFARE.PRO a dual interface card chip family, based on the long established 
Intel 8051 chip. The chip can be accessed both remotely, and through contacts, 
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but, at present, uses symmetric encryption. Philips says that, eventually, the chip 
will be the more powerful "cornbi" SmartXA, discussed shortly, and will 
incorporate a FAMEX crypto·coproccssor enabling asymmetric encryption 
(MIFARE.PRO", I 997). 
None of the announcements gave the clock speed, which is likely to be the normal 
5MHz used in chip cards. MasterCard selected the Hitachi chip for its Mondcx 
electronic purse and Visa the Motorola and Siemens designs for its Visa-Cash 
alternative. As yet neither purse scheme has a major application. Although the 
MIFARE.PRO chip is at present being touted as most suitable for public transport 
ticketing, the promised crypto-coprocessor suggests that Philips has an eye on the 
potential market for a financial application. Apparently, the major chipmakers 
believe that an enhanced crypto·chip with limited RAM and large ROM is what the 
financial market requires, but so far, the institutions themselves have established 
only pilot schemes. However, multiple applications require large EEPROM or other 
rewritable memory. 
Table I. Prominent smart card chips 
Manufacturer Product No RAM ROM EEPROM Bits 
(bytes) (kilobytes) (kilobytes) 
Motorola M68HC05SC49A 896 20 4 8 
Hitachi HS/3109 256 14 8 1618 
Siemens SLE44CR80S 256 17 R 8 
Philips MIFARE.PRO 256 20 8 8 * 
with sacs 1 dual 
interface 
*Eventually MIFARE.PRO ts to have the 16-btt SmartXA chtp. 
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2.7.3 Busic or "no frills" designs. 
If a less sophisticated chip wns acccpt.'Lhle, it might be possible to reduce card costs. 
Probably with that in mind, French researchers have designed a smart card chip for 
limited payment systems (SCALPS). The researchers merged the processor and 
coprocessor on a small chip dedicated to public-key cryptography, added parts 
needed to obtain a low-cost smart card and claim to have drastically reduced 
complexity without affecting the chip's usefulness (Dhem, Veithen & Quisquater, 
1996). Toshiba also claims to have a "no~frills" chip and estimates that prices will 
drop below 200 yen, or US$2.00, per card with the introduction of its CZ-3018 card. 
Toshiba says the new card has a chip with an 8-bit CPU, 6K of ROM and 128 bytes 
of RAM, supports enhanced data security and meets both the standard ISO/IEC 7816 
and EMV standards. The lower costs are primarily achieved by downsizing the 
memory capacity ("Toshiba introduces", 1996). So far there arc no reports of 
commercial organisations seeking to exploit either the French or the Japanese, 
proposal. 
2. 7.4 A "de-luxe" design 
It may be technically feasible to increase both the speed and the memory of smart 
card chips. The European Chip Architecture for SmartCArds and secure por1:1ble 
DEvices (CASCADE) project, part of the European Strategy for Promotion of 
Research in Information Technology (ESPRIT) Open Microprocessor Initiative 
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(OMI) initiative, seeks to develop a Reduced Instruction Set Computing (RJSC) chip 
with a 32-bit architecture, 32K of non-volatile memory and a clock speed of 20M Hz. 
The project was launched in 1993 as a cooperative effort hctwccn French companies 
(Gcmplus and Dassault), British companies (Advanced RJSC Machines (ARM) and 
Domain Dynamics) and a number of universities. The stated aims of the project 
were to achieve: 
• more programmability for shOrter time-to-market and greater versatility, 
• better configurability with multiple applications at the user's will, 
• an ability to handle the unscrambling of real-time audio-visual data of consumer 
entertainment applications, and the 
• ability to support enhanced human-card interfaces such as voice control (Peyret, 
P., 1994). 
More technically, the designers claim: 
• non-volatile memory life of lO years, 
• clock speed of 20MHz, 
• more memory in "flash" technology, 
• a 32-bit word, 
• a lower power requirement ( 1.8V), and 
• RISC technology. 
In a March 1997 press release, Gemplus said that Texas Instruments would be 
manufacturing the chip in 1998 ("Cascade a new chip", 1997). However, there are 
still no reports of any commercial application and Motorola, one of the dominant 
chip manufacturers of smart card chips, spent large sums to up-grade its facilities for 
producing the usual 8-bit chips ("Motorola, 1997). (Note: In May 1999, Atmel 
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purchased the Motorola Smart Information Transfer (SIT) division that manufactures 
tht.:: M68HCSOSC49A.) A reasonable conclusion i."i that although a more powerful 
smart card chip may be technically feasible, commcrciul factors arc likely to delay its 
introduction for some time yet. 
2.7.5 Contactless card potential 
Contactless smart cards, unlike contact versions, will probably find their mam 
market in rapid access, rather than financial, applications. Therefore, in addition to 
memory size, significant parameters are reading distance and data transfer rate, but 
security may be relatively less important. 
2.7.6 Memory size 
A limitation of the devices is that they necessarily have smaller memories than 
contact versions, due to the need to provide space on the silicon for additional 
circuitry such as coils, capacitors and charge pumps, but the situation might 
improve. Motorola, in a joint venture with Matsushita, is developing a new 
contactless card memory called YI (Fox, 1995, p. 22). YI is one of the perovskites 
(strontium bismuth tantalate) a material similar to some used in high temperature 
super-conductors. A chip using Y 1 might have a rewritable memory up to I 00 times 
greater than one using standard silicon dioxide, and a life with a greatly extended 
number of rewrite cycles (Johnstone, 1998, p. 38). The technology is also known as 
ferroelectric memory or FRAM. 
2.7.7 Reading distance 
Another contactlcss card problem is uncertainty about the maximum rca~ing 
distance, as can be seen from the following estimates. Although the range may seem 
to be increasing this may not necessarily be true as the different distances arc 
achieved with different technologies and frequencies. 
• 3mm -!Omm ("Smart Card Technology", 1994) 
• !Ocm (Duffy, 1996), 
• metre (Owen, R., 1995). 
• metres (Johnstone, 1998). 
A different author, Rank!, gives the following distances: 
• capacitive coupling lmm, 
• inductive coupling -reading I metre, 
• -writing I Ocm (Rank! & Effing, 1997). 
The cards used by ERG in the HongKong ticketing projeCt, described in section 
2.7 .9, use inductive coupling. An advantage of "close-coupled" cards is that they are 
subject to less wear than contact cards and the reader is less vulnerable to vandalism 
but the need for near contact would probably mean that they have no application in 
public transport ticketing. 
2.7.8 Data transfer rates 
The high frequencies used mean that high data transfer rates can be achieved and can 
vruy over the entire range (9.6 to 76.8 Kbaud) specified for contact cards by. ISO 
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7816. Proximily cards usc higher frcquuncics (13.56MHz) than vicinity cards 
(125KHz} and, data transfer rates, therefore, vt~ry from over 100 Kbytcs/scc to about 
ten. Both pcrtOnnnnccs lie within the range specified by standard ISO 14443. Two 
specific estimates of the contactlc.<.;S card data transfer rates follow. 
o 19.2 Kbytes/ sec (Owen, R., 1995) and 
o 106 Kbytes/scc (Duffy, 1996). 
As can be seen, the information is dated and the current situation is probably rather 
better._-- A data transfer rate of lOOKbytes/sec results in a ticketing process of about a 
tenth of a second. 
2.7.9 Dual chip cards . 
. In HongKong, Gemplus has devised a dual-chip card. The technology provided by 
Gemplus incorporates the latest technology in smart card usage, and the application 
is a result of a joint effort by Cit'~ University and Hang Seng Bank. Technically, the 
card is fabricated with both cont'·(\ctless and contact chips, with the contactless chip 
\\ 
supporting the access applications and the contact chip supporting the store(\-value 
function ("Banks launch", 1997). Apparently the two chips are not connected, thus 
maintaining security at the cost of some foregone flexibility in application design. 
2.7.10 Combi!Dual Interface cards 
Many contactless card applications, usually in transportation, use a dual interface 
card in which the microprocessor can be accessed either through contact or remotely. 
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Software usually conforms to the MIFARE architectural platform developed by 
Philips and the chip is often an Intel 8051, produced hy Philips, pres~mai?IY under 
licence. The arrangement results in u rather power hungry device with relatively 
short-runge access. Since 1998, Philips has been advertising a SmartXA 16-bit chip 
with 4k RAM, up to 32k ROM and up to 32k EEPROM. The chip has a crypto co-
processor and Philips claim it can handle asymmetric encryption with up to 2048-bit 
keys. Security is said to be maintained through the use of hardwired firewalls 
(Mifare News, 1997-10-01). 
2.7.11 Other potential advances 
Other potential smart card hardware advances may be achieved. Possibilities are: 
• improved geometric density, 
• more powerful coprocessors, 
• improved plqstic card manufacture, 
• improved chip embedding, 
" new memory storage materials. 
The last three possibilities deserve rather more detail. Currently the plastic used in 
card manufacture is either Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene (ABS) or Polyvinyl 
Chloride (PVC). ABS, which involves injection moulding, is more durable and 
cheaper for small production runs, but cannot have a magnetic stripe added. PVC, 
which is laminated, is cheaper for large quantities and is easier to emboss but has a 
shorter lifespan, less resistance to extremes of temperature and presents a hazard for 
the environment. Printing on ABS has made progress in the last few years, which is 
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an imporlant consideration becat.~sc it is hoped that advertising will pay for the cards 
(Bcnhammou, 1997). Other matCdals have been tried but so far have proved too 
\ 
costly. There arc now proposals to cmb:d the chip with a metal lead frame around it 
to protect it from llcxure of the card (Bcnht~mmou, 1997), and use new yttrium and 
ferroelectric materials mentioned earlier. 
2.7.12 More compact rewritable memory 
Initially, because space on a smart card chip is critical and ROM requires only one 
quarter of the space required by EEPROM, most card operating systems were 
created using a ROM mask, one of the chips manufacturing masks. The opera~ing 
systems were thus hardwired (see section 4.3.4) and usually optimised for a specitic 
application or applications; a technique that resulted in a robust, secure system, but 
made the use of the one card for various applications, let alone the creation of a 
multi-application card, very difficult, if not impossible. The space constraint still 
applies, but there is now a tendency to store part of the system code in EEPROM. 
Hopefully the use of non-volatile, rewritable memory- may lead to a successfu! 
multi-application card (see section 7.3.4). 
2.8 Conclusions 
As already noted, at present smart cards have limited memories and slow processors, 
but eventually a design that is capable of the authenticmion, stored-value functions 
and portable record keeping that is required for vehicle management, will be 
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devised. However, a discussion of whether and how such a card might capture the 
.necessary mass market, and a detailed :tnalysis to determine what capacity and 
performance must be achieved, is deferred until chapters five and six. The best 
idcntiticmion concept amongst the new technologies may he the combination of 
smart cards with biometrics, but although improved smart cards will probably 
continue to be designed and manufactured, whether any biometric method of 
identification will achieve a universally acceptable standard of performance is less 
certain. Nevertheless, at present, a smart card system seems to be the most 
promising possibility for personalising an equipment or device to a specific user 
(Noakes-Fry, 1994, p. 202). In particular, if the system could capture the template of 
a user's identifying feature to a smart card during an enrolment process and compare 
it with a supplied template derived from a scanned image, then, if the two templates 
match, positive identification would have been achieved. Alternatively the user 
might be required to supply a PIN which the smart card could compare to a 
previously stored item and then, given a match, send a code to a decoder that would 
then, and only then, activate the equipment or device. TherefOre, referring back to 
the major applications of a smart card as reported by the New Zealand Futures Trust, 
(Butler, 1996) identification followed by coded activation promises to provide the 
personalised, extendible authentication that is required, whilst there are no apparent 
technical impediments to eventually storing value and maintaining necessary vehicle 
management records. 
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3 SMART CARDS & VEHICLE MANAGEMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter one identifies the components of vehicle management as traffic 
management, usage control, maintenance and security, and chapter two considers the 
current state and the potential for improvement, of smart cards, biometrics and other 
relevant technologies. Continuing to employ the sequence introduced in chapter 
one, the present chapter examines how the aforementioned technologies might be 
applied to improve management of each of the listed components, and mentions the 
additional driver convenience that might be achieved as a by-product. The approach 
involves dealing with each identified aspect in tum, but traffic management and 
vehicle security deserve the most attention because. as will be seen, in both cases 
controversial matters must be addressed. The controversies arise because the four 
main groups concerned with vehicle management (authorities, fleet owners, owner-
drivers and drivers) do nL't have completely identical interests and are unlikely all to 
favour the same management solution. Therefore, an attempt is made to take a 
balanced view and, when considering how the technologies might be applied to the 
management problem, to identify advantages that might be attractive to each group. 
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3.2 Traffic Management 
3.2.1 General 
As defined in section 1.2.1, traffic management involves observing and influencing 
the behaviour of motorists (an activity in which identification is usually essential) 
and rapidly recording \!vents (a task suggesting a degree of automation). Smart cards 
could facilitate several parts of this process: in particular, 
• monitoring behaviour, 
• obtaining the facts relating to accidents and other incidents, and 
• collecting fees, charges and penalties. 
These points and a few subsidiaf1J matters are now considered 
3.2.2 Behaviour monitoring 
One day, if the mounting road death toll or the selfish and irresponsible behaviour of 
a few motorists becomes unacceptable to the electorate, control of road traffic might 
approach the tight regulation imposed on air traffic. Whilst control is unlikely to 
reach the point where drivers must file the equivalent of a flight plan before 
commencing a journey, it is not inconceivable, in urban areas, thut vehicles be fitted 
with the equivalent of an identifying beacon and be subject to individual or group 
direction regarding speeds, diversions and "special charge" or exclusion zones. The 
technology is already used on buses in Brisbane. If smart card systems ever became 
normal in vehicles, the authorities responsible for monitoring and enforcing traffic, 
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pollution, and congestion regulations, could make usc of them. The card could be 
part of a basic system, analogous to aircraft radar logging and cockpit voice 
recording, and ~:ould provide a simple "black box". Similar technology to that used 
for road pricing could be used to interrogate vehicles as to the driver's licence details 
and :-;peed - but motorists might not be enthusiastic. 
On a less fmuristic note, even if remote interrogation facilities were not available, a 
traffic officer equipped with a suitable reader could obtain at electronic speeds those 
details that, at present, are laboriously recorded with a ball-point pen. The concept 
of a smart card drivers' license is not new. A Swedish invention, the "kittelock", 
alr~ady implements it and has been recommended for an ESPRIT award, (Stott, R., 
1995). In Austria, in another application of the concept, a multiple application card 
issued by Kapsch, an Austrian telecommunication company, stores details of the 
motorist's license and insurance cover, and acts as a token to unlock the doors 
(Duffy, 1996), Finally, in the USA, the National Committee for Information 
Technology Standards (NCITS), formerly the ANSI, has produced a draft standard 
for a smart card driver's licence, but, so far, there seem to have been no 
implementations ("Driver's license", 1999). 
Given an on-board smart card system, the automatic identification of both vehicles 
and drivers would be possible, and data that were collected automatically could be 
analysed in real-time to determine traffic conditions at selected times and places. 
Extensions to the system might be possible: e.g., if the smart card incorporated an 
electronic purse application, a fee could be extracted from any vehicle entering a 
designated congest;on control area. Furthermore, if the card was mounted in a 
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transceiver, it is even possible that, in rcciprm:al conununications, drivers could be 
advised of traffic conditions ahead of their presumed route, and diversions 
recommended. Harrop lists a number of trials and initiatives of this nature 
undertaken in the US, Europe and Japan (Harrop, P., 1993, pp.II0-112). 
3.2.3 Black box 
Ascertaining the facts concerning actions prior to, and at the time of, an accident can 
often be difficult. Wigan, quoting "IVHS America (1994) IYHS Crash data needs" 
(a report of the Intelligent Vehicle Highway System (IVHS) America project), 
writes, 
"An onboard 'black box' recorder would be an invaluable legal and 
enforcement resource. If such systems are designed to record even the last 
100 seconds before a collision, then identification and privacy issues can 
arise. If such systems are designed to record continuously and especially if 
they were to transmit data for central storage and analysis, then a substantial 
surveillance pattern emerges.'' (Wigan, M., 1994). 
That may be so, but the 'black box' might also allow blameless drivers to prove their 
innocence. 
3.2.4 Road fee collection 
Smart cards could be part of a more general, automatic, "road fcc" collecting system. 
An experiment by the Transport Operations Research Group of the University of 
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Newcastle on Tync, in Automatic Debiting and Electronic Payment for Transport 
(ADEPT), has developed a new generation of road-usc pricing. The experimental 
technology incorporated an 'intelligent' communications transponder and smart card 
in the vehicle for automatic non-stop payment (Blythe, Burdon, Clark, Givens & 
Rourke. 1994). Results of an ADEPT experiment at Cambridge arc claimed to have 
proved that road pricing is technically feasible, although some problems remain, 
mainly relating to "multi-lane enforcement, the performance and security of smart 
cards and the operational issues surrounding integrated payment" (Dlythc, Clark & 
Rourke. 1994, p.45). However, other authors are less optimistic: for example, 
Harrop writes, "These and other challenges will provide a recession-proof source of 
employment for the talents of many electronics engineers for years lO come." 
(Harrop. P., 1994). Furthermore, Clark states, "What is certain is that it is a debate 
w~ will hear more of over the next few years." (Clark, J., 1994). Four years later. in 
September 1998, under the special conditions that apply on the small island state of 
Singapore, an electronic road pricing (ERP) system was installed on three highways 
and at entries to the central business district ("More about ERP", 2000). It replaced 
an Area Licensing Scheme (ALS) covering the central business district and a Road 
Pricing Scheme (RPS) implemented on the island's three main expressways: both 
schemes were manual and had been found to be cumbersome, labour-intensive and 
inflexible. The ERP uses a smart card installed in a special in-vehicle unit that 
communicates with toll stations by radio and incorporates an electronic purse issued 
by NETS, a consortium of Singapore banks. Worldwide. Certified Wide Area Road 
Use Monitoring (CWARUM), a more far-reaching and futuristic scheme, is under 
discussion (Malik, 1998). Clearly, road pricing is under consideration by many 
63 
national and regional governments, but a more detailed examination of how smart 
cards might be used to facilitate it, is left for future study. 
3.2.5 Parking fee collection 
The use of electronic purse smart cards as a way to pay parking fees has the usual 
advantages of cashless payment; in particular, avoiding the threat of vandalism of, 
and theft from, coin meters. In addition, purse use could enable authorities to 
accumulate statistics that would be of value in planning; however, two major 
prerequisites are: 
• the widespread adoption of card purses, and 
• standardisation (preferably international} of the technology for parking fee 
collection. 
Trials using both contact and contactless cards have proved the technical feasibility 
of the proposal (Luk, J.Y.K .. 1995) 
3.2.6 Pollution and congestion control 
Civic authorities are becoming increasingly concerned about pollution in urban, and 
especially central business district, areas. Pollution from wood or coal fires is more 
obvious, but the carbon monoxide and nitrous oxides from poorly tuned vehicles are 
more toxic (Ponneah, 1998). Sensors to determine the lambda, or air/fuel ratio, are 
already fitted to modem vehicles (Hillier, V.A.W., 1988), and their readings might 
be recorded on an "inMvehicle" smart card. At present. there is no external 
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monitoring of sensor readings, but, given a smart card system that was politically 
;.u;ccptable to the electorate, authorities could interrogate vehicles remotely and 
ascertain the recorded toxicity level in the same way as licence and registration 
munbcrs might be obtained (sec diagrams 3 and 4). 
3.2.7 Vehicle related purchases 
Automated payment for many purposes might be unpopular but could also have 
desirable aspects for the motorist. Automatic electronic fuel vending systems are 
already installed at the depots of some. major closed fleets (Arazi, 199 I, p. 648), and 
one can speculate that automated car washing is likely to follow. As mentioned in 
chapter one, about one in 10 vehicles is a fleet vehicle and, although no data has 
been collected, it is not inconceivable that, collectively, they could travel as much as 
half of all road miles travelled. Currently, petrol stations have the capability to 
record data for fleet owners and are increasingly under pressure to accept payment 
by both credit and debit cards; a method of payment that requires expensive, on-line 
authentication of many different cards, for what are usually relatively small, low-
margin sales. A smart card incorporating an electronic purse provides an attractive 
option from the point of view of the retailer (Dick, D., 1995). Perhaps. one day, the 
driver will be able to open lhe fuel tank filler from within the vehicle, pay either with 
a contactless card or by placing a contact card in an adjacent reader, and have the 
tank filled by a robot arm ("Robot", 1997). 
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3.3 Usage Control 
3.3.1 Journey records and vehicle handling 
Usage control is more likely to be favoured by owners than by authorities and 
drivers. Fleet vehicle drivers are customarily required to keep a record of their 
journeys, and, by recording the odometer reading and time of each start, a smart card 
supported vehicle Jogger would facilitate the chore; particularly if, by way of a 
keypad, a code number could be entered simultaneously to indicate the trip's 
purpose. The maximum deceleration (indicating an emergency) or maximum speed 
between vehicle activations could also be recorded and, since the smart card would 
probably be personalised, there would seldom be uncertainty about who was .. t1e 
driver. These features might bring a significant improvement in recording of fleet 
vehicle usage, because, although they have been on the market for some years, 
automatic vehicle Joggers have been too expensive for most applications. Basic 
versions, with limited recording capability, start at about A$750; more 
comprehensive, but still limited, versions cost A$1500 or more; very expensive 
loggers can record vehicle handling techniques such as gear changing or driver 
alertness; and, no known version accepts input from the driver. Nevertheless, whilst 
fleet managers might welcome a cheaper alternative, employed drivers might resist 
their introduction (Wigan, M., 1994). Owner~drivers might accept the envisaged 
systems if they were not too expensive and privacy was maintained, but it is arguable 
that little would be gained by their use. The reaction of a small sample of fleet 
managers is discussed in section 7.8 
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3.4 Maintenance 
If vehicles had suitable intcwctive readers, service mechanics could record the 
completion of maintenance activities, such as oil or tyrc changes, on a vehicle's 
smart cm·d, and the card could then be programmed to display in-vehicle reminders 
when servicing was due. Drivers could also use a card system to record faults or 
suspicious symptoms as they were observed; thus, to some extent, relieving 
themselves of the need to make a report at the end of the journey. In section 1.2.3 
the possibility has already been mentioned that, in vehicles fitted with OBD, faults 
that are diagnosed automatically could be recorded automatically on an installed 
smart card. With automatic fault recording, the validity of claims for repair under 
warranty might be more easily established, leading to reductions in fraudulent claims 
and extension of warranty periods. 
3.5 Vehicle Security 
3.5.1 General 
Security is the aspect of vehicle management likely to be of most interest to owner-
drivers, because vehicle theft is common in modem society, but, as mentioned in 
section 1.2.4, a discussion of vehicle theft has been relegated to Appendix 3. There 
seems to be a consensus amongst criminologists that approaches to deterrence 
focusing upon detection, arrest and conviction arc unlikely to be effective (Hamel, 
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1994). Instead, the manufacture of more secure vchicl_cs und other target hardening 
strategies arc advocated (Clark & Harris, 1992). Accordingly, after a brief mention 
of standards, which list a number of security precautions, those precautions will 
each, in turn, be outlined: an approach which should not be taken as an indication 
that the criminologists' view is accepted unrcscrv!!dly. On the contrary, since the 
cost of target hardening eventually falls upon the owner, as a required sf:btcgy it can 
be castigated as "punishing the victim". Here, however, only the technical a<;pccts of 
security are addressed. 
3.5.2 Standards 
A British standard, BS AU 209, describes a range of vehicle security precautions. 
These include: 
• vehicle perimeter security (i.e., door, boot and bonnet locks), 
• alarms on disturbance or breach of the perimeter, 
• immobilisation (i.e., steering and ignition locks), and 
• aid in the recovery of stolen vehicles (i.e., vehicle identification and vehicle 
tracking). 
A recent Australian standard, 3749 Part 2, covers the performance and installation of 
alarms/immobilisers. 
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3.5.3 Perimeter security 
Better locks may i,mprovc perimeter security, but any normal window glass may be 
broken and, therefore, although contactlcss smart cards might enable more 
convenient access through the vehicle perimeter than keys, they do not greatly 
improve resistance to a crude attack, followed by pilfering. 
3.5.4 Alarms and immobilisers 
Authorities differ about the usefulness of alarms which, in the literature, are often 
grouPed with immobilisers as a single device. Generally, immobilisers merely 
require the user to present the correct token. Bovelander has drawn attention to 
Kerckhoffs principle, that security should rely only on the key (not the algorithm) 
anq to the shortcomings of "security by obscurity" as it is sometimes called 
(Bovelander & Van Renesse, 1995). Unfortunately, most immobiliser vendors do 
not accept the Kerckhoff principle and are loath to disclose how their devices work. 
Naturally, their attitude gives rise to misgivings about immobiliser effectiveness 
against attack by professional thieves. 
The British Insurance Industry Vehicle Security Scheme (BIIVSS), out of a total of 
964 points allotted for various security features that could be fitted to a vehicle, 
awards 650 for a properly installed, approved alarm/immobiliser system (Ashley, 
1993). At about the same time another British organisation, Partners Against Car 
Theft (PACT), carried out tests that purported to prove that alarms were ineffective 
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(Adams, 1993). Livermore, commenting on immobiliscrs, says defeat by thieves 
with expert knowledge is certain for "after markcl'' devices, because these electronic 
immobiliscrs can all be de-installed (Livermore, 1993). He docs not elaborate on 
this rather surprising statement and most cng!nccrs would probably contend that 
there arc many engineering processes that arc reversible only with great difficulty. 
Apparently the Western Australian Government concurs with BIJVSS and PACT, 
because, in 1996, it agreed to pay an A$30 subsidy to support the installation of an 
immobi!iser, whilst alarms did not attract the subsidy ("Coalition's", 1996). Since 
the cost of an alann/immobiliser that met the Australian Standard 3793 lay between 
A$300 and A$600 and an immobiliser alone between A$130 and A$200, the subsidy 
seemed unlikely to alter significantly the public perception of the cost~effectiveness 
of the devices. By the end of 1997 the W A Government had actually spent only a 
twelfth of the budget for the subsidy and, under the W A Road traff1c Act Section 
24(2), has now made fitting an immobiliser compulsory before a vehicle can be 
licensed or transferred. 
In 1996, in WA, about 20% of the State's one million light vehicles were fitted with 
some alarm or immobiliser ("Car theft action", 1997), and in SA, in 1995, only 13% 
of stolen vehicles had an anti~theft device activated (Motor vehicle theft in SA, 
1995). Perhaps therefore, assuming the proportion of vehicles fitted with anti~theft 
devices in SA to have been similar to that in WA, the devices do give some 
protection, s!nce otherwise one might expect vehicles that were stolen to have 
devices fitted in the same proportion as those that were not (i.e., 20% not 13% ). 
I 
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According to police statistics, in 1999, car theft in WA fell by 19.6%; but the RAC 
points out that if vehicles subjected to malicious damage or theft of parts arc 
included, the fall is mu'ch smaller, and suggests that the reduction could, at least 
partly, be due to overall improvements to car security s)istems by vehicle 
manufacturers ("F6\vcr", 2000). Anti-theft devices tend to be installed on more 
modern and expensive cars and, since 1992, all Australian produced cars have had 
immObilisers factory fitted - but neither expensive, nor recently Australian 
produced, cars are prominent in the range of cars most commonly stolen - see 
Appendix 3. All commonly marketed immobiliser systems provide the driver with a 
token (e.g., a tag or transponder) that de-activates the immobiliser and these tag 
activated systems have the disadvantage that the tag can be stolen or the driver can 
fail to activate the system wh(m leaving the vehicle. A smart card could form part of 
an immobiliser system for a vehicle and, by requiring submission of an encrypted 
code, could make an electronic attack more difficult. In that case, the driver not only 
has to have something (i.e., the card) but must also know something (i.e., the code). 
Furthermore, the card could be programmed to immobilise the vehicle after a 
suitable delay, so that even if the driver left the card in the vehicle, any thief must 
then still either discover the code or by-pass the immobiliser system. However, as 
already pointed out, even a smart card system could do little to thwart the crude type 
of attack in which the perimeter is forced and the contents looted. 
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3.5.5 Multi·point immobilisation 
In immobiliscr design, the more points at which an immobiliscr acts the more 
effective a deterrent it will be. since the thief is put to more trouble in by-passing a 
multi-point system ("Multi-point imrnobiliscrs", 1995). A smart card might provide 
a code that could be made essential for the operation of any designated electric 
device, including locks that were electrically unlatched. The number of codes or 
"differs", to use the language of the British standard, could be quite large. The 
operation of the fuel and ignition systems might be made to depend on a signal 
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provided by the smart card and, also, without that signal, the "look-up map" in the 
microcontroller of the engine control unit made unavailable. Inevitably, multi-point 
protection adds to the cost. 
3.5.6 Aids to recovery 
Aside from either overt or hidden identification marks, aids to recovery consist of 
tracking schemes, of which there are several options. 
• Land·based schemes that rely on a beacon in the vehicle being located by 
resection from receiving stations. An example is the QuikTrak scheme in 
Sydney described by Adams (Adams, 1996). 
• Global Positioning Systems (GPS). These use satellite signals, require line of 
sight, and are used by major fleet owners to track their shipments. 
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• Some types of ccllpbonc network could be used. For example, the Federal 
Communications Commission, in 1996, mandated that within five years the 
technology must be in place to fix the location of callers to within 400 feet. 
• If road pricing and congestion control were introduced, the accompanying toll 
stations could track vehicles. 
None of these schemes require the use of smart cards, but tracing a vehicle by means 
of the cellphone network might be facilitated by their use. The possibility may 
become the subject of another study and is not discussed further here. 
3.6 Improved Convenience 
In introducing this chapter mention was made of the additional driver convenience 
that might be achieved as a by·· product of a system to improve vehicle management. 
Although this benefit is unlikely to be significant for most drivers, for luxury 
vehicles with power-operated seat and mirror adjustment, a smart card could store 
the cardholders' preferences and automatically adjust these ancillaries when the 
smart card w~s inserted. Similarly, cruise control, radio, CD/ROM and tape players 
could be set to the holder's preference. In a more futuristic scenario, relating for 
example to a "drive by wire" vehicle, the card might even contain settings for 




A smart card system could probably provide a useful "in-vehicle" alternative to 
today's manual, on-hoard automatic logg:ng, or external automatic methods of 
collecting vehicle managcmcnl data. System advantages might include generally 
improved convenience for authorities, llcet managers and, perhaps also, fleet drivers: 
but owner-drivers might be unenthusiastic. A smart card system might also bring 
marginal improvements in the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the data being 
recorded, and the card itself might provide a useful component in security, since it 
could be the critical part of a locking system, an immobiliscr, and at least one 
tracking system. The tracking aspect might be more attrJctive to owner-drivers than 
the preceding ones, but security must be balanced against its cost: a consideration 
deferred until chapter six. Possibly the greatest improvement would occur if all 
these measures could be integrated into a single system. Unfortunately, a number of 
difficulties impede the development of any (especially, integrated) system and these 
are discussed in the remaining chapters. 
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4 PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter one presents the assumption, amongst others, that smart cards will be used 
in vehicle management only if their use for other purposes becomes widespread. 
Chapter two claims that the technology to support smart card based vehicle 
management either exists or could be readily developed, and chapter three discusses 
how it might be applied, but concludes with a hint concerning obstacles to 
implementation. In this chapter, those obstacles that do not relate directly to 
commercial competition are described, beginning with the need to standardise, 
reduce costs, and improve smart card capacity and performance to a level that would 
support a multi-application card. At this point, it should be noted that a multi· 
application capacity requirement is more demanding than mere vehicle management. 
Other problems involving security and biometrics are then considered, and, finally, 
political and individual concerns are addressed. 
4.2 Multiple application smart cards 
A multi-application capability, precisely defined, is the capability to take a smart 
card housing one or more different applicatiom;, add another application without 
reference to the applications already on the card, and do this without disturbing the 
others or taking any special action with the application being loaded. Above, the 
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assumption has .:llrcmly been made that the development of multi-application cards is 
an t:sscntial prerequisite to their usc in vehicles. Happily, consumers may also want 
such a development. as evidenced by the Smart Card Forum reporting a consensus 
amongst its members to that effect. The Forum quoted research that purported to 
prove that 50% of members thought the multi-application card would be either 
excellent or a good idea. Only 15% thought it was a poor idea (Barr, Allen & Burke, 
1997. p. 64). The finding is suspect, although plausible, not only because market 
research is sometimes faulty, but also because the Forum was established in 1993 by 
Citicorp, Bellcore, and the US Treasury Financial Management Services Division, to 
accelerate the widespread acceptance of smart cards that support multiple 
applications. If the development of a multi-application card is essential before smart 
cards are used in vehicle management, the formidable preconditions for any such 
development must first be met. A list of essential criteria for multi-application 
success could include: 
• market acceptance of at least de facto standards, 
• a potential for long term economies of scale, 
• a common technology that is fraud resistant, 
• a satisfactory business case for each player, 
• the involvement of a high volume but low value application such a~ 
transportation or payphones, 
• a critical mass of cards in use, 
• a ubiquitous infm<;jtructure to accept cards (developed through alliances), and 
• brand identification and holder trust in the brand (Allen & Kutler, 1997, p. 15). 
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As will be seen, these preconditions arc, lo some extent, aligned with the problems 
and atlitudes that arc discussed in this and the next chapter. 
4.3 Standardisation 
4.3.1 Objectives and obstacles 
The smart card industry recognised at an early stage that standardisation would play 
a major role in the development and acceptability of smart cards (Bannerjee, 1997). 
Standards are being set which are: 
• specific to smart cards, and may be thought of as dealing with either external 
physical characteristics, or the internal workings of the integrated circuit (e.g., 
communications and operating systems) or, 
• specific to applications rather than the technology, such as those relating to 
identification and financial transactions (e.g., payments or the electronic purse). 
Standards may be the key to ensuring that smart cards and their infrastructures 
are interoperable, but progress is impeded because the requirement is continually 
changing as the technology develops and further applications are found. Where 
standardisation is achieved, confidence in smart card solutions and their 
attractiveness in meeting business requirements will increase. According to the 
NZ Future's Trust, quoting the Central Computer & Telecommunications 
Agency, 
77 
"Smart card manufacturers and scheme operators have a strong desire to 
develop international stand:.mls in order to achieve high levels of 
interoperability" ("CCTA Report", 1995). 
The statement may he true, but the manufacturers and operators also try to ensure 
that any accepted standard is as close to their own technology as possible, since in 
this way the effort needed to achieve compatibility is minimised. If this second 
motivation predominates the result might be a power struggle and delay. Ideally, it 
should be possible to use any smart card, in any reader, anywhere in the world, but 
this ideal is a long way from realisation and, indeed, might be realised only with 
overwhelming inter-industry and international cooperation. The inevitable reduction 
in variety will be painful for those who have developed unique products, and most 
standardisation work-groups are about sharing the pain. A further consideration is 
that, in the process of achieving interoperability, standards must not inhibit 
technological advances. If the efforts of the official organisations do not produce a 
standard, eventually, judging by history, a so-called industry standard wili become 
established, which all commercial participants will have to support if they are to 
operate successfully in the marketplace. An industry standard is, in fact, merely a 
specification that is being proposed as a standard by some powerful sponsor or 
consortium of firms. 
4.3.2 ISO standards 
ISO standards appear to be the most important and relevant agreements, within the 
framework of which most other standards have been developed. Although already 
outlined in section 2.3, the essentials nrc repealed here to provide a basis for the 
description of other cllorts to achieve a degree of compatibility. Standard ISO 7810 
covers the dimensions and physical characteristics of smart cards. Communications 
with contact cards arc covered by standard ISO 7816, which has six parts, of which 
parts one to three define communications with the cards, and four to six deal with 
matters relating to the card operating system, such as data clements and file 
structures. Parts seven and eight are still in draft, but will extend parts four to six. 
Parts nine and ten are in an earlier draf~ stage, and will define further inter-industry 
commands and protocols for synchronous communications, respectively. 
Contactless cards are covered by two standards, ISO 10536 for close coupling, and a 
planned standard ISO 14443 for remote coupling (Fancher, C. , 1997). A proposed 
standard for vicinity cards, ISO 15693, is not yet even in draft. There are a number 
of other ISO standards, but they have little relevance to the use of cards in vehicle 
management. It should be noted that Japan has its own independent standards 
organisations (e.g., JEIDA) that are also active. 
4.3.4 Standard card operating system 
If the card itself could be standardised, the next most important aspect might be the 
card operat.ing system. To date, smart card issuer:; have written what are essentially 
proprietary applications that are integrated with the card operating system and are 
not interoperable or portable, For a combination of technology, cost and security 
reasons mentioned in sections 2.3 and 2.7, 12, few chipmakers offer a smart card chip 
·that does not have at least part of an operating system hardwired as part of the 
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integrated circuil. Even fewer firms offer smart card operating systems that arc not 
designed for a specific chip (Guthery, 2000). Consequently, there arc at least a 
dozen different smart curd operating systems offered by various hardware and 
software vendors. ft would seem that if multi-applications are to be successful, there 
is a need for standard open platforms on which to deVelop smart card applicatiOns 
quickly: including those that are supplementary or "after issuance". Application 
issuers must be conVinced that another (genuine or fraudulent) application on the 
same card cannot interfere with •. or otherwise affect, their own (see section 4.2). 
Alternative proposals to achieve this situation are offered by several industry 
groupings. 
4.3.5 MULTOS 
Mondex and Ma~terCard, wilh cardmakers Gemplus and Dai Nippon and 
chipmakers Motorola, Hitachi and Siemens, (but, significantly, excluding Visa) 
promote an "industry standard" operating system, MULTOS, that seeks to ensure 
that multiple applications may reside on a single smart card without interfering with 
each other. MULTOS is claimed to be the first open, high-security, multi-
application operating system for smart cards, enabling a number of different 
applications to be held securely on the card at the same time. Its promoters say it 
may open up the smart card market, creating new avenues of convenience for users 
while delivering savings and opportunities for the industry (MULTOS, I 997). 
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4.3.6 Windows for Smart cards 
Recently, at the Cartes '99 Paris convention, Microsoft arrived on the scene as a 
powerful latecomer with Windows for Smart cards. Microsoft has promoted its 
operating system not only for network security, but also for health, payment, loyalty 
and, more recently, subscriber identity module (SIM) cards for the GSM cellular 
phone market. At the convention, the accompanying toolkit to enable developers to 
write SIM card applications using Visual Basic was expected to become available 
early in the year 2000 ("'Microsoft releases", 1999), but at the time of writing (June, 
2000), there had still been no report of its release. 
4.3.7 Java API 
As a consequence of the lack of a standard card operating system, only with 
difficulty can applications operate with cards from different vendors. One solution 
is to install on the card a program called an Application Programming Interface 
(API) that will translate application commands into a fonn readable by a range of 
cards and their operating systems. JavaSoft, a business unit of Sun Microsystems 
Inc., with some support from other industry leaders, (including Visa) has claimed 
that the Java Card API 2.0 will solve this problem ("Sun Microsystems", 1996). Sun 
Microsystems claims that: 
• the Java Card API is a specialised Java application interface, optimised to 
provide critical Java functionality to smart card developers, and 
XI 
• is the Jirst industry standard language and open API for smart cards that allows 
applications to run on all standard ISO 78J6w4-compliant smart cards. 
Java's scalability and platform-indcpcn~~nce arc said to provide the ideal 
environment for creating smart card applications, a standardised process for adding 
new features and changing old ones, and clearly established commercial terms 
describing the rights and responsibilities of participants. Unfortunately, it seems 
that, at least until recently, each card manufaclUrer defined its own Java byte code 
set, and so it is probably not possible to take an applet of the card of one 
manufacturer and run it on the card of another (Guthery, 2000). Gemplus and 
Schlumberger, who together make about 70% of all smart cards, support the Java 
Card API ("Smarter Java", 1997). But, see earlier paragraph, Gemplus also supports 
MULTOS! However, ,the financial institutio'hs, which c:.:e likely to be'· the most 
powerful issuers, will probably determine the outcome. Siemens, the third largest 
card m~er, also appears to be keeping all options open because, in July 1997, it 
licensed Java technology from Sun Microsystems ("Sun and Siemens", 1997). An 
open system, or operating environment, like Java Card, encourages Widespread 
support, because there are published specifications about how the environment 
works. The Java API may be thought of as an adaptor between, on the one hand, any 
of a range of operating systems or chip instruction sets, and, on the other, selected 
Java programs and applets: however, it is probably a memory and power hungry 
solution as illustrated more fully in section 7 .2.1 and Figure 16. 
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4.3.8 Backend software 
Another, somewhat different, potential solution to the problem of multiple non-
standard operating systems relies on a suite of software that resides partly on the 
cards and partly on the terminals that read and, if necessary, write to the cards. One 
proposal, known as the OpenCard Framework, comprises three software layers, two 
of which (CardService and Application Management) reside on the card and 
effectively adapt the card's operating system to match the other layer (CardTerminal) 
that resides on the reader. It is Java based, but in this way, at some cost in card 
processing resources, many smart card types may be enabled to work with almost 
any reader. A consortiu·.TI that includes IBM, Visa and American Express (but 
excludes MasterCard, Hitachi and Mondex) promotes the framework (OpenCard 
Framework, Oct, 1998). A second related concept, is Visa's Open Platform, which 
is being promoted by GlobaiPiatform, an organisation whose primary objective is the 
development and publication of standards and specifications that might be used by 
companies implementing multiple application smart card programs. The Open 
Platform is said to enable the fast and easy development of globally interoperable 
smart card systems, and is comprised of three integrated elements: the card 
specifications, the terminal specifications, and the workbench tools. The concept 
seems to be similar to that of the OpenCard Framework, but the organisation claims 
to be different from the Framework's consortium in that it has a "crOss industry" 
membership and, indeed, it includes several tclcconununication companies, known 
as telcos, but no major financial institution ("Open Platform", 2000). 
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4.3.9 Electronic payment standards 
Even if a standard operating system, or an acceptable alternative, emerges, there 
would still be a need for standardisation within applications. One of the most 
important application areas relates to electronic payments. Whilst awaiting the 
promulgation of an official payment standard, which, hopefully, will be incorporated 
into the ISO framework, a specification has been developed by Europay, Mastercard 
and Visa (EMV), that covers the interaction between smart cards and readers for all 
payment system applications (debit, credit and offline) (Rank! & Effing, 1997). The 
specification was intended to create a common technical basis to compete with 
Mondex specifications: at the time MasterCard had not purchased control of 
Mondex. The EMV specification is a substantial document that aims to ensure that 
any payment system smart card may be read by any reader if both conform to the 
standard, but, according to some manufacturers, it is actually not quite specific 
enough to achieve this aim. The first version was based on cards with symmetric 
encryption and the matter of key transportation was unresolved ("What contains", 
1995). The EMV standard was declared by its sponsors to be "functional" in 1996. 
but many large, particularly French, applications do not conform to it. The Estonian 
Institute of Cybernetics has provided a summary of the contents, grouped into three 
parts: 
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"Part 1: Electromechanical Characteristics; Logical, Interface, and 
Transmission Protocols 
This part of the specification concentrates on physical and logical clements 
of the interaction between smart cards and electronic tcrtninals used for 
payment transactions .... 
Part II: Data Elements and Commands 
This part defines data elements and files, the commands required to execute 
financial transactions and terminal requirements. When data elements arc 
exchanged between cards and terminals, they become data objects. These 
objects can be simple or complex depending on how they have been 
processed. All data objects reside in data files. Data files in a card, when 
viewed from the terminal, appear in a tree structure whose main branches are 
application definition files that are application-specific. This .structure allows 
diverse applications to be maintained separately within a single card .... 
Part III: Transaction Processing 
This part defines the content and flow of payment transactions for both cards 
and terminals, establishing common core functions for international 
interchange transactions. However, card issuers may also.create fl)nctions 
that are unique to specific applications and payment systems .... " 
("Technology/smartcards", 2000). 
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4.3.10 Common electronic purse specification 
A specification being developed by the ComitC EuropCcn de Normalisation (CEN), 
prEN 1546, covers the electronic purse. Apparently in an attempt to pre-empt other 
efforts to develop an industry standard for the purse, in Ma~c.h 1999, a consortium 
"released" the common electronic purse specification (CEPS). The specification, 
reportedly, is based on the former CLIP purse system discussed briefly in the next 
chapter. The consortium consisted of CEPS Co of Spain, Kartensysteme of 
Germany, Europay and Visa. Mastercard, which owns the Mondex system, is not a 
member (CEPS, 1999). 
4.3.11 PC/SC specification 
Another effort to produce an application specific specification, by a consortium of 
leading companies from the PC and smart card industries, seeks to promote the 
acceptance of smart cards in the PC/Internet environment. The intention is to 
develop a set of open standards enabling PCs to work with such smart card 
applications as network access; especially in electronic commerce. In particular, the 
Workgroup members identified the need to standardise interfaces to readers, and 
considered the specification of common PC programming interfaces and control 
mechanisms as critical areas to be investigated ("PC/SC Workgroup overview'', 
1996, September 12). If the effort is successful the conforming smart card readers 
will become, in effect, standard PC peripherals. Microsoft's "Windows for Cards" 
appears to be the first operating system to support the "standard". A second version 
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of the specification IS being draf~cd ("PC/SC Workgroup specifications update", 
2000). 
4.3.12 MIFARE 
Yet another application area that would benefit from standardisation is transportation 
ticketing. Since the standard ISO 14443 for contactlcss card communications is still 
not finalised, it seems likely that the European standard, CEN 1545, for data elements 
in contactless cards, or de facto standards such as the Philips designed MIFARE 
system, will dominate these applications for some time. However, both Motorola 
(now Atmel) and SGSThornson (now STMicroelectronics) have announced that they 
intend to develop cards based on ISO 14443. The two makers claim to believe the 
planned ISO standard provides better security and wider interoperability than 
MIFARE (Costlow, 2000). 
4.3.13 Other standards organisations 
A number of other organisations are attempting to ·establish stanQ.ards for smart 
cards. Probably the mo·:;t successful of these is the European Telecommunications 
Institute (ETSI) which has achieved worldwide acceptance for the Global System for 
Mobile Communications (GSM) card used in one mobile telephone system 
(Guthery, 2000). Another example is the National Committee for Information 
Technology Standards (NCITS), formerly the Americun National Standards Institute 
(ANSI), that has produced a standard for a driver's licence on an electronic card 
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(Electronic, 2000). There arc several commercially sponsored groupings purporting 
to further standardisation but, ulas, they arc prohably driven more by marketing 
agcmlas th:.m any technical necessity. 
. 4.3.14 Certification authority model 
Standardisation of smart cards, their operating systems and key applications may not 
be all that is required for interoperability. Robin Towncnd, of Intellect Australia Pty 
Ltd, a Perth manufacturer of smart card readers with international standing, says 
' 
there are two issues blocking the faster rollout of smart cards and that a common and 
open operating system is only the first. The second is the need for banks to work out 
.a certification authority model ("Curly questions", 1997). A certification authority is 
a trusted third party that issues and manages credentials in the form of certificates for 
individuals or entities. 
' 
Commonly, the authority checks with a separate 
investigating body to verify infonnation provided by the party requesting the 
certificate. All over the world, organi:mtions are setting themselves up a'\ certifying 
authorities. Within Australia, SecureNt:.'i, a Melbourne company, is offering to 




4.4.1 Cost estimation 
All estimates of the future cost of smart cards are based on two a'isurnptions; 
• the cost of electronic circuitry will continue to fall, and 
• a mass market will emerge. 
Before either a multi-application card or a "killer" application appears, costs may 
need to be reduced. Put another way, if a mass market is to be developed, the cost of 
smart cards must be kept low. With an estimate in 1992 that, by 1995, the annual 
" 
market would be one billion cards, it was expected that, by then, the cost of a smart 
card would be US$3.00 (Baker, 1992). Neither the volume, nor the cost, was 
achieved (Amdur, 1997). 
4.4.2 Components of system costs 
The cost of a smart card system is more than the cost of the cards themselves. Other 
costs are: 
• hardware peripherals, such as terminals or readers, 
• software, for both smart cards and their infrastructure, 
• network costs, and 
• enrolment of users (Svigals, 1994). 
Svigals does not mention the development costs of applications, which would need 
to be taken into consideration. There might be comparative gains for smart cards 
mnong~t these other costs. For example, co~t~ in validating current magstripc card~ 
at EFfPOS terminal~ might be reduced if smart cards were u~cd, but probably would 
not vanish. Agnin~t the co~t~ of smart cards must be ofL'iel bencfits,'i'lsuch as the 
potential reduction in fraud, and the greater durability of smart cards. 
4.4.3 Card costs 
A comparison of the cost of mags tripe and smarC cards follows. 
Table 2: Magstripe and smart cards compared 
Parameter Ma~stripe Smart card 
Life (years) 2 10 
Cost (US$) 0.10 to 0.50 1.00 to 20.00 
The life of a smart card is estimated· to be lO years, versus tWo years for a mags tripe 
card, but·smart card cost estimates vary greatly. (It may be worth noting that the 
primitive smart cards used in the simulation to be described in chapter six, cost 
A$20 each.). Duffy estimates that a complete smart card might cost US$1.00 to 
US$20, whereas a magstripc card might cost from US$0.10 to US$0.50 (Duffy, 
1996). His estimate makes no mention of the cost of emb~dding the chip in the card. 
Cordonnier, in 1995, gave the average price of a card as us~·4.00 (Cordonnier, 
1995). In 1997 he estimated the average cost of a smart card, including its sha•·e of 
the infrastructure overhead, as US$20, and the cost of a contact smart card as from 
US$2.00 to US$10 (Cordonnier, 1997). In the earlier estimate he may have been 
including memory cards and in the later one con tactless types, but, even so, docs not 
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appear to be able tl report th<ll costs arc falling. The Gartner Group provide 
different estimates again. 
Table 3: Magstripe smart cards and optical cards compared. 
Card type Maximum Processing Cost of Cost of 
Data Power Card Reader and 
Capacity Connection 
Magnetic Stripe 40 bytes none $0.10 - $750 
Cards $0.75 
Integrated I Kbytes none $1.00- $500 
Circuit Memory $2.50 
Cards 
IC Processor 8Kbytes 8/16-bit $7.00-$15 $500 
Cards CPU 
Optical 4.9 Mbytes none $7.00-$12 $3,500-
Memory Cards $4000 
Source: Gartner Group (Stand: June 98). All costs are m US$. 
4.4.4 Components of card costs 
Components of the cost of the card itself include the plastic rectangle, estimated at 
US$0.45 to US$0.55. In 1996, assuming mass production, the chip was estimated to 
cost from US$1.00 to US$2.50, but this cost was expected to fall to US$0.75 -
US$1.50 by 1997 (Duffy, 1996). 
In tabular form the estimated cost of contact smart cards could be as follows. 
Table 4: Smart card costs 
Component Cost (US$) 
Microchip $1.00 to $2.50 
Plastic card $0.45 to $0.55 
Embedding N/A 
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Although the cost of embedding the chip in the card must be recognised there is no 
published information available as to what the cost might be. 
4.4.5 Other costs 
Even a basic reader is estimated to cost more than US$1 00, whilst retrofitting a 
magstripe reader, for example an ATM, to read smart cards might cost from 
US$2,000 to US$3,000 (Duffy, 1996; Fancher, 1997). Consideration of what a 
smart card supported vehicle management system might cost, and what owners 
might be prepared to pay for it has been left until chapter six. 
4.4.6 Cost trend 
It appears that the fall in costs expected by Baker did not happen and, even now, 
there is no evidence of any such trend. Perhaps, instead, gains from more efficient 
production are being absorbed in developing improved cards. 
4.4 Card capacity and performance 
4.5.1 Required capacity 
Chapter two gave an indication of the potential for increased chip power, but the 
question now to be addressed is whether or not any increase might be enough to 
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provide a multi-application capability. Assuming costs can be kept at an acceptable 
level, i(!smart cards arc to be attractive to all partiCs (issuers, financial instilutions, 
mcrch:mts and the public) and arc to support multiple upplications: then they will 
need to provide on-card, asymmetric, encryption facilities, and, eventually, biometric 
identification. A multi-application capability i!' expensive in computing resources, 
and encryption even more so ("CASCADE FIRST", 1994). The definition of multi-
application capability in section 4.2 implies that the applications may belong to 
different entities and be loaded at different locations, that inter-operability har.; been 
' 
achieved, and that applications must be isolated from each other. This ideal open 
system does not appear to be imminent, bur, when and if it arrives, it will almost 
certainly make further claims on the limited chip resources. Finally, biometric 
identification, for true security, should match supplied and recorded features on the 
card itself, rather than merely supplying a template for comparison elsewhere. Smart 
card chips will need to improve in both speed and memory if they are to meet these 
requirements. With the exception of the CASCADE chip, until recently, 'the chips 
being promoted or used, for reasons explained earlier, seem intended for financial 
applications and have little spare capacity for anything else ("Motorola", 1997). 
4.5.2 Extensibility and personalisation 
Two further tenus need definition. In the smart card context, extensibility is the 
ability to add further applications to an existing smart card. Hitherto, in general, 
extensibility has been limited because an application written for one smart card type 
could not be installed on another; a problem already discussed under standardh;ation. 
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Personalization is the process of taki,ng a "generic" smart card ancl customising it 
with duta that arc specific to a singlc~application or multi-application card and the 
' 
indiv·~~~~al cardholder. While identification data might be inscribed on the plastic, to 
personalise the curds the programmer will need to cmb~d personal statistics in the 
chip and customise applications stored on the chip. The process. an essential service 
to imp!t!ment any smart card applications system, is conceptually identical to the 
personalisation of vehicles and ccJlphones, being merely different m 
implementation. Personal identification is essential to provide secure access for 
smart card holders to pr;emises or company networks, and Internet or other electronic 
commerce applications. Mere possession of the card should not be sufficient. 
Personalisation also enables issuers to build brand recognition and customer loyally 
by enhancing frequent shopper and similar loyalty programs ("Standard Register 
partners", 1997). Ease of both extensibility and personalisation._is important for 
issuers and those employing smart cards as part of an application. The facility might 
not be relevant to vehicle management, but it must be borne in mind that for the 




4.6.1 Aspects of security 
Although smart card technology is making steady advances, most.mass markets h.we 
not yet used it to anywhere near its potential. Qne reason may be that for many 
applications such as electronic purses, bankcards, pay-TV cards and phonecards, it 
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has proved almost impossible to achieve the high level of security demanded at a 
low enough cost. If a smart card is to be used to improve the security of facilities or 
systems, then the card itself must be secure, and unauthorised persons should not be 
-<~blc to counterfeit it, read it, manipulate its contents, or usc it. Security may be 
considered at the chip level, the card level, the application level, or the system level. 
Breaches might be systemic or individual. E. T. Patrikis, First Vice President of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York defines a systemic risk ac; " ... the risk of an event 
which could bring markets or clearing and settlement systems to a httlt, or cause the 
failure of additional market participants." Elsewhere, more succinctly, he refers to 
systemic breaches as "show-stoppers" (Patrikis, 1996). 
4.6.2 Systemic 
At the individual level, a fraudster might possibly discover the PIN (or biometric 
template) of an individual and abscond with money or gain access to information. 
The individual concerned could be severely inconvenienced, if not ruined, but for the 
issuer the loss would probably be supportable. However, in some f~ture, smart card 
supported, global financial system, if criminals found a way to counterfeit cards, the 
world's financial system might be destroyed in an attack similar to that attempted by 
Germany against Britain during World War ll (Bank of England, 1997). In this 
attempt, a large number of five pound notes were allegedly scattered over Britain by 
airdrops. Although subsequent reports claim the notes were used to finance 
Germany's spy system and found there way to England indirectly (Hottl, 1955), 
whatever the distribution route, the notes were indistinguishable from the genuine 
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item and, as a result, no Jlnancial institution or merchant would accept the 
denomination until a new issue was .r.oadc with a distinctive gold wire through it. 
Many people holding perfectly genuine notc!-i suffered loss. An oftcn~pcrccived 
advantage of cash money is anonymity, but the flip side of anonymity is risk. If' a 
hacker wns able to counterfeit DigiCash or Mondex cards', the entire currency mighl 
become worthless ("Timorous trade", 1997). A somewhat different systemic breach 
might occur if, through a failure of non-repudiation, an individual could prove that a 
withdrawal from the deposited money had been taken by fraud. No doubt the 
deposit taker (presumably, the card issuer) would be obliged to make good the 
individual's loss and, thereafter, dishonest people could claim that withdrawals t~ey 
had actually made were the work of fraudsters: to the great embarra'isment, if not 
loss, of the deposit taker. 
4.6.3 Chip level 
Chip security begins with the design of the chip, which is arranged, not only for 
efficiency, but also for the protection of the stored data: therefore, the design team 
usually includes the card manufacturer's representatives. Chips must be 
manufactured in as secure an environment as are, for example, banknotes; so, all 
chips, whether acceptable or faulty, must be accounted for (Baker, T., 1992). Chips 
normally may be operated in one of three modes; test, development or user. 
• The chip manufacturer must be able to test the chips. 
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• The card manufacturer must be able to develop the chip, usually by adding 
programs to the non-volatile, rcwritable memory and ensuring that these 
programs cannot be tampered with. 
• The application developer must be able to add stifl more programs and, similarly, 
prevent further tanipering. 
Before the card re3ches the user, the test and development modes should have been 
irreversibly disabled. Various techniqu,es arc used for this purpose, amongst which 
are: 
-'--~ providing a power spike to the chip that causes essential, polycrystalline silicon, 
fuses to 'blow'; and 
• precision sawing to remove part of the circuitry (Myers, 1996; Paterson, 1991 ). 
Delivery must be handled in a secure manner similar to that used for banknotes or 
bullion (Paterson, M., 1991), and any attempt to tamper with the chip should cause it 
to self-destruct (Myers, 1996; Paterson, 1991). 
Finally, until recently, a single chip was used because, among other problems, 
multiple chips may have connections that are vulnerable to attack: a consideration 
that limited the size and, hence, the power of the chip circuitry. Since, as already 
mentioned in section 2.7, a dual-chip card is being trialed in China, it might seem 
that this restriction on multiple chips had now been relaxed, but that is not the case 
as the two chips on the card are not connected. 
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4.6.4 Chip cracking 
Despite all these precautions, chips probably may he reverse engineered or 
"cracked". At least four groups claim to have proved that it can be done. 
The first was Bcllcorc Labs. Julie Krueger, acting executive director or the Smart 
Card Forum, and Rebekah Schloss, senior product manager, IntcrBold, and member 
of the Forum's board, have commented on the Bellcore research. 
"In September 1995, Bellcore announced a theoretical technique to crack a 
smart card or other RSA cryptographic processor by inducing faults through 
mechanical means, and monitoring the resulting changes in the output 
ciphe1text. The press coverage that followed cited a number of authorities 
whose conclusions, in general, are that the technique, while it is only 
theoretical, is important for the industry to be aware of, and cracking one 
smart card through a rather elaborate scenario does not compromise the 
security infrastructure." (Krueger & Schloss, 1996, p. 1). 
The second group comprised a team of researchers from Cambridge University, 
which, under the leadership of Professor Ross Anderson, categorised a variety of 
types of attack on the S~"curity of smart cards. The team had in mind the increasing 
' ., 
number of systems, from pay-TV to electronic purses, that rely on the tamper 
resistance of smart cards and other security processors, and, hence, the team 
described a number of attacks on such systems - some old, some new and some that 
are simply little known outside the chip· testing community. The researchers 
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concluded that trusting tamper resistance 1s problematic: smart card security IS 
routinely breached, and even a: device that was described by a government signals 
ugcncy as 'the most secure pror.:cssor generally available' turned out to be 
vulnerable. Designers of secure systems were advised to consider the consequences 
with care (Anderson & Kuhn, 1996). However, an unsigned web page by 
Semiconductor Insights Ltd sets out to rebut the Cambridge team's claims. Its 
rebuttal depended mainly on the contention that the microchips attacked by the 
Cambridge team were chips with parallel ports, unlike those used in smart cards 
which have only a serial port and a reset ("TAM PER RESISTANCE", 1996). 
The third group was from an Israeli University. According to a report by Markoff in 
the New York Times, two Israeli scientists, Adi Shamir, a professor at the applied 
mathematics department at the Weizmann Institute, and Eli Biham, a member of the 
faculty of the computer science department at the Technion, reported that, in 
addition to the so-called public key coding systems that were found vulnerable by 
the Belicore team, private key data coding systems, such as the American Data 
Encryption Standard, or DES, might be successfully attacked if a computer processor 
can be made to produce an error (Markoff, J., 1996). 
The fourth group, Cryptography Research, a private consulting company m San 
Franscisco, was reported in the New York Times to have used a technique 'that relics 
on the fact that semiconductor chips must use electrons to do calculations. The 
Company showed, for instance, that the key from an RSA system might be extracted 
by watching an oscilloscope graphing the power consumption of a card (Wayner, 
1998). Some counter measures were also mentioned. 
4.6.5 Counterfeiting 
Counterfeiting, a different form of attack, has t:voked conflicting comments. 
Stephan Seidman, editor or the Smart Card Monthly, wrote in 1994 that, in twenty 
years, not one counterfeit smart card had been reported anywhere in the world 
(Seidman, 1994). Strangely, Svigals, at <!bout the same time, quoted a Wall Street 
Journal report of a 1992 cellular phone system probable revenue Joss of US$400m, 
due to chip based fraud. The attackers got good identification numbers from cellular 
transmissions, and replaced the ro chips in the cellular phones with gcneral·purpose 
chips programmed to emit the pirated identification numbers. One massive attack 
used modified cellular phones for a week and then discarded them (Svigals, 1994, p. 
Ill). More recently, the Smart card Developer's Association (SDA) and two UC 
Berkeley researchers announced that the GSM SIM card could be cloned. Although 
this was a research exercise and not an actual theft, the potential for peculation wa<; 
demonstrated. In addition, the association drew attention to other weaknesses 
which, it alleged, were partly due to government agencies requiring that 
confidentiality be weakened (SDA clones digital GSM ccllphones, 1998). 
Therefore, it seems likely that, as with telephone SIM cards, other smart cards could 
be counterfeited, stolen, or misused. It is possible that the fear of a similar systemic 
breach has played a part in the reluctance of financial institutions to implement the 
electronic purse, or wholeheartedly to support electronic transactions. 
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4.6.6 Card 
Apart from the chip. it is possihlc to make the card itself difficult to counterfeit. The 
materials used arc not c<tsy to work with, <tnd features could hr..: included analogous 
to the watermark, or hologram, of a banknotc. Even laser engraving, which hurns a 
subsurface layer of the plastic, is a fairly secure print, and can be removed only with 
great difficulty. It should be born in mind, however, that a bogus card will probably 
not be used in the presence of the person being deceived. The bogus version often 
does not need to look like a genuine item, only to behave like one. 
4.6. 7 Application 
At the application level, the card may provide a cryptographic facility that helps to 
protect information stored in it, and the facility could be enhanced by an asymmetric 
"challenge and response" protocol, to render the card virtually proof against 
spoofing and masquerading. Unfortunately, protocol protection uses a lot of the "on-
card" computing resources (Leach, 1995). Although the card's processor security is 
capable of being controlled by the card issuer (through the card personalisation 
process), the control comes with an additional need for a secure key management 
system to be designed and implemented. In most 'smart card based' applicat;ons, 
the business users have to take the word of the smart card vendors that .security has 
been properly implemented, and trust that they will not abuse their privileges. 
Another problem relates to card testing. Because of the security protection that is 
built around the chip, most of the security features of the smart card logic cannot be 
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tL'!'itL'd without hlo~king the card or destroying it. Any tests, even if identified, may 
han~ hL·cn performed only on a small production sample ( Kang, I C)tJ6) . 
.t.6.8 Security Certification 
The creators of smart card products may obtain security endorsement through the 
Information Technology Security Evaluation (ITSEC) or Common Criteria schc:mcs. 
The procedure involves: 
• a claim by the product sponsor as to the degree of security offered by the 
product, and 
• a rating under the scheme that represents the extent to which the product 
achieves the sponsor's claim. 
This kind of certification is not totally satisfactory because not all users may be 
aware that a high rating might be merely a consequence of a modest claim. 
Nevertheless it is not easy to see how a more stringent system could be devised 
(Reid & Looi, 2000). 
Biometrics 
4.7.1 Performance 
Biometric identification has been suggested as a partial solution to the security 
problems impeding the widespread usc of smart cards, but requires sophisticated 
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expensive hardware; and, although smaller biometric identification devices arc in 
sight, size is slill u problem for mobile applil::ations (Kim, 1995). Furthermore, the 
usc of the image of any human feature depends on computationally intensive image 
registration techniques (already described in section 2.4) and arc currently beyond 
the capability of any smart card processor. In current systems the smart card is used 
to store a template of the biometric feature of the card owner, and the creation of a 
matching template from a supplied feature, followed by any comparison of the two, 
is undertaken elsewhere, using a more powerful processor; a technique that fails to 
exclude the possibility that the communication between the card and the computer 
could be intercepted, and the system breached by manipulating the communication. 
If the work of comparison is to be done in the card, more powerful card processors 
will have to be developed, or simplifications found. A major problem is that the 
banks require a False Rejection Rate (FRR) of less than I in !00,000 (Carter, 1995, 
p. 3). In this connection, MYTEC, a leading designer of biometric identification 
systems, has published the following statement about the performance of its system: 
"FAR: (type l error) False Acceptance Rate is wht:n someone other than a 
legitimate user is accepted. MYTEC Targets: FARI/10,000. 
FRR: (type 2 error) False Rejection Rate is when the legitimate user is not 
recognised by the system. MYTEC Targets: FRRI/100,000. These numbers 
are industry specifications, and as we are currently testing large populations, 
we are confident that the MYTEC system will exceed these specifications." 
("MYTEC Training", 1996). 
It is difficult to share MYTEC's confidence, because no independently tested system 
has achieved anything approaching that performance, and other vendors' claims are 
still an order of magnitude from it. National Registry Inc. (NRI) in r'lnjunction with 
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Unisys claimed, at the American Bankcring Assoc. conference in May I 91)6, to have 
met the hanking requirement, but released no actual figures ("NIH at ABA 
Solutions", 1997 Feb 10). Financial institutions arc believed to argue that fal!;c 
acceptance is a less grievous fault than false rejection, because, for a potential 
intruder. it makes no difference if the chance of penetration is one in 10000, or only· 
one in 100 (Carter, 1995). In either case the intruder will probably be discouraged 
and think twice before attempting to intrude: whereas, even occa'iional false 
rejection might result in a ruinous loss of custom. 
4.7.2 Certainty of uniqueness 
False acceptance may be considered from a different angle. Identical twins have 
identical hands and will experience little trouble in being identified as each other 
with the hand geometry method, and even between family relations the false 
acceptance for hand geometry is probably much larger then the false acceptance for 
rand ..... m!y chmen people. Fingerprints, on the other hand, are the result of a genetic 
random process, and fingerprints of identical twins or other family relations are 
believed to have no correlation (Miller, 1994). Therefore, when choosing between 
fingerprints and hand geometry, there is a logical bias in favour of fingerprints. 
4.7.3 User acceptance 
User acceptance might be an issue for smart card system developers attempting to 
use biometric identification. An ECU study showed that for many people the 
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intrusiveness of the ~.:ollcction method, the length of the enrolment time, the 
likelihood of system failure, and the speed and throughput rate at the time of usc, 
were all major issues affecting the acceptability of an application. A framework for 
the treatment of the issues was developed, but its effectiveness has not been tested 
(O'Loughlin. 1998). 
4.7.4 Testing 
The testing of biometric identification methods still poses great difficulties and a key 
issue for the Biometric Consortium's National Test and Evaluation Center (now 
known as the US National Biometric Test Centerj was the development of test and 
evaluation method(s) for repeatable statistically-significant performance tests. The 
main question the Test Center sought to answer was as follows: how might testing 
technicians obtain reliable receiver operating curves (ROC) from a device, and make 
meaningful comparisons with ROCs of other, possibly non-biometric (e.g., 
password), devices' The Center listed a number of subordinate questions grouped 
according to whether the tests usc humans, simulations, or recordings/reproductions 
respectively. 
• If a human sample is used, how are the individuals selected and calibrated? Will 
the same humans be needed for all future tests, or can a sufficiently large sample 
be used to make this unnecessary? 
• If simulations arc used, what types of simulations will be used, and how will they 
be used? If fabricated body parts arc used, how shall they be constructed and 
used? 
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• If recordings and reproductions arc used, how will the sensor and recognition 
system be separated? 
This last question directs attention to a difficulty peculiar to the group. In vo1cc 
systems the sensor (e.g .. a microphone) and the verifier arc usually separable, and 
speech may be recorded and the exact record repeatedly played back into the device. 
For multidimensional verificrs/identitiers (e.g., image-based systems), there is a 
difficult problem, because some use adaptive scanning, thus making the sensor and 
the verifier inseparable and the repeated use of exactly the same image impossible. 
Different devices might also require different illumination, poses, and resolution, 
further complicating the recording of a databa~e (Campbell & Alyea, 1995 ). 
4.7.5 Industry testing and certification 
Presumably because of slow progress by the Biometric Consortium, a number of 
USA vendors of biometric ID systems have formed the International Computer 
Security Association (ICSA), whose main task is to raise the level of public 
confidence in biometric identification, whilst improving the accuracy and 
applicability of each product. To accomplish the task, it undertakes the testing and 
certification of biometric identification products (ICSA, 1997). Another group, the 
International Biometric Industry Association (lBIA) represents the biometric 
industry (i.e., scanner) manufacturers. Yet a third group, the Biometrics 
Authentication Programming Interface (BAPI or BioAPI) seems to represent the 
computer industry. To date none of these groups appear to have captured the 
complete confidence of major potential purchasers. 
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4.8 Political and individual concerns 
4.8.1 General 
A number of political and individual concerns may be significant in impeding or 
promoting the widespread usc of smart cards, although only indirectly relevant to 
their possible use in vehicle management. 
4.8.2 Tax avoidance. 
Governments may be concerned about tax avoidance. There is a perceived risk that 
an individual with a source of income in a low income tax country could use a smart 
card in conjunction with a PC/SC application (as described in section 4.3) to live, 
and spend the income, in a high tax country without paying the higher tax. Although 
the financial systems and on-card applications necessary for this activity are feasible, 
no reference has been found suggesting they are available. 
4.8.3 Hot money 
It is sometimes contended that the widespread, uncontrolled usc of electronic purses 
could make management of national financial systems difficult, and that the 
unregulated movement of "hot money" might destabilise governments. The term is 
used here in the sense defined by Walter Wriston: 
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"Money that can move. If you get nervous and [JUll everything out of the 
market, at the end of the day you'll he holding hot money.'' (Wriston, 1996). 
This is a different co1H.:cpt from "dirty money" (the proceeds of illegal activities), 
formerly called ··hot money". The annual turnover survey results published by the 
Bank of International Settlements, show that the average daily turnover of global 
exchange markets in spot. outright forward, and foreign exchange swap contracts, 
was estimated at US$1.2t in 1995 (Patrikis, 1996). Today, 1999, the daily flows 
probably exceed US$2t. These money flows take place over dedicated networks, not 
the Internet, and, as the Asian financial crisis showed, they are capable of 
dcstabilising governments: but, smart cards are probably not involved. Relative to 
the total of "hot money", mane;' transfer by means of electronic purses seems 
insignificant. Estimates of global ruonetary flows have been relegated to Appendix 4 
but, in section 5.3. 7 are briefly related to accrual transactions. 
4.8.4 Dirty money 
Ar.'1ther concern is that money laundering might be facilitated. In certain 
circumstances this could be so, since, if there was no limit to the amount that could 
be loaded onto a smart card, dirty money in an electronic purse would certainly be 
easier to carry and conceal than the suitcases full of note!-i that are popularly 
supposed to be used. However, the law could prohibit "open limit" purses and be 
enforced in the same way that large cash transactions arc today monitored through 
the banks, so the contention probably carries no great weight. 
IOK 
4.8.5 Consumer choice 
Even if the problems discussed in the prcv1ous paragraphs could he solved, 
Governments might still he nervous about the widespread usc of smart cards. In 
addition to public hostility to the perceived invasion of privacy and potential for 
surveillance, discussed in the 11L~Xt paragraph, consumer advocates contend that there 
is a chance that individuals may be deprived of choice. Today, despite their legal 
right to do so, many workers feel too insecure to demand their wages in cash. 
Instead they accept, in some cases reluctantly, their employer's insistence that wages 
be paid by bank transfer, and the banks' imposition of fees for the service. 
Consumer advocates contend that a similar situation could develop with electronic 
purses. People might be given no choice but to use them, and be forced to accept 
whatever charges are levied ("Smartcards", 1996). 
4.8.6 Consumer protection 
Anyone, who is cheated, defrauded, or even suddenly impoverished as a result of a 
smart card shortcoming, may be expected to call on his/her government for help. If, 
for example, a purse card issuer failed financially and was no longer be able to 
redeem the tokens that it had sold, a government could be put under pressure to 
indemnify the losers. Naturally this possibility makes politicians wary. On the other 
hand, governments, particularly local governments, will probably be supportive of 
schemes to use contactless cards as access tokens for public transport, because there 
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is perceived to he a need to improve the image of puhlil: transportation, and persuade 
the public to minimise the usc of private cars (Higgs, 1996). 
4.9 Privacy and surveillance 
4.9.1 Perception of privacy 
According to the US Smart Card Forum, in the arenas of consumer acceptance and 
policy development, no issue is more visible or important than privacy (Allen & 
Kutler, 1997, p. 248). As a result, smart card business propositions will only be 
successful if consumers, policy makers, and all other parties, understand the role 
card technology could play in protecting privacy, whilst efficiently and securely 
delivering services and benefits. While privacy has many meanings, in the consumer 
context it is commonly defined as: 
• the consumer's interest in knowing 
• how his/her personal information will be used by business or government 
agencies, and 
• the benefits which will accrue to the consumer from such use, and 
• the extent to which the consumer can choose to limit, or prevent, that use 
(Consumer privacy, 1994; Allen & Kutter, 1997, p. 76). 
Invasions of privacy may be grouped into three categories; surveillance, the scanning 
of databases for information to be used for reasons other than those for which the 
databases were created, and unjustified identification. 
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4.9.2 Surveillance 
Surveillance, probably the least controversial infringement of privacy, may be 
defined as the activity whereby logical or physical areas arc kept under intermittent 
or continuous scrutiny, but individuals are identified only if unacceptable behaviour 
is detected. Examples are the videotaping of football crowds, or the analysis of 
expenditure patterns for anomalies. 
4.9.3 Control of personal data 
Clearly, the use of smart cards will raise social issues. A privacy policy could begin 
with the premise that the cardholder owns the data on the card, and should have 
defined rights and resp0nsibilities concerning them. For example, the policy could 
enunciate the holder's 
• right to know 
• what data are stored on the card, 
• the uses to which those data are to be put and 
• the benefits accruing to others as well as to him/herself, and 
• right to seek remedies if, in the holder's opinion, the data are not accurate. 
The policy could also define the limits within which the holder could control the 
accumulation and use of the data ("Cashless society", 1995). From a different point 
of view, corporations and others who are contemplating llsing the features of the 
smart card to encrypt sensitive inforn~ation, are concerned that governments might 
legislate to ensure that the encryption method embodies a facility to enable 
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authorised officials to read the encrypted inli.mnatil1n (Wriston, 1996). J\llhough 
there is nothing new in such Jcgislatinn, it may be regarded as authorising scanning 
and. hence, an invasion of privacy. 
4.9.4 Unjustified identification 
It has already been argued, in section 2.4.1, that accountability, for which a possible 
definition is 'the matching of individuals to their actions', begins with identification. 
The identification of individuals is important to many government agencies and 
corporations, because it contributes to efficiency and the control of fraud, and may 
offer benefits to clients as well. Indeed, a focus of information systems security in 
recent years has been the intensification of efforts to establish identity. Identification 
involves conflict between two conditions. On the one hand, flawed identity 
checking results in duplication, fraud, disruption, costs and risks; and, on the other, 
rigorous identification is invasive, and its effectiveness may be undennined by 
unpopularity, falsification and evasion. Biometry, a promising but as yet uncertain 
identification technique, is, in many senses, merely an extension of natural methods 
by harnessing technology. Whether the public senses a danger in the establishment 
of such an extension will depend on its sensitivity to privacy. High-quality 
identification offers the promise of the avoidance of error and fraud, and privacy 
advocates often have difficulty expressing their opposition to it; nevertheless, the use 
of biometric<; needs to conform to the standards and expectations of the public. 
General-purpose schl·mes may represent a threat to the fabric of contemporary 
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society (D;.1vics, 1994). but even specific-purpose biometric schemes raise tssues 
which need to be addressed. As Clarke puts it, 
"Where tran:mcti<.m trail dala arc gathered and processed by corporations with 
an interest in marketing, the activity is viewed by many people as consumer 
manipulation. Where governments do this, it may represent anything from a 
balanced and fair mechanism for protecting the public purse, to an oppressive 
exercise of power by the State over the citizen .... There are inevitable and 
necessary compromises that have to be made to privacy interests, in order to 
achieve a satisfactory mix, and privacy issues accordingly generally involve 
an exercise of discovering a suitable balance" (Clarke, 1996, p.13 & 18). 
Some people, especially in the US, for example Agre and Harbs, believe that, in 
most circumstances, the unambiguous irrefutable identification of individuals 
without their com:ent is an invasion of privacy (Agre, P. & Harbs, C., 1994). 
Hibbert supports this view, 
''Many people are concerned about the number of organisations asking for 
their Social Security Numbers. They worry about invasions of privacy and 
the oppressive feeling of being treated as just a number. Unfortunately, 
(Hibbert) can't offer any hope about the dehumanising effects of identifying 
people with numbers. •• (Hibbert, 1999, p. I). 
Contrarily, a national opinion survey carried for the Columbia University in the USA 
in 1996 by the Equifax/Harris Information Service, claimed to show that a majority 
of people may be becoming more optimistic in their outlook towards privacy 
protection (Harris & Westin, 1996). Most people would agree that scanning should 
be restricted to specific situations. For example, usually it would be reasonable to 
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~xp~ct a lender to sc:m tb~ credit record of a borrower, hut indi!-.criminatc datah<J!-.C 
scanning, or the scanning of data collcct~.:d li1r !-.tHliC unn:lat~.:d purpose, would ran.:ly 
be justifiable. 
4.9.5 Vehicle identification 
If a card forms part of the electronic systems of a car, it might become impossible for 
the driver to remain anonymous or deny anything recorded on the card. The 
potential would exist for authorities to use this feature to supplement enforcement, 
surveillance and scanning (Wigan, M .. 1994). A survey. commi!-.sioned by the 
Australian Automobile Association, concluded that many motorists thought vehicle 
tracking was "great for stolen cars but ... unacceptable ... for stolen moments" 
(Motorists' views, 1996). Despite the survey's conclusion people may be becoming 
more tolerant of electronic identification techniques (Butler, G., 1996). A general 
conclusion is that smart card technology, if properly designed and implemented. may 
enhance both the fact, and the perception, of the consumer's ability to exercise a 
much greater degree of control over personal information than is the case with any 
comparable delivery system (Consumer privacy, 1994). Nevertheless, since the 
technology, perhaps desirably, may also facilitate legitimate law enforcement, the 
basic issues of control and tmst must be addressed. 
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4.10 Resistance to change 
A final problem might he the wcll~known human characteristic, "resistance to 
change", a characteristic that is derided by those seeking to introduce changes, but is 
understandable, nevertheless. If one has mastered a way of dealing with one's 
situation or environment it is hard work coping with change and, if no gain from the 
change is perceived, resistance is a logical response. It is, therefore, the task of the 
innovators to persuade and convince, rather than compel. Ideally, there should be 
some gain for those who must change. Hopefully, in most situations, users will have 
a choice between options, but there are already indications that the first people to use 
smatt cards in large numbers might be beneficiaries and commuters by public 
transport (Lunt, P., 1995). Neither group may be considered powerful, nor will 
either benefit much. On the other hand the Australian Federal Bureau of Consumer 
Affairs takes a more optimistic view. It writes: 
"Changes in financial services are not happening overnight, and to a 
significant extent the success or failure of innovations is being determined by 
consumer demand. Most importantly, some of the new developments do 
have a real capacity to benefit consumers." ("Cashless society", 1995, p. 2). 
4.11 Conclusions 
Standards for the smart cards themselves are reasonably acceptable and mature, but 
standards for card operating systems and applications are still at the stage where 
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indu~try groups arc promoting competing ~olutions; consequently, intcropcrability 
issues remain unresolved. There is :t~ yet no evidence of' any fall in smart card costs. 
Vehicle insur:mce premium reductions arc likely to be less than the cost of vehicle 
security. so a smart card ~upportcd security system will probably be incidental to 
other smart card at.!vantagcs. It follows that improvements in the capacity and speed 
of smart cards arc e.liSCillial and there is a need for open systems so that other card 
advantages may be exploited. Smart canis arc virtually proof against cracking by 
individuals, but are conceivably vulnerable to attack by well-funded organisations 
with world-level expertise. Biometric methods of identification have yet to meet 
required standards, their testing is difficult, and the test results controversial. 
Governments have concerns about consumer choice, consumer protection, "hot 
money" and "dirty money". Human rights activists may be expected vigorously to 
oppose invasions of privacy, but with the proper design and control, smart card 
technology could actually enhance individual control over privacy. 
The crucial factor might be the difficulty of gaining the agreement of competitors to 
standardisation. If communications between devices and interoperability between 
systems could be achieved, the multi-application card might become a reality, a mass 
market emerge, and costs fall. Problems of security and identification would remain, 
but might be sufficiently controllable to be acceptable to the community. 
Standardisation is being hindered by the efforts of commercial organisations to gain 
competitive edge. This situation and related problems are examined in chapter five. 
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5 COMMERCIAL ATTITUDE & APPLICATIONS 
5.1 General 
This chapter continues consideration of the assumption that a probable precondition 
for smart cards to be used in vehicle management is their widespread general use 
which, in turn, probably depends on standardisation. Currently, ~ommercial efforts 
to identify a business case for smart cards seem to focus on a search for competitive 
edge, rather than standardisation. Therefore, the likelihood is examined that an 
acceptable business case for some smart card system will be found and some "killer 
application" emerge, tn provide the core of a multiple application card whose 
acceptance might create the environment needed for the adoption of smart cards in 
vehicle management. In that event, many of the organisations currently fighting for 
dominance might have to accept niches, whilst the industry as a whole might 
burgeon. Following this line of thought, having identified the "players" some 
possible "killer applications" are evaluated. 
5.2 The smart card industry "stakeholders" 
The "stakeholders" in the industry, each of whom must foresee a potential for profit, 
may be grouped into four categories, as follows: 
• Manufacturers who endeavour to sell the technology to the next group. They 
include: 
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• Chipmakers who have been described with the major names listed in section 
2.3. 
• Card makers who embed the chip in the card and may design the card 
operating system. As part of this process the card maker usually supplies the 
chipmaker with a mask that installs most of the operating system in the chip 
ROM. This mask forms one of up to 15 used in chip manufacture. Major 
card makers are Gemplus, Schlumberger, Bull, Siemens (lnfineon), Phillips, 
Oberthur, Orga., Datakey and Toshiba, but there are at least ten others. 
• Peripherals manufacturers who make the readers, terminals and other 
supporting hardware. 
• System providers, who constitute the market for the first group and co-operate in 
order to create the market. They include: 
• Card issuers which either are, or are prepared to assume the responsibilities 
of, a financial institution. Cards with applications that have no financial 
implication, for example identification cards, need only a sponsor. Cards 
with financial applications, however, need an issuer who is likely to be a 
bank or other organisation normally responsible for supplying credit cards, 
debit accounts, checks and electronic tokens, but might be an insurance, 
transportation or telephone company. An issuer sets the card or account 
holder's credit limit, pays for his/her purchases, funds the free credit period 
and any extended credit, and displays its name on the card ("Electronic 
Cash", 1996). 
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• Acquircrs or funds dearing houses which arc finandal institutions that 
support merchants by providing a service for processing card-based 
tran;;actions ("Glossary", 1999). Acquircrs arc actually, but not necessarily, 
banks, and, often, either arc issuers or else control or own the issuer. For 
example, Mas!crcard and Visa, potential issuers, arc each owned by a 
consortium or banks. 
• Organisations whose programmers personalise the card. Recall, from section 
4.5.2, !hat pcrsonalisation is the process of taking a "generic" smart card and 
customising it with data that are specific to a single- or multi-application card 
and the individual card holder. Almost all applications require the card to be 
personalised. These organisations are usually hired by, and are answerable 
to, an issuer. 
• Merchants who provide goods or services and accept payment by way of the 
cards. 
• Holders, members of the public who are prepared to use a smart card. 
Naturally, amongst these players there is discussion about who will benefit the most, 
and what proportion of the cost each should bear: their expectations of benefit 
impact upon the prospects of any potential application category. 
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5.3 Financial applications 
5.3.1 Transactions generally 
Today. almost everyone carries some sort of financial card, be it debit, credit, or 
stored value. Naturally this situation suggests financial applications as being 
candidate "killer applications" for smart cards. Discussion of some possibilities 
follows. Commercial transactions may be classified as either cash, or accnlal, in 
nature. Cash transactions take place virtually instantaneously; the item purchased 
and the cash being exchanged simultaneously (Horngren & Harrison, 1989, p. 86). 
A stored value smart card application, including an electronic purse, might be used 
to implement a cash transaction. Accrual transactions are initiated when either an 
item or cash is transferred, but the reciprocal transfer that completes the transaction, 
occurs later. All parties to the transaction must be assured that: 
• the other parties are genuine, identifiable and locatable, 
• the implementing messages are correctly attributed and unaltered, and 
• the confidentiality of the message contents is preserved. 
In accrual transactions, smart card applications could be used to facilitate the 
eventual payment, to provide the essential mutual identification, and possibly to 
provide secure storage for any encryption keys. Transactions involving credit cards 
are accrual in nature. 
I 
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5.3.2 Bank attitude 
Before discussing the possible nature of smart card supported transactions the 
nttitude of the trading banks, especially the US hanks, will be considered. Smart 
cards have yet to be adopted worldwide by financial institutions because, although 
fearful that others will take the business, banks are wary of participation in the 
development of smart card systems; being concerned that the business case for their 
use is weak (Lunt, 1995). This caution is particularly true of the USA financial 
community which, being the engine driving world finance and commerce, has a 
global influence. A reason for the USA reluctance, advanced by many writers, is 
that the existing investment in an infrastructure relying on magnetic stripe cards and 
an elaborate communications network is too great to abandon until it truly fails 
(Fancher, 1996; Duffy, 1996). Whilst the existing system suffers steady losses due 
to fraud, the losses are not systemic and, although increasing, are not yet sufficient. 
in many eyes, to justify the change to smart cards (Duffy, 1996). Svigals contends 
that the reason that the United States lacks a realistic, smart card, credit-card, action 
plan is simple: the two major bank credit-card associations (Visa and Mastercard) 
are service companies, and derive their revenues from their investment in networks 
and online authorisation services. The merchant pays for each online authorisation; 
the fee being a 1.5 to 2 percent discount based on transaction value. In 1995 those 
fees amounted to US$10b (Svigals, 1996). Although Svigals docs not make his 
opinion more explicit, his contention implies that he believes the credil card 
companies oppose the introduction of smart cards as electronic purses because they 
do not wish to lose this cash tlow. If his contention is tmc. Visa and Mastercard 
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seem to have adopted different strategies. Visa promotes VisaCash, an online 
payment system in which the.! smart card functions rather like an instantaneously 
cleared personal cheque, whilst Mastercard has purchased Mondcx, a largely offline 
system where the smart card functions like a digital traveller's cheque. On a more 
optimistic note, it IS possible that the introduction of financial smart card 
applications might be more rapid if a cheap reliable system of biometric 
identification could be developed and introduced. 
5.3.3 Cash transactions 
To evaluate the potential for smart card implemented financial transactions, it is 
necessary first to estimate the size of the market. A discussion of the mechanisms by 
which the currency might be created and controlled, and of the forms not involving 
smart cards, lies outside the scope of this thesis, and it should be noted that there are 
sceptics who think stored value cards may never be popular. For example, Bert Ely, 
in an article for the Cato Institute, writes: 
" ... it will be much safer to hide ten US$100 bills in one's home rather than carry 
a US$1 ,000 balance on a stored-value card used frequently to make small 
purchases." (Ely, 1996, p. 2). 
Sceptics there may be, but most authorities seem to think the electronic purse could 
function in the area at present employing coins and notes. A number of estimates of 
the total value of annual cash payments worldwide and the references upon which 
they are based have been relegated to Appendix 4. Sufticc to say here that a 
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reasonable l~stimatc might he US$101. This total may be small in value relative to 
that of transactions as a whole, but if, for example, smart cards were used for a major 
part of the transactions at present effected using cash, then almost everyone would 
have such a card. and their adoption for vehicle management would probably follow. 
5.3.4 Electronic purse definition. 
Section 2.2.1 listed .stored value transactions as one of the application categories of 
smart cards. A smart card that provides a store of value as one of its functions is a 
novel financial instrument, and the financial institutions will probably be major 
players in its development. In section 2.2 a distinction was drawn between stored 
value cards and their subset, the electronic purses. Both contain spendable digital 
tokens, but the purse may be reloaded and is more suitable for open systems. 
5.3.5 Electronic purse contenders 
Given the size of the market, it is not surprising that there is the usual struggle for 
dominance, as evidenced by a report issued in September 1996 by SJB, a company 
selling data about smart cards. The report claimed that a battle was in progress 
between the five major potential purse card issuers, which SJB identitied as 
Mastercard, Mondex, Visa with VisaCash using Banksys technology, CLIP and 
Proton (Battle, 1996, p. 1). Since Mastercard has now purchased a controlling 
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interest in Mondex, presumably, the "big five" have become the "big four". David 
Jones, editor of SJB's Card Technology Today (CTI'), wrote 
'Two major questions loom over the Big Pivc purses. Will there he scnous 
competition from non-banks? And is there scope for an international purse?" 
As to the possibility of new competition, Jones says the banks are well placed to 
issue the electronic purse, for four main reasons . 
.. First, consumers already look to banks to supply payment instruments. 
Secondly, retailers already look to banks to process card-ba<>ed transactions. 
Thirdly, banks can make use of their international networks (e.g., Europay, 
MasterCard and Visa) and their national networks for settling purse transactions. 
And finally, banks have, or are on the point of having, the necessary sman card 
technology in place.' 
However, CTT, whilst it did not pursue the idea of an international versiOn, 
elaborated on the possibility of competition by pointing out that: 
• there was no reason why only banks should issue a purse, 
• phone companies already issue stored value cards, 
• card usage could be widened to include many types of small retailer, and 
• mass transit operators are active in the field, since transport operator Creative 
Star is running one of the world's biggest purse schemes in HongKong (see 
sections 5.9.2 and 7.6.6). 
An article in the Economist in April 1997 considered the question indirectly. By 
then Proton, still the largest distributor of purse cards, had made a deal with 
American Express; no minnow by card issuer standard<>. but nevertheless not large 
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enough lO guarantee Proton indepcmlencc. The article hinted at an eventual alliance 
between Proton and Visa ("Electronic money", 1997 April 26). Four years on, there 
is still no report of any such alliance but if it did eventuate the outcome would sec 
Mastercard {Mondex) competing with Visa (Proton) and leave CUP (sponsored by 
Europay) unlikely to survive outside Europe. The possibility does not augur well for 
an international purse except within Europe, where the introduction of the eurodollar 
might nullify one of the arguments for a pan·European purse. In short, the prospects 
for a smart card supported cash transaction mechanism are not yet favourable. 
5.3.6 Accrual transactions 
The second financial area in which smart cards might make a major contribution is 
in electronically conducted accrual transactions, or e-commerce. Apart from foreign 
exchange transfers or "hot money", which will be briefly defined and then excluded 
from the discussion, if one accepts the estimates formulated in Appendix 4, 
e-commerce currently probably forms less than one percent of total world commerce. 
There are many definitions of e-commerce but electronic monetary transfers may be 
grouped into three broad sectors: 
• "hot money" flows, 
• e·commerce or business to business (b2b) payments, and 
• e-tailing, e-shopping or business to consumer (b2c) payments. 
These are now considered in more detail. 
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5.3. 7 Hot money 
"Hot money" has already been discussed in section 4.8.2, and is valued in hundreds 
of trillions of US dollars. At US$2t per day, US$700t per year may be a rcasonuh ·c 
annual estimate. It is true that the volume of elct:tronic transactions using dedicated 
communication links controlled by the financial institutions is gigantic, but in this 
activity only a relatively small number of financiers arc involved, and, even if smart 
cards were used, most people would be unaware of that fact. Most authorities, when 
discussing e~r;ommerce, exclude "hot money". 
5.3.8 E-commerce 
Electronically conducted accrual transactions between major organisations (the most 
common meaning of the term e-commerce) are valued merely in billions of US 
dollars. Many writers include Internet shopping in this sector, but a separate 
discussion of lhat category has been deferred Ia the nexl paragraph. Delail of 
estimates of the total and the references upon which they are based have again been 
relegaled Ia Appendix 4 bul a plausible estimate is probably aboul US$210b. To 
obtain some sense of proportion this estimate can be contrasted with the world's 
GDP of aboUI US$35t or lola! share-market capilalisalion of US$321. The wide 
variation is probably a consequence of differing definitions, but the market is 
certainly growing. In this type of e-commerce, authentication might be the most 
useful function of smart cards, because they are capable of delivering all needed 
controlled and traceable accesses; although it is true that money tlows could 
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probably continue hy tmditional channels. Despite that likelihood, there is a 
growmg hody of opinion that the need for identification of all parties to an 
c-commcrcc transaction could 'drive' the introduction of smart cards. 
5.3.9 E-tailing 
Internet shopping, the third sector (sometimes referred to as e-tailing), is made up of 
individual buyers who purchase using the Internet and usually buy small items such 
as computer programs, magazine articles, and CD-ROMs, and, at least in the USA, 
effect payment with credit cards. Currently, this market is smaller than the market 
for the "purse" and, umil recently, could be measured in millions of US dollars. Yet 
again estimates of its current total and supporting references have been relegated to 
Appendix 4, but a reasonable figure might be US$ lOb. From the perspective 
illustrated in Figure 4 it may be concluded that the claims sometimes made that 
e-shopping is about to change the world is premature. Exacerbating the problems of 
e-shopping are those of handling micropayments, which are briefly discussed in 
Section 7.6. Finally, it should be noted that even if thee-shopping total is smaller 
than predicted, individual purchases over the Internet could have implications for 
those states, or political entities, that depend on sales taxes for revenue. 
127 
Sinct: it is easy to overlook the great difference in sc<lle limn glohai firwndal flows, 
to world commcrc~:, to ~.:~~.:nmmt.:n:l!, to c·:•hopping, the following diagram attempts 
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Figure 4: World linuncc nnd commerce in perspective 
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5.3.10 Security problems with c-shopping 
Traders are bclicyed to be wary about making major purchases and reluctant to pass 
their authorising numbers across an Internet that they may not regard as secure: they 
have good reason for their caution. The description of a fairly recent scam shows 
how, using stolen or irregularly acquired credit card numbers, a group stole US$47m 
from members of the US public. The amount stolen from any one person was small 
but, according to the report, both Visa and Mastercard made a profit from the scam 
(Wallich, 1999; Faughnan, 1999). ln 1996 Walter Wriston formerly CEO of 
Citibank believed that the major impediment to the expansion of electronic 
payments is the sectlrity of the Jntemet and, in particular, the US Government 
determination that it must be able to decipher all ciphers (Wriston, 1996), but two 
years later Charles Goldfinger, Chairman of the European Financial Issues Working 
Group, belie'ved there to be a growing consensus that secure payment could be 
achieved by a combination of PKI and digital signatures (Goldfinger, 1998). The US 
may have been persuaded because it now permits the use and export of 
''unbreakable" encryption schemes. Theoretical solutions designed to overcome 
security fears are being advanced in most developed countries, and small schemes 
are being implemented. The solutions range from the use of trusted third parties, to 
encrypted digital numbers representing cash that are purchased from an issuer who is 
bound to redeem them when they are presented. The schemes depend on reliable 
identification, and probably any of the candidate standard smart card schemes 
discussed in section 4.4 (Multos, Javacard. and Windows for smurt cards) could 
provide this feature if the business community could agree on one of them. 
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5.3.11 Summary 
Tile electronic purse possibility appears to be stalled in a competitive tug-of-war and 
because the business case is weak, but c-commcrce is growing rapidly, and if the 
business community ac'ccpted smart card systems a'i a facilitating mechanism, smart 
cards could become as ubiquitous within that community as photocopiers are now. 
For the general public, that situation would be matched only if e-shopping equalled 
the growth of e-commerce, which it has yet to do. As with the electronic purse, the 
acceptance of smart card based system(s) would imply public familiarity with the 
cards and the existence of the infrastructure needed to support them, and their 
adoption for vehicle management would probably follow. 
5.4 Telecommunications 
In many countries the telecommunications industry. is directly owned by the 
Government and, even privately owned telecommunication companies, known as 
telcos, are heavily regulated. There are logical reasons for this situation. 
Telecommunications: 
• has a substantial direct effect on the national economy, 
• by its nature, tends to be monopolistic, 
• requires global, let alone national, standardisation, 
• uses a limited public resource (the frequency spectrum), and 
• requires an enormous capital investment in infrastructure. 
I 
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The telecommunications industry is already the lurgcst user of smart cards, and h:~s 
experience with their usc both in cellular telephones and in payphoncs. Furlhcrmorc, 
there is <Ill increasing convergence between the computing and telecommunications 
industries. Therefore, telecommunications would seem to be an industry likely to 
produce a "killer application" that might form the core to which other applications 
could be added. At first glance SlM cards might be thought to be the most 
promising possible "killer application", because they are used to manage both money 
and communications, and more Sllv1 cards have been put into use than any other true 
smart card. A discussion of possible reasons why this has not happened is deferred 
until chapter seven. 
5.5 Oil companies. 
Oil companies have always endeavoured to persuade their outlets to make better use 
of their sites by offering services in addition '(o the dispensation of fuel, oil and 
lubricants, and, in particular, payment by credit, or debit, fuel cards. Although the 
companies have a substantial investment in the databases created from the data 
obtained from fuel cards, if vehicles generally included a smart card system with a 
stored value application, the cost of obtaining on-line authorisation for purchases 
could be reduced. Further, if motorists habitually used smart cards to purchase 
petrol and other items at petrol stations, the cards could become an extended source 
of marketing information (Dick, 1995). However, control of the data might move 
from the oil company to the car owner. Accordingly, oil companies might be 
ambivalent about any moves to establish such systems. Each company may be 
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expected to favour a proprietary system that "Jor..:ks in" its customers and, thus, the 
inevitable "conflict of interest" obstacle to standardisation might reappear. On I 4111 
March 1997, in the UK, in an apparent effort to circumvent cuslOmcr resistance to 
this strategy, the Shell Oil Company launched "Shell Smart", a cooperative effort by 
Shell and a number of substantial companies in different fields. The companies 
were: 
• Commercial Union 
• Dixons 
• Hilton Hotels 
• John Menzies 
• The Link 
• RAC 
• Shell 
• Vision Express 
• Victoria Wines. 
No other oil company participated ("lnTouch", 1998). Even this scheme is likely to 
encounter customer resistance because, for example, the customer who likes Shell 
petrol might not like Victoria wines. 
5.6 Major retailers 
Cooperative, departmental and mail order retailers, world wide, arc seeking to 
encourage customer "loyalty". Supermarkets, which usually provide free parking for 
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their customers. might be keen to promote a smart card parking system if it would 
enable them to identify and reward their better customers (Duffy, 1996). The 
customers, themselves, would prohably prefer a card that was valid at any 
supermarket of their choice; a conflict of motivation likely to delay the introduction 
of any scheme. 
5.7 Entertainment 
Smart cards could be used to authorise viewing of in-house entertainment, such as 
pay TV, in much the same way as for access to public transport, although the 
possibility of petty fraud is greater, since the holder is likely to have undisturbed 
access to the reader (Seidman, 1994). An advantage from the entertainment 
provider's point of view is that, given an appropriate connection, the smart card 
could be either reloaded or nullified without the need to visit the in-house terminal. 
The payment scheme eventually chosen might depend more on the outcome of 
competition between telecommunication companies than that between smart card 
issuers; a choice that might not be made for some time. 
5.8 Local authorities 
Local authorities, such as city councils and shires, arc unlikely to agree upon any 
single scheme, and might be expected to be cautious about pioneering any high 
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technology solution, but have at le:tsl two potential, vehicle related, smart card 
applicntions. 
• The control of congestion and pollution. For example, as described in section 
3.2, in Singapore smart cards arc used to support a system that imposes a fcc 
upon the drivers of vehicles that enter a designated central area. 
• The control of parking. Luk has suggested a two~stage strategy for moving 
towards a smart card~based system. Civic authorities could first institute a 
magnetic-stripe, disposable~card system, and after a period, perhaps three years, 
upgrade it to a reloadable, smart card system. He believes that public 
acceptance, rather than technical difficulties or the need to raise revenue, will be 
the controlling factor. In discussing problems, he points out that an 
infrastructure would need to be established to sell the cards and recharge them, 
and that a funds clearing house would be required, and claims that banking 
institutions are reluctant to be involved in low value transactions such as phone 
calls or parking (Luk, 1995, p. II). That might be so at present, but if smart card 
systems began to be installed nationwide, the banks would be loath to let the 
business go to others. 
In Perth, as elsewhere, the city fathers are waiting for the bandwagon to move before 
jumping aboard. Two major prerequisites arc the widespread adoption of electronic 
purses and standardisation (preferably international) of the technology for parking. 
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5.9 Federal and State Governments. 
Governments, worldwide, arc inwstigating the possibility of electronic regulation 
and delivery of services (especially social services), and the potential for smart card 
systems in applications of this nature (sec section 7.5.5). All these possibilities 
might have an indirect, but only road pricing a direct, effect on vehicle management. 
5.9.1 Road pricing 
Road pricing is under consideration by many national and regional governments 
(Harrop, 1994). Roads are a national investment, but the return on the investment is 
uncertain, and the methods of collecting it, currently either through general taxation 
or through fuel taxes, are controversial ("Options", 1966). Recognising that road 
pricing is an emotive, as much as logical, issue, Governments are proceeding 
cautiously. A call for submissions from the NZ Ministry of Transport seems to 
indicate that government support for a road pricing will not be forthcoming unless 
the alternatives become insupportable ("Options", 1996). If benefits, such as better 
funding for road construction, reduced congestion and pollution, and increased 
safety, can be demonstrated, governments might adopt a more positive attitude. If 
that happens, ease of use may dictate an automatic toll system, and give a boost to 
the installation of smart cards in vehicles (Harrop, 1994). As described in section 
3.2, and demonstrated by the Singapore ERP, a technical solution to the problem of 
efficiently collecting road tolls seems to be within reach. A non-technical problem is 
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the difficulty of !oitandardi!-iing both charging and charge collection systems 
(Electronic toll collection, 1997). 
5.9.2 Public Transport Ticketing 
A promising commercial area in which smart cards might make a substantial, initial 
impact is transportation. since contactless cards might provide a convenient way of 
authorising access to the transport medium, and a rapid method of payment. From 
the transport operator's point of view this rapidity is highly desirable for its own 
sake, but, in addition, the operator would be able to acquire valuable statistics about 
the passengers. The major disadvantage of contactless smart cards is their cost. A 
secondary problem is that current systems are vulnerable to individual petty fraud, 
although the possibility of a systemic fraud appears small. Major schemes are being 
conducted in many parts of the world, of which the largest is in HongKong. In 
Australia, Transcard, a multi-function, rcloadable, stored value, transportation access 
card is being trialed in Sydney. A small scheme was first implemented in the suburb 
of StMary's, and then, in 1996, expanded into western Sydney generally. Consumer 
research conducted by McNair, indicated that although users found contactless cards 
convenient to use and readily acceptable on buses, this was not true of shopkeepers, 
who failed to provide vending devices. Consequently, card usage has failed to 
expand to any marked degree. If expanded acceptance does occur, the c;.u-d issuers 
will want to exploit the user base and add other applications, which might put 
pressure in the financial institutions either to develop contact cards, or to exploit the 
contact interface of a dual interface option. In South Korea the Pusan Bank plans a 
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large (I million cards and 10,000 terminals) pilot scheme and proposes to usc a dual 
interface card in this way (''South Korea bank", 2000). If these: and other schemes 
prove successful, in the future a symbiosis between banks and transportation 
operators might develop. 
5.9.3 Health. 
At least two possibilities exist for the application of smart cards in health. First, a 
card could be used to store its holder's individual health record, and the cards of a 
population of patients then analysed to produce a reference databa'ie. There is a 
growing need to store, retrieve and analyse, large volumes of data because the 
number of tests available to medical professionals is increasing rapidly. A smart 
card system might meet the requirement efficiently (Hnnnan, 1994). A smart card 
supported health record system has been implemented in France. The concept is 
analogous to that common in business, where not only are records kept of 
transactions and analysed to provide a view of the sitnation of the business, but, in 
addition, industry associations keep aggregated records of the situations of their 
members, so that any member is able to see how it is performing in relation to the 
other members. Second, since health administration commonly involves benefits 
and other public contributions. administrative, as opposed to medical, detail could be 
stored on the card. Germany has introduced this type of system (Duffy, 1996). If the 
possibility of storing either medical or administrative information is fully exploited, 
smart cards are likely to become more familiar to the general public. 
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5.9.4 Welfare 
In several states in the USA. biometrics, sometimes in conjunction with smart cards, 
have already been introduced as an authentication device to prevent fraud (Campbell 
& Alyea. 2000). Several authorities have suggested an extension of this system to 
usc the smurt card as an electronic purse, but the suggestion docs not yet appear to 
have been tried. Nevertheless, it seems a likely candidate for application 
development, since the number of cardholders would be fairly large and individual 
holders would have difficulty in pressing any objections. In September, 1998, the 
Asia Pacific Smart Card Fomm, whose members include most leading Australian 
smart card companies, wrote to four Federal Ministers complaining about the delay 
by Centrelink in deploying smart card delivery mechanisms ("Smart-card makers", 
1998). The Government response has not been made public (see also section 7.5.5). 
5.10 Conclusions 
In the discussion of possible applications, the requirement of the holders has been 
considered only a<; a factor to be taken into consideration by the other players. 
Holders would probably like a multi-application card to reduce the number of cards 
they must carry, and the ability to choose the applications on their cards. In 
particular they might wish to have debit, credit and electronic purse facilities on the 
one card. This may cause conflicts as to the security required for each upplication. 
For example, no existing card could support both public and symmetric key 
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cryptography. From the acquirer's point of view cost justification of this 
combination is marginal. There seems little chance of making prolits until a "critical 
mass" of merchants with compatible readers exists. According to the UK Smart 
Card Club, experience has shown that banks and retailers do not negotiate 
successfully on an industry-to-industry basis. Thus there is a conflict between, on 
the one hand, the open, multi-application vision of the banks and holders and, on the 
other, the desire of the merchants to capture the "loyalty" of their customers ("In 
Touch", 1998). The "players" in the smart card game must each see an opportunity 
to benefit. As always, commercial factors will eventually prevail over technology 
and Government fears. Once the manoeuvring and negotiation to achieve mutually 
acceptable positions is over, investment in smart card applications may increase and 
a "killer application" emerge. In that eventuality other applications may scramble to 
attach themselves to the same card to form a multi-application system. When some 
"critical mass" is reached the much predicted explosion in card use might occur. 
6 SPECIFIC INVESTIGATIONS 
6.1 General 
Some questions could not be answered by reference to the lilcraturc. No vehicle 
management system appeared to have been analysed to determine what rcwritahlc 
storage might be needed, and although the potential to control the operation and security 
of a vehicle using a smart card as a token was obvious, no device to demonstrate the 
potential has been constructed to date. No infonnation was available a<; to owner and 
driver attitudes to light vehicle management and neither was there any report of what 
they might pay. Therefore, to clarify these matters, specific investigations were 
undertaken. 
6.2 Non-volatile rewritable memory estimation 
A set of data flow diagrams was prepared to enable the estimation of the memory 
requirement for a smart card supported vehicle management system. These diagrams 
follow. A description of the required data stores forms part of the system repository 
that is at Appendix 5. 
The system modelled by the diagrams is fairly comprehensive and assumes the vehicle 
is fitted with a transceiver enabling external entities to extract data (and, perhaps, even 
cash) from the smart card without the need for physical contact or stopping. This 
electronic purse feature would be useful for toll payments as well as regulation, since 
cash could be added at ATMs; and, if banks and authorities provided the appropriate 
facilities, it could be used for petrol purchases and parking charges. The model 
incorporates a provision for the driver to input a usage code to identify the purpose of 
the journey for usage control. Securir.y could be either two-factor (card and password) 
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or better (card and template derived from a biometric feature). The arming code so 
derived could be made a necessary input for the operation of any/all of the 10 to 20 
microcontrollers in a modern car, and since these devices control the engine, the 
gearbox, brakes and many other features of the car, bypassing all of them to steal the car 
would be very difficult. 
The smart card processes proposed in the model are in six groups, namely: 
• enrolment, 
• driver identification, 
• data transmission, 
• sensor polling, 
• vehicle management, and 
• data extraction . 
Enrolment enables all the external entities to be identified on the smart card and the 
extent of their authority, rights and obligarions, defined. In an ideal design the card 
might be a dual interface card, with the authentication of the driver provided via the 
contactless interface, and all other detail via the contact option. With such a design, no 
external reader would be needed to provide access, whilst the other functions could be 
supported by a securely located card. However, if the card incorporated an electronic 
purse, or other payment function, the current misgivings of the financial institutions 
about the security of contactless interfaces would have to be overcome. In the modelled 
system, vehicle activation occurs when an authorised driver supplies the con·cct 
authorisation and a usage code, or when the owner activates the vehicle in valet mode 
for servicing. Interaction with external authorities, or merchants, is supported, and a 
process can p'ersonalise the vehicle to suit the driver and control the speed. Sensor 
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readings would be repeatedly polled und stored in a cyclic queue, and finally, the owner 
could extract periodically, the data stonxl on the smart card and ohtain a report of starts, 
usage, payments and spccified sensor records. 
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Note: Data llows that are identical to the stores in which they originate or terminate are not labelled and those that are identical 
have the same name even when appearing in different places (Hawryszkiewycz, t99B, p. 164) 
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Note: Five data stores from Level 0 hnvc been repeated here for clarity 
because the extracted data depends on the RcspnnscDdinition. 
Figure 8 
4.1 
Poll vehicle sensors 
DIAGRAM 4 
Poll vehicle sensors 
Scn~urRrcaJing~ 
VEl IICLE SENSORS 
Engine rev>. !cmperuwrc. oil prc\>urc. 
>pccJ_kph. imukc manifu!J prc>>urc. 
oJmnc!cr. thron!c >cUing, lime 
......................... VEHICLE PULSE 
GENERATOR 
Stomb!cRcaJings 
Store the sensor 
readings as apppropriate 
(At start, at each pulse 
PrcviousRcadings 
maxima only) ScnsorRcaJingsAsAppropriatc 
SENSOR READINGS 
• Max deceleration since !a>t start. 
Max speed since last ~tan 
L~~t stan time 
Turn: last read 





Power (throttle opening) 
EngmcRcn• 
Note I. External entity VEHICLE from the Context Diagram hns been expanded 
here to show relevant sensors and items. 
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The data flow diagrams and the system repository (Appendix 5) that supports them, 
show tlmt existing normal smart cards with 8 bit processors and 8K of EEPROM would 
be inadequate to provide ~til or even most of the desired applications. The "data stores" 
section of the repository shows an estimated initial requirement to store over 2K of data; 
therefore, assuming a factor of three as an allowance for expansion, the entire 8K could 
be used for data. Use of a factor of three is common in other engineering disciplines: 
for example, the Marks Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers proposes a figure 
between 1.5 and 4 depending on the degree of uncertainty (MacGregor, 1967). The 
object code of the program at Appendix 8, to compare a stored codeword to a supplied 
word, required 338 bytes, some of which was used for offsets and other constants. 
However, at least 200 bytes was required for the basic process of getting a data item, 
comparing it to a stored item and responding appropriately. Using this figure for a 
comparison as a yardstick, the 19 processes envisaged in the model, have been 
estimated to require an additional 9600 bytes (rounded to lOK) of memory. Estimates 
for each process, including stacks and queues, have been shown with the process 
descriptions in the System Repository at Appendix 5. The estimate is lent additional 
plausibility by figures from a paper recently presented to the CARDIS 2000 conference. 
Here the authors showed that the cardlets for synthetic benchmark handlers, each of 
which considered four kinds of Application Programming Data Unit (APDU), required 
from 2-to 4.5K bytes depending on the smart card used (Castella-Roca, Domingo-Ferrar 
& Planes, 2000). To the requirement for storage space for vehicle management 
processes and data stores, must be added space for other applications. A multi-
application card would require an interface between the applications and the chip 
instruction set, which could take the form of an operating system such as !vtULTOS, or 
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an application programming interfnce, such as the Java API, superimposed on any of a 
range of proprietary operating systems. 
In tabular form: 
Table 5: Card memory requirement 
Data 8K 
Processes JOK 
Other applications 8K 
Interface 2K 
Total 28K 
A conclusion is that even current 16-bit smart cards could not support the 
comprehensive system modelled. However, although the required memory is not yet 
provided by any commercially available card, the manufacture of such a card is within 
the technical potential oftoday's manufacturers. 
6.3 Vehicle Fleet Manager Opinions 
As determined in chapter one, about ten percent of Australia's light vehicles are fleet 
owned. To ascertain fleet manager opinions, the questionnaire at Appendix 6 was sent 
to the managers of what were believed to be five of the biggest vehicle fleets in W A, 
eliciting responses that proved to be almost identical. In each case the present system 
relies on data obtained as a result of purchases made with a magnetic stripe fuel card. 
The static detail on the card, the amount of the purchase, and the odometer reading as 
advised by the driver, are recorded by the petrol station, the information is assembled 
centrally by the oil ClJmpany that issued the card, and a periodic report is sent to the 
fleet manager. The c<mvassed managers felt that the system was reasonably 
satisfactory; particularly, if the same driver customarily drove the vehicle. There was 
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occasionally a problem with defect reporting when the vehicle was driven by a number 
of different drivers, and managers would have welcomed more information. The main 
objection to the available alternative automatic logg,ing systems was their cost. 
6.4 Security and a Simulation 
In chapter three potential vehicle security was described under the headings of 
perimeter security, alarms and immobilisers, multi~point immobilisation and aids to 
recovery. Apart from a possible contribution to better locking, a ~mart card system 
could do little to improve perimeter strength. since this is mainly a function of materials 
and manufacture, but it might impact on the remaining three aspects. Current 
irnrnobilisers are reasonable value and a smart card system might improve their security 
because it would be a two-factor system requiring something the driver knows, as well 
as something he carries (or is). The state diagram that follows--shows the different 
security states that could be achieved with the system envisaged. 
OPEN 
Doors unlocked 
Theft alarm activated 
Seats and mirrors 
adjusted 
STATE DIAGRAM 
Vehicle security slates 
Ctard in<icrtcd in contact reader. 
Authentication code matched 
{PIN, biometric or other) or 
[Valet code keyed in! 
Arming t:odc sent to igniti(m ;md fuel systems. 
Rclcusc code sent to brakes, steering and 
bonnet catch. 
(Locking release prcssun: reservoir 
prcssuriscd opened) 
Doors lockable I unlockuhlc manually. 
Card removed from proximity of 








Ignition and fuel systems disarmed. 
Locking release pressure reservoir 
depressurised. (Battery operated pump) 
If no weight on any seat for 'X' seconds 
and all doors and windows closed then 
doors, brakes, steering and bonnet all 
locked. Theft alarm sensitised. 
LOCKED 
Ignition and fuel 
systems disarmed. 
Doors, brakes, 
steering and bonnet 
catch locked. 
Theft alarm sensitised 
Notes 
I. If valet code keyed in the 
vehicle may only alternate 
between ready and running. 
The owner may remove the card 
2. A dual chip card is assumed 




Ignition and fuel system~ arrncJ 
but off 
Doors as manually selected 
Brnkcs, steering and bonnet catch 






Ignition and fuel 
systems on. 




The system might be a little more convenient, since if the smart card was removed the 
vehicle would automatically be immobiliscd. To demonstrate the technical simplicity 
of a smart card controlled vehicle security system, a hardware simulation was 
constructed. The block diagram of the simulation that follows demonstrates the two-
factor aspect of a smart card system. The Pascal code needed to extract the activation 
key from the card is at Appendix 7, and the Motorola assembler code needed to 
compare it to the key stored in the vehicle actuating microcontrollers is at Appendix 8 
THE SIMULATION 
A block diagram of the main components of the system 
ICodc from keypad 










\ Device L..--i-1 Micro j 
Controller 
\ '-----j.,/ \ /L. __ __J 
'•, ,.· 
The area within the dotted 
ellipse to be encased in rigid 
thermosetting resin so that it 
cannot be bypassed without 
damaging the device 
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The simulation was constructed using a variety of compommts, sec Figure 15. Th'.! 
smart card was from Smart Silicon Systems Ltd (SSS) and incorporated a Hitachi 
HS/310 chip supporting their smart card operating system (SCOS). Since only a basic 
reader was available, enrolment was carried out us.ing lhe SSS Mercwin program that 
loads on a PC and enables the reader to be manipulated. The PC was required because 
the available card was application specific and not programmable by the researcher. 
For a more realistic simulation a programmable card, such as the Java cards, Smart Card 
for Windows or GemXpresso would be needed together a reader with an integral 
keypad, as these are now available at a reasonable price. Alternatively, in the unlikely 
event that access was granted under contract by Mondex International, a program could 
be written for a Mondex card in MEL. During enrolment a codeword wa<; stored on the 
card, but in a more sophisticated system, a biometric template would have been used. 
Using a standard terminal emulator package, ProComm, the same codeword was stored 
on a microcontroiler that was representative of the microcontrollers found on a modem 
car. The particular microcontroller is a Motorola MC68HCll that is commonly used as 
an engine controller. Using a Motorola development board the small assembler 
program at Appendix 8 was also stored on the HCll. Finally, the Pascal program in 
Appendix 7, running on a PC, enabled a user to direct the smart card to pass the 
codeword to the microcontroller where the assembler program compared it to the 
previously stored codeword and, if the two matched, sent a group of pulses to the 
thyristor between the power supply and the device. If the thyristor did not first receive 
the pulse..li, power could not reach the device. Security, therefore, depended upon the 
user having been enrolled, being in possession of the smart card, and knowing 1he 
codeword to activate the Pascal program. Additionally, it depended upon the 
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microcontroller and thyristor being mounted on the device in such a way that they could 
be neither removed nor bypassed without incapacitating the device. With potting resin 
this would be possible. 
Switch 






From P.C . to microcontroller 
Smartcard 
The simulation demonstrated only the security aspects of vehicle management and, in 
particular, no attempt was made to assess the response time of the card used. In a more 
ambitious simulation a com bi card, as described in section 2. 7 .6 could be used, if a 
programmable version could be found, and the feasibility of contact with external 
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authorities examined. For the limited ,h;monstration to hl! expanded into a smart card 
management system installed on a vehicle, a number of vehicle modifications would he 
necessary and some devices would need to be installed, as ronows. 
• First is a smart card access module (SAM). A contact reader component of this 
module would be required to obtain the activation key and any data required for 
personalising the vehicle. The SAM should be able to write data obtained from 
sensors (rpm, temperature, etc.) to the card. Prob~ems with vibration causing 
intermittent disconnection of contacts may have to be solved. 
• Second, a contactless terminal component would be needed to respond to the access 
control signal if a dual interface card was used. 
• Third, microcontrollers, together with thyristors, or some other circuit control 
devices, would be needed for each system that wa<; to be activated under the control 
of the smart card. A modern car already has about 20 microcontrollers, and some of 
these could be incorporated into the smart card system. 
• Fourth, sensors would be needed to capture the different dala items to be recorded 
on the card. In a number of cases these sensors would already be present and 
supplying input in analog form to instruments, or the engine control unit. 
• Fifth, an input device might be needed to enable the driver to interact with the card. 
This could be a keypad to accept a PIN and/or codes covering usage. If a biometric 
feature was to be used to identify the driver then an appropriate scanner would be 
needed. 
• Sixth, if the application called for the contactless payment of tolls or parking 
charges then some form of transmitter would have to be installed. 
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• Finally, an output/display device could possibly he required if the application 
envisaged external authorities, or others, communicating with the driver. 
Conceivably the output could be by voice using some form of wireless transmission. 
This list presumes that current automotive technology has continued in use. In the 
event of futuristic developments such as "drive by wire" control, or a manufacturing 
and distribution process driven by e-commercc technology, other presently 
unforeseeable modifications might be necessary. Whether or not these developments 
occur the modifications would add to the cost. 
6.5 Security cost and Perceived Benefit 
6.5.1 Perceived need for security. 
Potential security benefits must be related to their ne~d as perceived by owners and their 
cost. There is no unanimity as to the needed level of security. Geason quoted UK 
Home Office Consultants on this point. In 1985 the Consultants believed that better 
vehicle design could contribute to security and indicated that necessary security features 
should include: 
• better locks for doors, steering, and ignition, laminated window glass, protected 
bonnet and boot catches and audible reminders of carelessness, such as leaving 
doors unlocked. 




• central locking, and 
• engine immobilisation. 
6.5.2 Cost of smart card facilitated vehicle security 
When considering card system security, as with all security, the need must be balanced 
against the cost and, according to Geason, the Consultants estimated that car buyers 
might pay up to US$100 extra for effective security. However, she also quoted 
manufacturers as saying "security doesn't sell cars"(Geason & Wilson, 1990). Since 
fewer than 10% of claims against vehicle insurers relate to vehicle theft, it is unlikely 
that any reduction in premiums will be enough to pay for the cost of adequate security. 
A general conclusion is that, if smart card supported security systems are to be part of 
vehicle design, the systems should be incidental to other features for which the buyers 
will be prepared to pay. What Austraiian motorists might be prepared to pay is now 
examined. If a smart card security system could be provided at close to the same cost as 
an immobiliser, then it would probably be chosen because of the extra facilities it wuuld 
provide. Since individual owners seemed to be satisfied with present us~:ge and 
maintenance control arrangements, it may be assumed that they would not be prepared 
to pay much to improve those aspects of any management system. Security is probably 
their main concern, and therefore, in an effort to determine how strong was that 
concern, a questionnaire was distributed to 300 vehicle drivers in the Edith Cowan 
University , Mount Lawley car park and eighty five responses were obt<lint:d. The 
questionaaire is at Appendix 9, and a table summarising the responses follows. The 




owner-drivers would like better security, hut would he prepared to pay only from 
A$1 00 to A$500 for it. 
Table 6: What motorists might pay for security 
CAR PARK OPINION SURVEY 
QUESTION NUMBER ANil PERCENT GIVING INDICATED RESPONSE 
!\lore I $500 I $100 I $50 I $25 I $11) I Less I y" IN<> I ToU!I 
What would you p~y for I 26 32 H 4 12 2 " ultim~tc security'.' 1.2':1- JU'l- ]8.5'fr I! A% u 1·U 2.4% l ()()'h. 
'"· 'l What would you pay for prcuy . H ll 23 ' II 1 HS good sc.:urity~ 9.6'::¥ J4.1J<;t. 27.7'7< 6'7< l.U H.4'.f. 100% ,, 
Is standanl security enough? 30 55 " 36% 64'k 100% 
Arc alanmlimmobi1iscrs worth 71 14 H5 
fitting~ 84'7< 16% ](){)'k 
What would you pay for an . 1 "' 11 3 4 14 H5 alamllimmobiliscr~ 8A% 47% 20.5% 36 4.8% 15.7% IOO'k 
% . .. 
Fleet managers accepted that the present security arrangements already cost something, 
and for a better system, would be prepared to pay a litt.le more. None was prepared to 
give an opinion as to a specific figure without detail about what a smart card system 
might do: however, in conversation, for a total system providing both security and 
management, one percent of vehicle cost was mentioned. This would be about A$200 
per vehicle. 
6.6 Summary 
As a result of these investigations it has been determined that a smart card suitable for 
use in vehicle management would probably need a dual interface should have between 
20K and 30K of rcwritablc memory. 1\ dual interface chip might meet the technical 
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requirement for access and activation, but might not gain widespread usc for reasons 
unrclat::d to vehicle management (e.g., Jinancial institution misgivings about security). 
Vehicle Occt owners might be interested in a smart card supported management system 
if it was cheaper than existing vehicle logging devices, but the upper limit of one 
percent of vehicle value is possibly based more on optimism that any firm limitation. 
Apart from very elaborate security involving biometric identification, only ten percent 
of owner-drivers indicated they were prepared to pay more than one hundred dollars. 
For a full system, vehicles would require quite extensive and expensive modifications. 
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7 RESULTS & PREDICTIONS 
7.1 General 
The first chapter poses four questions. 
• What technical advances are needed and what might be expected? 
Technology generally is considered in chapter two, and some aspects specific to 
vehicle management, in chapter six. Now, required improvements and technical 
expectations are described in sections 7.2 and 7.3. 
• What problems might impede improved personal mobility? 
Problems, as it turns out mainly of a non-technical and non-commercial kind, are 
discussed in chapter four. In sections 7.4 and 7 .5, this chapter considers what 
solutions might be feasible and whether regulatory action might facilitate them. 
• What commercial developments and changing public attitudes might result m an 
environment conducive to a smart card supported system. 
This question resolves, after discussion in chapter five, into an evaluation of the 
possibility of a "killer application". The prospects of each of the candidate "killer 
applications" are evaluated in section 7 .6, and, as an alternative, a projection of 
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possible growth, based upon published actual figures and industry forecasts, 1s 
presented in section 7.7. 
• What is the perception of the need for improved personal mobility, including better 
vehicle management? 
Chapter three outlines the possibilities for better management but perception may not 
be the same as reality, and this aspect is examined in section 7.8 before drawing a 
general conclusion. 
7.2 Required improvements 
7.2.1 Chip architecture 
When considering the advances needed to make smart cards practicable and acceptable 
for a wide range of applications, it must be borne in mind that events may be influenced 
by apparently unrelated developments such as faster higher-capacity communications 
disintennediating the motor industry, the development of alternatives to liquid fossil 
fuels, "drive by wire designs", a heightened public concern about pollution, and any 
number of other currently unforseen possibilities. However, disregarding such 
unpredictable events, it is still clear that improvements are required to the cards 
themselves, both hardware and software; to peripherals and infrastructure; and, to 
associated technologies such as biometric identification. From this limited perspective 
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the outline or an ideal multi-application architecture might be like that illustrated in the 
block diagram at Figure I 6. 




Java YM security 
(8-JJK ROM) management 
Operating system ( 14K ROM) 
Hardware 
Figure 16: An idealised smart card architecture. 
The card management system may be considered analogous to a data base management 
system and it will be needed to control the loading and unloading of applications, and to 
maintain their security, integrity, and independence. Block labels indicate the functions 
of other components in this scheme. This architecture would be needed to support the 
multi-application card that has been assumed to be necessary to promote ubiquitous smart 
card use. 
7.2.2 Chip improvements 
As estimated in chapter six, existing normal smart cards, even those with 16-bit 
processors and 16K of EEPROM, are inadequate to provide all, or even most, of the 
desired applications. A more powerful card is needed. In a multi-application card for 
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general use, the chip will need a cryptographic facility which will probably be 
asymmetric. For reassurance, the key is likely to be at least I 024 bit, and much of the 
work of encryption will be carried out in a hard-wired co-processor. For security, at least 
parts of the facility should be in ROM; and, for speed, access will require more RAM 
than is now normal in card chips. If the chip is to compare biometric features, then it will 
need even more processing power. To produce acceptable results, it will need to have 
increased reliability, faster enrolment capability, and improved discrimination between 
biometric features. It will be recalled that in chapter six the requirement, fqr non-volatile, 
rewritable memory for a comprehensive vehicle management system alone was estimated 
as l8K. As mentioned in section 2.7.4, chips with 32-bit words and 32K of rewritable 
non-volatile memory capable of being installed in smart cards have been designed, and at 
least two, the CASCADE chip and Motorola's M-Smart Jupiter, even manufactured. No 
applications are known to have followed, probably because the resultant smart cards so 
far have been considered to be too expensive by potential issuers. Both the CASCADE 
and the Jupiter chips need 32-bit processors because their code is interpreted rather than 
native (P. Spalding, Senior Engineer, ERG, personal communication, July 11, 2000). 
Given a large enough demand it is probable that the requirement could be met. Overall, 
bearing in mind that the potential for card improvement is heavily weighted by that for 
chip improvement, what emerges is a requirement as follows: 
Table 7: Required and available chip features. 
Feature Probably Now available 
Required 
EEPROM 32K 16K 
RAM IK 256 to 640 bit 
ROM 30K 25K 
Clock speed 20MHz 3 to 14MHz 
Word size 16 bit 8 or 16 bit 
Circuit density 0.35 micron 0.7 micron 
Power 1.8 v 3 to 5 v 
Current < I to 10 rnA < 200mA 
Note: The parameter values shown under "now available" arc not all available 
on any one card chip. 
This hardware requirement could be as illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 17. 







16·bit word bus 
I 
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Rewritable R ROM 
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Figure 17: Required chip features. 
167 
7.2.3 Card manufacture and chip embedding 
Reductions in curd costs, as distinct from chip costs, would be helpful and this might be 
achieved partly by obtaining economies of scale, as discussed in section 7 .4, and partly by 
more efficient manufacturing technology. The main task in manufacture is to embed the 
chip in the card: a far from a simple process. There are two technologies. 
• With PVC laminated cards, the core lamina is printed and has a recess milled in it, the 
chips are fanned with contact plates into modules that are attached to an epoxy 
bonding tape. The tape, which bonds on one side to the plastic and on the other to the 
chip silicon, is chopped into units that are pressed into the milled recesses, a coating 
of resin is applied and then ground flush, and outer transparent laminae are added. 
The work is almost completely automated and, although even in 1992 an output rate 
of 1800 cards per hour had been achieved (Baker, !992), further improvements may 
be possible. 
• With ABS cards the process is different. The chip and contact plate module is placed 
between outer laminae, and the core lamina is injected to fill the space and surround 
the module (Benhammou, 1997). At least for small runs the basic process is cheaper, 
but the cards are more difficult to print. 
In either process, some manufacturers embed the module in a lead frame to protect it 
from stresses imposed by flexure of the card: no doubt, this adds to the cost. What is 
needed is a satisfactory method of printing 6h ABS, together with a cheaper system for 
manufacturing large batches. 
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7.2.4 Biometric identification 
Biometrics technology needs improvement in three areas. 
• The most obviously useful development would be a biometric identification method 
that met the financi.al institutions' required FRR of 1 in 100,000. 
• A second requirement is a smaller cheaper scanner. 
• Finally, there is a need for a reliable standardised testing methodology that will enable 
specifications to be written so that vendors' claims may be compared independently 
and objectively. In this respect the International Computer Security Association 
(ICSA) certification, and similar efforts, should be regarded merely as an interim step. 
7.2.5 Vehicle management 
Potential improvements in vehicle management have been given in chapter three, and the 
necessary consequential modifications for their implementation in chapter six. If 
consideration is limited to improved security, keys that incorporate transponders, without 
which the vehicle will not start, are now commonplace; but, two~factor security should be 
developed and it should employ biometric identification. 
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To summarise, the technology improvements needed arc: 
• more powerful, cheaper smart curds, structured to support multiple applications, 
• either more discriminating biometric identification tcclmology, or a more relaxed 
FRR requirement, 
• cheaper smaller scanners, 
• more reliable, standardised biometric identification devicr.-testing, and 
• kits to implement inexpensively the modifications listed in chapter six. 
7.3 Technical expectations 
7 .3.1 General 
Assuming the requirements have been identitied, the question of if, and when, they might 
be met, must be addressed. Although not yet 'adequate to support multiple applications, 
smart cards will certainly improve in size, circuit density, power required and memory 
over the next few years. 
170 
7.3.2 Circuit density and size 
Circuit density increases and size reductions would seem to be inevitable in both the 
research and manufacturing environments. For example: 
• Chicago University has announced that it can make chips with tiny features using a 
process called SCALPEL; a process that uses electrons rather thJn photons to define 
the etching of chip circuitry. Densities of the order of 0.076 microns are claimed 
("C"tting chips'', 1997). 
• Intel has announced that it now has a technique that enables it to store twice as much 
memory on the same area of a chip, and IBM has said it had found a way to replace 
aluminium conductors in a chip with faster, cheaper copper ("Chips ahoy", 1997). 
These advances might eventually be exploited in smart card chips, but even without such 
spectacular advances, chip density has been increasing. For example, three years ago the 
circuit density of CMOS transistor chips, including EEPROM technology. were at the 1 8 
micron level; whereas today's state of the art is 0.6 microns, which is expected to fall to 
0.35 microns by the year 2000 (Benhammou, 1997). 
7 "3.3 Power supply 
Contact cards have chips that normally require SV supply, whilst SIM cards conforming 
to the GSM ll. I 1 standard, function with only 3V; but the variation in power supply is 
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probably more a matter of conformance to standards than a technical necessity, and today, 
card chips requiring only I .8V arc manufacturable. 
7.3.4 Memory 
Memory, especially non-volatile memory, is a different matter. As Henry Mundt, 
executive VP, global deposit access for MasterCard International, and Mondex CEO, 
Michael Keegan, said in a joint interview with Electronic News, in 1997, 
"MULTOS is 'the Windows for sm<lrt cards' and current-generation smart card 
microcontrollers (MCUs) will be capable of supporting MULTOS, but the true 
benefits will come when chip makers can get more memory around their logic for 
smart cards, which they expect will occur in 1998. When the ICs can offer 16 
kilobytes EEPROM and between 28 and 32K ROM in the tight 25 square millimetres 
of silicon on the cards, the multi-application card will be a reality," Mr. Keegan said. 
"Such ICs will be freely available in the '98 time frame," he predicted. "The 
MULTOS platform is viable now," he said. "It's just not as capable. Listen, a PC 
was still a practical product when we were running new applications with the PC's 
120K of memory. The real story is that we're now looking at a programmable smart 
card (with MULTOS), and that has not happened before. Every solution had to be 
hard-wired by the silicon maker." ("Smart cards in spotlight", 1997, p. 8). 
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Allowing for marketing optimism, and bearing in mind that MULTOS is only one option 
for the industry, it seems likely that the technology Mr Keegan described would be 
available as soon as there was a commercial requirement for il. Today, in the year 2000, 
only the CASCADE care! and MIF ARE.PRO with the SmartXA chip come close to 
providing the features he named. and it should be noted that for vehicle management the 
card might need even more EEPROM than he envisaged. Keegan made no mention of 
cost. The major non-commercial Mondex smart cards pilot scheme completed so far is 
that by the Exeter University, whose Joint Technology Applications Project (JTAP) report 
in late 1999, concluded among other things that: 
" ... smart cards are moving towards support for multiple applications on the card, but 
this is severely limited by the memory capacity of present cards." (Cannon & 
Wooderson, 1999, p. 3). 
It would seem that as yet there is insufficient demand for large memory chips. 
There is also a potentially improved rewritable memory technology, called 
magnetoelectronics. New magnetoelectronic devices, based on the integration of 
magnetic and semiconductor materials, can be used for developing smart magnetic 
sensors, magnetic media reads and MagRAMs (magnetic RAM memory). Initial 
statements say that the technology may produce memory devices that are cheaper, require 
less power, be faster to read and write, and be a!-i enduring as any of the ctmenl non-
volatile memory technologies (Wayt Gibbs, 1999). 
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7.3.5 Contactless requirements 
For the contactless card the requirement IS for speed rather than memory and the 
expectations are more optimistic. According to Roy DaSilva, NEC Electronics' product 
marketing manager, NEC's capability in ferroelectric RAM (FeRAM) will help the 
company gain entrance to the smart card market. He said: 
"We are entering this market backed by the fact that we have already made significant 
investments in ferroelectric RAM, which gives the speed of RAM with the 
programmability of EEPROM and permanent storage of ROM in a single device." 
("Smart cards in spotlight", 1997, p. 8). 
Again, the optimism should be regarded with caution. FerroRAM has a serious weakness 
in that each "read" must be accompanied by a refresh operation that restores the memory 
state. The process takes only about lOOnS but a power failure during that time could 
corrupt memory. Nevertheless, judging by the New Scientist article quoted in chapter 
two (Fox, 1995), the required performance might be achieved. Furthermore, the JT AP 
project team, reporting on the use of the Mondex purse by the Exeter University, believes 
that FeRAM will become the preferred memory for all smart cards in the near future 
(Cannon & Wooderson, 1999, p. 18). 
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7.3.6 Biometric identification 
Current performance rates arc FAR, negligible, and FRR, 1:1000. These rates arc well 
short of the financial institutions requirement of FAR, l :20 and FRR, l: I 00,000. There 
seems little likelihood of any biometric method meeting the FRR required by the financial 
institutions within the next few years. Not only does such a development seem unlikely, 
but one must question the need for such a high standard. Possibly, the problem might be 
ameliorated by the use of variable thresholding in which the laxity of the threshold is 
automatically adjusted to match the imrortance of the transaction, or commercial 
pressures may force the financial institutions to accept a lower FRR. Biometric 
identification, despite the FRR problem, will probably improve. 
• Smaller, better scanners will almost certainly be developed, and, if the market 
expands, costs may fall. For example, Veridicom is promoting a capacitive sensing 
fingerprint scanner that is claimed to be no bigger than 2.5cm square and cheaper than 
current opt.ical types, and ldentix has countered by claiming that it will soon have 
developed an optical scanner no bigger than a 25mm cube - but neither finn has 
released any performance figures. 
• Better perfonnance and testing, faster enrolment and verification and reduced 
invasiveness will almost certainly be achieved, although the difficulty of truly 
objective testing of biometric methods has still not been solved. Sandia Laboratories 
undertook an as;.;essment of biometric methods in 1991 and this is believed to have 
beelt updated in 1995, but an inquiry about the outcome drew the response that the 
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re~ult.s were not being released. Therefore, it is difficult to be hopeful about any early 
breakthrough, but neverthclc.ss, under the auspices of the Biometric Consortium, 
research into testing methods is continuing, and presumably, in time, method.<> will be 
developed that will enable the independent, repeatable testing of products. In the UK, 
a workgroup of the Association for Biometrics (AfB) has developed a statement 
outlining its view of best practices in testing biometric devices, but, a'> yet, there are 
no reports defining any specific method of testing, let alone results from actual tests. 
7.3.7 Summary 
In the light or the requirements and expectations described in this and the preceding two 
paragraphs, and despite the accompanying caveats and shortcomings, informed opinion 
appears to confirm the conclusion reached in chapter two that today's technology could 
produce a functioning, if not fully satisfactory, smart card supported vehicle management 
system. With the possible exception of biometric identification the obstacles to a better 
system appear to be non-technical, and the technology will be found to be adequate when 
and if the demand emerges. These non-technological obstacles are now examined. 
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7.4 Possible progress in overcoming non-technical difficulties 
7 .4.1 Standardisation 
Section 4.3 describes the lack of stamlardisation as one of the major obstacles to the 
widespread use of smart cards. Progress in defining and conforming to standards has 
been slow because regulatory authorities believe that conformity should not be imposed, 
since attempts to do so might stifle innovation. However, a degree of standardisation is 
inevitable once the technology stabilises and the pace of innovation slows. What usually 
happens is that, initially, each contender seeks to become the dominant player, and force 
all the others into niches or supporting roles, but as soon as any one contender seems 
likely to be successful the others unite. At this point a single standard or dual competing 
standards may be agreed, and regulatory assistance might be useful. At present, in smart 
card technology, there is little to be done except await the outcome of the ongoing 
struggle for competitive edge. 
7.4.2 Cost reduction 
Cost trends for the past ten years are discussed in section 4.4. The improvement needed, 
which is partly technical, is a reduction in cost, but this is unlikely to happen until design 
is stabilised and a mass market created, because cost reductions may not be achieved until 
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economies of scale justify more investment in automating the process. More recent 
reports show no eVidence of any cost fall. Late in 1999, Exeter University reported its 
Mondex system cost per issued smart card as being £15 plus £20 for programming and 
personalising, which is expensive compared to (admittedly limited) magnetic stripe 
solutions; and, Edinburgh University cancelled its Mondex project, citing cost as the 
reason (Canon & Wooderson, 1999). Christophe Dolique: formerly of Oberthur, is 
quoted in the January 2000, online issue of Card Technology Today, as estimating that in 
1999 smart card chips cost an average of US$1.33. If true, this estimate does indicate a 
fall in cost ("Juiced up chips", 2000), but should be weighed against the evidence to the 
contrary presented in section 4.4 and here. A FaulknerGray report by Don Babalon 
quotes Andrew Phillips, aUK-based analyst for the Dataquest unit of the Gartner Group, 
as giving the average price of microprocessor cards as: 
1998 US$3.05 
1999 US$3.79. 
(Babalon, 2000). Apparently the desired. reduction has yet to be achieved. 
7.4.3 Improved chip and transition to it 
The specification for a chip to provide the required improvements in performance seem 
elose to being met by the specification for the CASCADE chip, rcp011edly to be produced 
by Texas Instruments for Gemplus in 1998. However, Motorola (its card chip 
manufacturing now by Atmel), Hitachi, Siemens (now Infincon) and SGS-Thompson 
(now STMicroelectronics) are all producing card chips of the current type and have not 
announced any intention to· produce anything to c01Tipare with CASCADE. Motorola has 
~nnounced an M-Smart se~ies that includes a "Jupiter" chip, that is 32-bit and uses RISC 
technology, but gives no detail of its rewritable memory size. In addition to the 
requirement for an improved chip, there will be a need to cope with a difficult transition 
and so, for at least an interim period, smart cards may need to be dual-chip (contact and 
contactless) and hybrid (retaining a magnetic stripe). 
7 .4.4 FRR reduction 
As mentioned earlier a biometric method that met the false rejection rate (FRR) of the 
financial institutions is highly desirable, but the actual standard specified (I :100,000) 
must be questioned. The institutions are said to claim that the very high standard is 
required because they cannot afford to offend genuine customers, but with the current 
system it is not unusual for an ATM to malfunction and fail to perform as requested. The 
institutions seem able to absorb any resentment that ensues. Problems with the rejection 
of authorised persons could be solved by offering alternative methods (Fak, 1991 ). 
Eventually, failing a device that meets the rcquiremenL, public demand may force its 
relaxation. 
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7.4.5 Biometric ID method industry certification 
Until the time that a reliable biometric testing method is developed, purchasers will have 
to rely on the certification processes of the ICSA, IBIA and BioAPI. The ICSA process 
has already resulted in six products being certified ("Standards set", 1998). Product 
specifications, with which vendors will be required to comply, will probably follow. 
Smaller scanners and faster processing methods are likely to emerge. Although the use of 
biometric identifiers is expanding, this has been in areas where fairly relaxed false 
acceptance and false rejection rates (FAR & FRR) are acceptable. Employers, welfare 
organisations and exhibitors, amongst others have required clients to identify themselves 
by providing a biometric feature for scrutiny. These applications are effective even with 
very lax false acceptance and rejection rates. Examples are the Atlanta Olympic gar.;es, 
attendance recording in the workplace, identification of beneficiaries, and rapid 
processing of international travel approval at airports. It seems likely that for the next 
few years, acceptance of biometric identity verification using smart cards will occur only 
where lax false rejection rates are acceptable and the people to be identified are relatively 
powerless. General acceptance may not occur until the banking requirement is lowered or 
met. No evidence of any such development has been discovered. 
I 
180 
7.4.6 Contactless card costs 
The main apparent market for the contactless card is in public transport ticketing. People 
who normally travel by public transport are unlikely to be wealthy, but because of the 
extra circuitry, contactless cards are more expensive than contact versions and, in view of 
the nature of the target market, this expense may discourage their widespread use. In 
section 2.7 the potential for better rewritable memory with ferroRAM is mentioned, but 
the source gives no indication of the likely cost of the new technology (Johnstone, 1998, 
p. 38). The flaw in ferro RAM mentioned in section 7.3 is not as serious a drawback for 
ticketing as it might be in a financial application, such as the electronic purse or 
e-commerce, because readers could be designed to reject corrupted tickets and the 
consequences could be handled in the same way as those for defective tickets rejected by 
a multi-rider. 
7.4.7 Vehicle Security and cost 
Immobilisers are now factory fitted to Australian assembled cars, and this class of vehicle 
is probably safe from theft by impulse thieves so long as the driver takes reasonable care. 
However, Victorian experience shows that they are not immune to the attentions of 
professionals ("Thieves beat car giants", 1996). Cheaper vehicles arc still easily stolen 
and even middle to upper range cars, as they become older, will become vulnerable to the 
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less organised thieves, partly because their mysteries will b~comc known to the thieves 
and partly because many owners will fail to maintain the anti-theft devices in as-new 
condition. Despite advances in technology, economics will dictate the level of protection 
and, without either incentives or compulsion, owners will probably merely continue to 
rely on insurance to indemnify themselves against loss. 
7.4.8 Summary 
With the exception of the lack of ·standardisation and problems with biometric 
identification, most non-technical problems relate to cost and their solution will probably 
depend on the achievement of improved cost-effectiveness. 
7.5 Regulatory expectations 
7.5.1 Traffic regulation enforcement 
Although traffic regulations vary from one country to another W A is fairly typical and 
will be used as the main example. When of interest the special situations in other 
countries and states will be mentioned. Are changes in traffic management to be 
expected in WA or elsewhere? There are repeated calls for improvements in traffic 
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management to achieve reductions in accidents, road congcistion, pollution and the cost of 
road construction and maintenance, but there is some hypocrisy. Accidents could be 
reduced if speeds were reduced, and extra automatic speed traps might achieve this 
object, but extra traps would cost more money whereas, if they achieved their object, 
fewer tines would be collected. Road congestion could be avoided if more commuters 
used public transport, but it is hard to separate a motorist from his car, since each wants 
someone else to use the public transport. Exhaust pollution is easy to detect and could be 
reduced by normal enforcement methods, but moves to do _so havt! proved unpopular. 
Taxes on fuel, and vehicle registration fees, after meeting the cost of road construction 
and maintenance, are a net contributor to public revenues. ("Facts", 1997). In short, 
although there are occasional calls for action (such as road pricing and stricter 
enforcement), remedies using smart cards or not are unlikely to be implemented in the 
present climate of opinion. Discussion with Main Roads W A indicated that it is regarded 
as politically hazardous to strain the link between a man and his motor car and, therefore, 
changes will probably rely on education and other non-coercive influences upon 
behaviour. 
7.5.2 Road pricing and parking fees 
The use of smart cards in vehicle management would be given considerable impetus if 
traffic authorities created more turnpike roads, or congestion controlled areas, and 
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parking authorities established parking zones that accepted payment via smart cards. All 
three of these possibilities are under investigation worldwide. 
• In Singapore (see section 3.2.4) a full system that uses contact cards has been 
installed. The contact cards are inserted into in-vehicle units that transmit and receive 
signals to and from overhead gantries to achieve the contactless access function. The 
card is a stored value card that can be used, not only to pay tolls but also for other 
cash transactions in supermarkets and petrol stations. 
• In Melbourne, Victoria, in a venture called OneLink, the Perth company ERG had 
problems with finalising its automatic fare collection scheme, and was able to 
complete only with the support of the international giant Motorola ("Motorola-backed 
ERG", 1997). The project, after overcoming these problems, now appears to be 
functioning satisfactorily. 
• In Sydney, an electronic system for collecting harbour bridge toll fees uses a stored 
value rechargeable smart card, and there is a toll system for the Sydney Eastern 
Districts tunnel. 
Nevertheless, there seems little chance of specific action in W A. 
• A proposal to build a turnpike road from Karratha to Shark Bay has disappeared 
without trace ("Toll road planned", 1996). 
• Congestion and pollution control by charging vehicles for entry to specified zones has 
not been given any public airing . 
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• An "issues and directions" document distributed hy M:lin Ro;Jds W A, gave traffic 
congestion as a key issue, and then, under "current directions", listed nine remedial 
<lctions. but not road pricing. 
• Under the heading "futmc directions", the tentative option, "Look at dist:ouraging 
unnecessary road use through possible road use charging", was twclflh in a list of 14 
possibilities ("Issues", 1996). 
• City and Local Authorities, when contacted by telephone, said their organisations 
might move to a smart card supported parking system if this becomes the nann 
elsewhere. 
In short, if the authorities are moving towards a user and polluter pays policy, the 
movement is slow. 
,7 .5.3 Minor control improvements 
A study of policy papers issued by Main Roads, W A, seems to indicate that traffic 
management will be a matter of minor traffic control improvements, such as improved 
intersection control, data collection, and education. Officials are at pains lo a'isure lhe 
inquiring public that any surveillance is only to monitor traffic patterns and densities and 
that there is no capability to identify vehicles, nor is it policy to seek it. The official 
perception is that higher authorities fear that the public will be hostile to any sy,<.;tcm with 
a potential to support surveillance. 
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7 .5.4 Summary of traffic regulation prospects 
Apparently congestion and pollution arc to be controlled by informing and educating the 
driving public, und there is no proclaimed intention to change the present traditional 
methods of monitoring driving behaviour. A number of statements in the discussion 
papers do indicate a government wish to encourage the use of public transport and, no 
doubt, any smart card application that improved its convenience would be welcome. but 
no regulatory action to compel the application of the available technology is 
foreshadowed. Apparently, regulatory authorities intend to follow, rather than lead, and 
the use of smart cards will gain no direct support from them. 
7 .5.5 General Government applications 
Even if there is little expectation of regulatory action directly relating to roads and 
vehicles, there is the possibility that some general government strategy may lead to the 
widespread use of smart cards. According to a report in the daily newspaper The 
Australian, the Federal Government, in January 1998, announced that it would begin to 
buy application space on about 2.7 million private smart and credit cards in 1999 
("Government agencies", 1998). This was a rather surprising statement as the multi-
application card is, as yet, hardly a reality. The number, 2.7 million, .o.;eems to suggest 
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that the Government had the Tclstra card in mind. In September 1998, as mentioned in 
section 5.9.4, a number of leading smart card companies wrote to all Federal ministers, 
warmng that the country risked being lcfl behind because of Government inaction 
("Smart card makers appeal to Canberra", 1998). However. it could be that the 
Govemment had become aware of the difficulties of what was proposed. In the UK, the 
Federation of the Electronics Industry (FE I), in 1996, pressed the Government to establish 
a multi-application smart card for all government employees, that would fulfil key 
requirements of Government, and be a slimulus to. and basis for, commercial 
applications. Two years later a follow-up showed that no progress had been made ("Role 
of Government", 1998) and, even now, there are no reports of any action. The situation 
in the US and Canada has followed much the same pattern. It seems that the 
implementation of smart card systems is unlikely to be driven by regulatory action. 
7.6 Commercial expectations- non-vehicle 
7.6.1 Introduction 
Failing either solutions to the non-technical problems or regulatory action, the next 
question is whether normal entrepreneurial processes will cause some "killer application" 
to emerge to form the core of a multi-application card of which one application might be 
vehicle management. Candidate applications arc examined in this section, commencing 
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with those in finance. The three financial possibilities introduced in section 5.3: namely, 
a cash payment substitutes system, including an electronic purse, c-commcrcc and 
e-shopping are now evaluated as possibilities. 
7.6.2 The purse and banks versus merchants 
Financial institutions (sec section 5.3.2) are accepting smart card technology only slowly. 
In the USA the investment in the excellent existing infrastructure, the handsome profits 
made from online credit and debit authorisations, and the fear of a systemic breach, will 
probably ensure that financial institutions are followers rather than leaders in any move to 
make wider use of smart cards. Credit and debit cards may be upgraded by using smart 
cards instead of magnetic stripe devices, but there appears to be no move by the 
institutions to promote a multi-application capability. The trial of an electronic purse 
system in Manhattan by four major US financial organisations has been reported as a 
failure, as has a trial in Guelph by the Canadian Mondex banks. In Manhattan, Citibank 
with VisaCash combined with Chase Manhattan and Mondex in a joint pilot scheme. Six 
hundred merchants, who were not required to pay for the readers, are said to have been 
frustrated by early technical faults and, although about 95,000 cards were issued to 
residents, only 53,000 loads to the cards were recorded - an indication that many cards 
may not have been used at all (Foderaro, 1998). In Europe there are unresolved conflicts 
over who will pay, and how much, and some financial institutions are trying to force 
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merchants to pay what the merchants regmd as excessive fi..--cs for participation: for 
example. 
"All present electronic-purse pilots have proved unsuccessful because they have 
not had enough merchant support" 
says Societe Nationalc des Chemins de Fer Francais (SNCF) treasurer Eugene Caffart 
and, ag<.tin, 
"We prvvide a critical mass of users, and we expect the users to pressure shops to 
accept the cards later." (Amdur, 1997, p. 4-5). 
Merchants may see the electronic purse as a device that will enable the banks to 
participate more profitably in the cash transaction market and may regard it as a bank 
solution to a bank problem for which they should not be expected to pay. In Australia the 
four major banks (National Bank, Westpac, ANZ, and the Commonwealth Bank) 
announced in November 1997 that they intended to run a major trial and issue eight 
million Mondex cards starting in July 1998 ("Smart card invasion", 1997). Whatever 
their plans may have been, the banks appear to be having second thoughts, because since 
1998 their activities have been confined to closed pilot schemes. Exacerbating the 
problems of digital cash systems, whether implemented with smart cards or online, is the 
difficulty of handling micropayments. As Ison of Commonwealth Bank put it 
"We are attempting to derive sufficient revenue from a transaction of, say, one 
dollar to pay for its processing infrastructure and deliver a commercial proposition 
to the five parties in the transaction, the cardholder, the merchant, the system 
operator (issuer), and the two banks involved." (lson, 1996, p. 16). 
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Likewise, from an article in the June 1999 issue of Sdentific American, 
"In the US at least, all the hanks that once supported micropaymcnts have taken 
their resources elsewhere" (Wallich, 1999, p. I). 
Surprisingly, within three months of the Scientific American article, the Aberdeen Group, 
an internationally respected market surveyor, :;tated that, 
" ... the future acceptance of digital cash will challenge traditional means of 
exchanging value ... " ("Dash to digital cash", 1999, p. 7). 
Finding an issuer prepared to pay for a major issue of smart cards may be difficult, but 
achieving a substantial volume of transactions may be even more so. The conflicting 
aspirations of banks and merchants and the difficulties of handling micro-payments seem 
unlikely to be resolved soon. In addition to the disagreement between bankers and 
merchants, the financial institutions are fighting amongst themselves. 
7.6.3 Payment standards 
Failure to achieve either a common protocol standard for smart card payment applications 
or a common operating system has been covered in section 4.3. Major candidates for the 
protocol standard, the EMV :md Mondex specifications, are still competing. The struggle 
over what operating system or application interface to use continues, with MasterCard, 
and Mondex, seeking to establish MULTOS, Visa, with a rival industry grouping, 
pressing for the Java API and Microsoft making a late but powerful push on behalf of its 
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Windows for Smart Cards. There is no indication that a compromise is ncar in any of 
these areas. 
7 .6.4 Purse battle 
Behind the negotiations to achieve common standards for operating systems, interfaces 
:md payment protocols and a fair share of profit for each stakeholder, the battle for the 
electronic purse market continues (see section 5.3.5) and until settled will probably 
frustrate efforts to establish a viable system in the US. It may be that US financial 
institutions wi!l accept smart cards as debit or credit cards in an effort to reduce fraud, but 
probably will not pursue the idea of an electronic purse without some strong incentive to 
offset the attractions, and fees, of online transactions. Insufficient attention may have 
been given to the attitude of potential purse holders. Issuers write of the cleanliness, 
convenience, and improved divisibility of digital money contained in smart cards, but 
until the cards are able to be used as freely as money, holders may not be impressed. 
7 .6.5 Internet payment protocols 
In addition to the purse, other potential smart card supported financial applicar.ions are 
cash micropayments and accrual transactions (categorised as either e-commerce or 
e-shopping) consummated over the Internet. There is still no agreement on Internet 
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payment protocols. Visa and MasterCard have co-operated in developing a secure 
electronic transaction (SET) protocol for usc in electronic payments, but although this 
protocol may be suilablc for substantial transactions it is over-engineered for handling 
individual purchases or the micro-payment~ that arc likely to be the main traffic in 
e-shopping ("Can current technologies", 2000). If SET wa'i accepted for c-commerce, an 
increase in transactions supported by identification and encryption using smart cards 
would probably follow, but there are many competing systems, some involving trusted 
third parties and others asymmetric key encryption using software installed on PCs. In 
short there is no sign yet of a C:t111Sensus, whilst merchant~ are unlikely to invest in smart 
card readers or join any system until it is widely accepted. Today there is talk of seeking 
compatibility between the PC/SC protocol and SIM: cards in cellular telephones, with a 
view to facilitating e-commerce between mobile entities. The goal seems plausible 
because the SIM card already incorpor::,tes a payment capability. One may doubt the need 
fore-commerce on the move and note that the SIM: card is a European rather than a US 
device, but GSM or PC/SC controlled access is one of the applications most likely to 
form the core of a multi-application card, since the former is already being implemented 
by FranceTelecom with a Cartes Bancaires card, and the latter enjoys the powerful 
support of Microsoft and does not depend too heavily on the acquiescence of financial 
institutions. 
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7.6.6 Public Transport Ticketing 
Despite their competitive struggle the financial institutions may have no choice but to 
agree on a payment protocol, because transportation companies have seen the advantages 
of contactless cards in automating fare collection and could leverage the ticketing 
application by adding a purse function. In addition to the Octopus project being run in 
HongKong, transportation organisations are conducting trials all over the world. There 
are trials in South Korea, London, Paris, Rome, San Francisco and, in Australia, the 
Sydney Transcard scheme. All'_ of these trials have shown promise but, with the exception 
of HongKong, none has been a runaway success and, again, apparently, the problem lies 
ir. merchant acceptance. Some financial institutions regard a purely contactless ·card as 
. unsuitable for a financial application because a contactless application may lasl no more 
~han a third of a second, too short a time in which to process a ericryption algorithm. A 
dual-interface card may overcome this objection at some cost. Contactless cards as yet 
may be too expensive to be economic purely as access tokens. In this respect the Sydney 
Transcard scheme is particularly interesting becaUse its contactless card, in addition to 
giving access to several different transportation services, includes a stored value 
application. Transcard has published research results showing that 56% of users were 
satisfied with the system, but the only information released about merchant attitudes was 
that 35 percent of consumers reported that the cards were not readily accepted by 
shopkeepers (MacSmith, 1996). However, if merchants do not support a stored value 
application by providing readers in substantial numbers, then users are unlikely to want it. 
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In W A, the only indication of a possible application is that the Department of Transport, 
as a feature of their "System 21". initiative, claim.<; to be considering smart card 
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technology as u \VL\Y to improve ticketing within ten years. Although as yet, it shows no 
sign of doing so, public transport ticketing may become the "kill.er application" that the 
.smart card indu.stry requires, because it enjoys a de facto standard in the MJF ARE 
specification and it has issued more smart cards than any application except 
telecommunication. 
7.6.7 Telecommunication 
The point was made in section 5.4 that the telecommunication industry has more 
experience with smart cards than any other sector. The following table shows the actual 
and forecast use of smart cards by the industry. 
Table 8 Telecommunication Industry Smart Cards. 
Year Pay phone cards Mobile phono cards 
1996 lOOm 15m 
1997 220m 70m 
1998 Not known lOOm 
1999 250m 
2000 (est) 430m 
2004 (est) 970m 
(Facts and forecasts, 1999; ICMA Quick card facts, 2000). 
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The increase in the use of mobile phone cards and the potential for their usc in an 
ex.tended role has led to the belief that they could form the core of a multi·application 
card. Hitherto, the telccommunicationcompanies have been prepared to sell only pre-
pai~ cards (both pay and mobile phone), or "credit" phone cards that record the service 
and enable later billing. Apparentiy the industry did not wish to become involved in 
providing cards that could be used by entities outside the industry: possibly, because of 
the difficulties of the consequential furids clearing process. The financial institutions, for 
their part, are believed to be wary of any financial application using the 
telecommunication payments protocols. Today, in addition to information services such 
as news, weather and stock reports, there is discussion of providing interactive services 
such as banking and e-commerce including payments. For these proposed services to be 
implemented there will need to be co-operation between telecommunication companies 
' 
and banks. Card Technology Today, an online magazine dedicated to reporting news 
about smart cards, writes that, in France, this proposal is already being acted upon 
("France Telecom", 2000). 
In Australia developments are slower. In l997,Telstra announced that it would issue six 
million reusable (electronic purse) and eight million disposable (stored value) smart cards 
before 1 July 1998, claiming that, by contrast, Australia's four major banks planned to 
issue only 100,000 Mondex smart cards in the second half of 1998 ("Telstra winning", 
1997). Telstra has the advantage that it is a nationwide "near monopoly" and has already 
issued som~ cards, but it remains to be seen whether it is able, or even wishes, to usurp 
the traditional banks' function in this way. In a pilot scheme in Adelaide, Coca-Cola and 
Smiths installed vending machines that would accept Telstra non-reloadable cards, but no 
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results have been released. In Melbo~1rne, the City council considered adapting parking 
meters to accept the Ci.lrds, but apparently did not proceed, because there have been no 
further repOrts about the proposal ("Phone cards get smarter", 1998, January 13 ). In 
short, the cards have been used in payphoncs, but hardly anywhere else, since merchants 
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" app-ear reluctant to provide the necessary readers. 
In late 1999, the ANZ, Telstra and ERG announced that they had jointly formed a 
transaction processing company with a centre to handle purcha~es. At present each of 
these companies uses a different purse technology, but they intend to select one, probably 
MULTOS, because a single standard would enable the offer of a variety of applications 
on a single card (Big players get smart, 1999, September 14). It would seem that, despite 
early optimism, telecommunication has not become the hoped for "killer application", but 
the potential exists and one day could be exploited. 
7.6.8 Purely access applications 
The majority of smart card applications may be thought of as access applications but, 
most of the majority, like the GSM SIM cards, involve some transfer of value. Purely 
access applications, such as those restricting admission to secure physical areas, networks 
and sources of infonnation have been successfully implemented for some time, but none 
has been large scale. Such applications make no profit for the issuer, and any reduction in 
administrative costs is usually small. 
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7 .6.9 Welfare ben eli ts . 
In several states in the USA, smart cards, in conjunction with biometrics, have been used 
as the authentication device to enable beneficiaries to draw their benefits. Reports claim 
substantial savings and, in particular, savings that result when applicants decline to 
provide the biometric feature required. If beneficiaries were induced to use smart cards 
as identification, it would be a logical extension to provide an electronic purse on the 
cards, and even, perhaps, enable beneficiaries to download their benefits directly onto 
them. Judging by the Australian public's reaction to the Australia Card proposal, in 
Australia the situation is different, and the application of smart cards in welfare is likely 
to face great difficulties. Public rejection of identification may be expected to continue 
despite pressure upon the Government from industry, discussed in section 7.5. 
7.6.10 Health 
In Germany and France, smart cards have found a role as a store of information in health 
schemes, but the cards do not include a fi "Uncial application and seem an unlikely core 
for anything except their specific function. In W A, a health insurer (HBF) announced its 
intention to issue 700,000 memory chip cards to its members by Christmas, presumably 
1997 ("Smart card"", 1997). Although it seems unlikely that a memory chip card 
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application could be the core of a multi-application system, ERG, the card suppliers, say 
'that whilst the current application requires only a memory chip, the chip to be US(;d is 
capable of handling other applications. The intention, initially, is to usc the card as an 
identification token, am.l eventually to extend it to become a multi~application system. 
Neither HBF nor ERG has indicated how they propose to address the problems of 
standardising operating systems or establishing a certification authority. These problems 
are discussed shortly, but, by 1999, few vendors had installed card readers that would 
accept payment using the cards. 
7.6.11 Border control 
Several pilot schemes have been introduced at airports with a view to determining 
whether smart cards may be used as improved passport substitutes. The first was a Dutch 
scheme launched in 1992, but apparently it was discontinued because a television 
documentary proved that it could be defeated (Overview, 1997). Other smart card 
supported border control schemes are still operating, but their success, or otherwise, has 
not been widely reported. 
7.6.12 Multiple applications 
Th~ potl!ntial applications discussed in the prcvtous paragraphs ~hould he considered 
ag~tinst the presumed desire of holders to have a multi-application card and the 
assumption in chapter one that, for general acceptance, ~mart cards would need to support 
multiple applications. The technology to create and implement multi-application cards 
probably already exists, as do most of the non-commercial criteria given in section 4.2 for 
a successful system. The problems are commercial, and the crucial obstacle is the lack of 
a satisfactol)' business case for each stakeholder. To create a suitable commercial 
environment requires co-operative answers to the following questions. 
• Who will own the card and applications? 
• Who will issue the card, own application keys and customer information and update 
the information? 
• Who will perform application certification and authenticity? 
• Who will pay for the infrastructure development' 
• Who will control the advertising space on the card and its chip? 
• Who will be liable for lost, stolen or faulty cards? 
• Who will get the revenue .streams? 
• Who wiJ: own the card brand? 
There are as yet no generally agreed answers to these questions and, until there are, it 
seems unlikely that holder expectations will be met (Barr, Allen & Burke, 1997, p66·67). 
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7.6.13 Holders versus issuers 
Holders might desire increased functionality, fewer cards and the ability to make their 
own sdcction from amongst the applications described above, hut they may then 
encounter resistance from issuers who want no other brands on their issued cards. As 
Peter Fogarty, CEO of ERG said, "It is unlikely you will have another Telco on a Tclstra 
car•l" (Big players get smart, 1999). Further, if the card includes an electronic purse, the 
holder would want to be able to usc it with a wide variety of merchants and reload it 
anywhere at any time. ATMs and EFTPOS tenninals would need modification and 
further standardisation before this ideal could be achieved. 
7.6.14 Operating system compatibility 
Even if a killer application is discovered, it may not be possible to use it as the core of a 
multi-application scheme due to the struggle between the supporters of the MULTOS 
operating system and those of the Java API. If the financial institutions choose MULTOS 
and the killer application usts the Java API or some other interface, then the applications 
that can be built around the core might be restricted. It could be that the purse will first 
emerge as a method of p'flying beneficiaries and, if so, the banks might insist on the use of 
MUILTOS, since they control it and they perceive it as being more secure. On the other 
hand the de,velopment of other uses of the card would be simplified for developers if the 
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Java A~l was employed, since it is easier to install nr~w applic<Jtions on the Java interface. 
In addition, non-bank participants might not trust a card with an operating system that 
was the property of a banking consortium, especially as the banks might reserve the right 
to install all applications. Although, ideally, a card should be capable of supporting Java 
with MULTOS as shown in Figure 16, two incompatible systems could emerge. 
MAOSCO, the international consortium that licenses the MULTOS specification, ha'i 
committed the next generation of MULTOS to support a Java run-time engine (Cannon & 
Wooderson, 1999), but only time will tell to what extent the commitment is met. 
7.6.15 Public key certification 
A different problem relates to public key certification. In testimony before a committee 
on banking and financial services of the United States House of Representatives on 11 
June 1996, Denis A. Calvert Vice President and General Manager United States Financial 
Retail Division, Verifone, said, 
" ... one of the cornerstones that will shape the future of money is the strength of a 
private sector national and international Public Key Certification infrastructure (PKD. 
The foundation for Electronic Commerce in the broadest sense depends on this crucial 
infrastructure, including many Internet payment schemes. If these certification 
systems are susceptible to compromise, if they are not supported in law, if they do not 
provide a solution to the business liability issues related to a Certiticate Authority, 
20 J 
then business trans<~ctions and the trunsiCr or money over puhlic.: networks may never 
rcuch their full potential"'. (Calvert, 1996, p. 2). 
7 .6.16 Holder certification 
However, the need for a certification authority goes beyond financial applications. Before 
any multi-application card is accepted by the public there will need to be a procedure and 
authority agreed by the issuers of the applications, for determining, at the time card users 
are enrolled, that they are indeed who they say they are. Similarly, each reader or 
terminal will need to be certified iu some way as being what it purports to be. The 
certification authority model would need to be agreed nationally or, preferably, 
internationally ("Curly questions", 1997). An international standard for certificates of 
this kind has existed for several years, documented within the CCITI standard X509, and 
services of this nature are being offered in the US, but not yet globally. As mentioned in 
section 4.3.4, in Australia, SecureNet offers this certification service. 
7.6.17 Summary 
After taking these difficulties into consideration, one may conclude only that a critical 
mass in any application, or combination of applications, cannot be expected soon. 
Incompatibility between smart cards has the potential to delay their widespread 
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introduction for scvcml years. The ongoing struggle for compt.:titivc edge and the gaps in 
standardismion, until resolved, will prohibit the multi·application card that is essential for 
acceptam:c. At present there is no compelling pressure that would cause the leading 
stakeholders to sink their differences and move to a worldwide smart card system. As an 
editorial in the Au.'>tmlian Computer News put it "Only the foolhardy would expect 
companies involved in this brand-new technology to work together." ("Scourge", 1997). 
Having said that, it should be added that amongst the competitors some arc more likely to 
win than others. In the USA. a card system using the Microsoft sponsored PC/SC 
specification in conjunction with Windows for Smart Cards and finding a market in 
e-commerce is probably the favourite. In Europe, an application using a mobile phone as 
a payment terminal with the aid of a smart card might be more likely. Close behind could 
be ticketing applications using a dual interface card and a modified MIF ARE 
specification, or other protocol accl!ptable to the financial institutions. Finally, less 
likely, is the possibility that governments will sponsor a benefit smart card incorporating 
an electronic purse and with identification established using a biometric feature. 
7. 7 Industry forecasts 
An alternative approach to forecasting the future use of smart cards is to extrapolate from 
past growth, rather than to evaluate expectations. From reading predictions in journal 
articles and Internet pages one might cas!!y gain the impression that we will all be 
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familiar with ~mart cards within a decade. Table 9 follows with estimates or forecasts 
made by various organisations and authors, some of which approach, and in one case 
equals. the world population. The most recent short-term forecasts, for 2000, seem to 
group around two billion cards. However, the "track rccorJ" of earlier long-term 
forecasts suggests that the spectacular increases indicated after 2002 should be regarded 
with caution. Despite caution, and accepting the doubtful nature of available information, 
in view of the rapid growth in e-commerce and consumer applications such as PAY-TV, 
health cards and mobile phones, and bearing in mind the expiry of patents taken out up to 
25 years ago, the two billion card forecast does seem plausible. With a world population 
of six to seven billion, of which less than one billion is in Europe, the forecast implies 
that almost every breadwinner in the developed world, outside of the US, will carry a 
smart card. Some caveats would be prudent. 
• The probability that affluent sophisticated people may choose to carry more than one 
smart card must be acknowledged. 
• Some authorities~ for example, Schlumberger, may disagree with the more optimistic 
forecasts. In a review published on the Internet in April 97, it estimated that 1.35 
b;llion chip cards would have been issued by the year 2000, but that only 450 million 
of them would be "smart". ("Schlumberger", 1997). In a later forecast for the year 
2005, Schlumberger seemed more optimistic, but it should be noted that the 
infonnation for the longer term forecast is second hand, being a BitCom statement of 
Schlumberger's opinion. 
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• There arc donbts about the validity of statements even hy sources considered more 
reputable. For example, the Financial Times Business Research Archives issued a 
WWW page about WHSmith, the bookseller, and usc of smart cards, that made the 
sli.ttemcnt. "In 1994. 99% of the 420 million smart cards were .... " ("Financial Times", 
!997). Since this figure is outside the range of numbers reported for 1996, it can 
hardly have been true in 1994. 
• The fact that two billion cards have been issued does not necessarily mean that they 
have been activated and in use. As de~cribed in sections 7.4.5 and 7.6.9, the actions 
of HBF and Telstra in Australia have already shown that cards may be issued, but 
then either not activated, or else only partially exploited. 
Generally, it seems that forecasts are illMdefined, and occasionally conflicting, and 
provide insuffici!!nt grounds for disregarding the conclusion in the previous section that 




Tahlc 9A: Schedule of Estimate and Forecast References ( 1992-1 CJ9X ). 
No Source Year Rcrcrcnce Year ror Estimate 
cslimatc which or 
or rorccasl t.;i[~-,atc Forecast 
made or rorecast (billions) 
r.- made I Baker, T 1992 See n:li.:n:nt:L'.~ 1992 0.26 
2 "CASCADE" 1994 .. JY92 0.25 
3 "Or)!a" 1995 .. IYlJ4 0.134 
4 Cordonnier, V. 1995 .. 1994 0.3 
5 "Gemplus'" 1997 .. 1994 0.11 
6 Choi & 1998 .. 1994 0.11 
Whinston 
7 Goldfinger, C. 1998 Quoting Orga , Gemplus & Philips in Economi~:s of 1994 0.132 
Finandul Applications of smart cards p. 9 
Ohtaincd from: httn://www.isno.sec.be/fiwgffasc.htm 
8 Baker, T 1992 Sec references 1995 1.0 
9 "Orga" 1995 .. 1995 0.235 
10 Cordonnier, V. 1995 .. 1995 0.4 
II "Philips" 1995 .. 1995 0.052 
12 '·Solaic" 1997 .. 1995 0.04 
13 Amdur, D. 1997 .. 1995 0.084 
14 Goldfinger, C. Quoting Orga , Gcmplus & Philips in Economics of 1995 0.178 
Finundul Applications of smart cards p. 9 
Obtained from: htto://www.isoo.scc.be/fiwg/fasc.htm 
15 Myers, W. 1996 Sec references 1996 0.35 
16 Fancher. C. 1996 .. 1996 0.156 
17 Benhammou,T 1997 .. 1996 0.151 
18 Choi& 1998 .. 1996 0.205 
Whinston 
19 Frost & 1999 Facts & Forecasts Obtained from: 1996 0.102 
Sullivan hup:/ /www .card l ( J u i x .com/fm:l! lids. ht m l 
20 Dataquest 1997 GartnerGroup's Dataquest Hot News Obtained from 1997 0.311 
http://www.infopower.eom.tw/trcnd/dataqucst/chip-
card.htm 
21 Gemplus 1999 Smart Success. Riding high on mulr.iplc applications, 1997 0.9 
smart cards arc here to stay in the Indian market 
March 151h, 1999. Obtained from: 
http:/!www .dqindia.com/mar 1599/ds I .htm 
22 DataQuest 1998 Gemplus edges Schlumbcrgcr. Obtained from: 1998 0.3 
htt 1:/ /www .card tech. f au I knergra v .com/more. htm 
23 Ovum 1998 Mlilti·application smart card prospects. Ovum claims. 1998 0.645 
Obtained from: 
h!!n/fwww.canltcch.faulkncr)!ray.com/morc.htm 
24 Philips 1999 BitCom quotes Philips. Obtained from: 1998 1.362 
hun/fww w. hit. i nc.com!h tm 1 fi lcs/ovcrvi c w. h tm 
25 Andersen 1999 Smart cards account for I H% of world curd 1998 1.2 
production. Card tech quoting Arthur Andersen Co. 
Obtained frm: httn://www.c:mltcch.faulkncrgray.com/ 
Table YB: Schedule of Estimate <md Forecast References ( 1999~2005). 
No Source Year Reference Year for Estimate 
estimate which "' or forecast estimate J'orecast 
made or forecast (billions) 
made 
26 "Or.c:a" 1995 Sec rcfcrcm:cs 1999 1.212 
27 "Philips" 1995 .. 2000 0.513 
28 Daniels, G. 1995 .. 2000 0.75 
29 Cordonnicr, V. 1995 .. 2000 I 
30 Fancher, C. 1996 .. 2000 0.99 
31 n"'nhammou, J 1997 .. 2000 1.34 -
32 Amdur, D. 1997 .. 2000 1.1 
33 "Soliac" 1997 Excludes Japan and China" 2!KJO 0.4 
34 Schlumber.c:cr \997 .. 2000 0.45 
35 Cordonnicr, V. 1997 .. 2000 4 
36 Goldfinger, C. 1998 Quoting Orga, Gemplus & Philips in Economics of 2000 1.088 
Financial Applications of smart cards p. 9 
Obtained from: http://www.ispo.scc.be/fiwg/f<~sc.htm 
37 Choi & 1998 Sec references 2000 2.4 
Whinston 
38 "Soliac" 1999 BitCom quotes Soli<~c. Obtained from: 2000 1.25 
http://www.bit-inc.com/htmlfiles/overview.htm 
39 "Philips" 1999 BitCom quotes Philips. Obtained from: 2000 2 
http://www.bit-inc.com/htmlfiles/overview.htm 
40 "Mentis" 1999 BitCom quotes Mentis. Obtained from: 2000 2 
http://www.bit-inc.com/htmlfilcs/overview.htm 
41 "CardTech" 1999 BitCom quotes Card Technology. Obtained from: 2000 2.8 
http://www.bit-inc.com/htmlfiles/overview.htm 
42 "Gemplus" 1999 BitCom quotes Gemplus. Obtained from: 2000 2to 3.8 
http://www.bit-inc.com/htmlfiles/overvicw.htm 
43 "Siemens'' 1999 BitCom quotes Siemens. Obtained from: 2001 2.8 
hllp://www.bit-inc.com/htmlfilcs/ovcrview.htm 
44 "Dataqucst" 1999 SitCom quotes Dataquest. Obtained from: 2001 3.4 
hno://www.bit-inc.com/htmlfiles/overview.htm 
45 Ovum 1998 Obtained from: 2003 2.7 
http://europe.cnnfn.com/digitaljam/newsbytcs/111910 
.html 
46 "Gemplus" 1999 BitCom quotes Gem~] us. Obtained from: 2003 6.3 
http://www.bit-inc.corn!htmll1lcs/overview.htm 
47 "Ovum" 1999 Card Technology quotes Ovum. Obtained from: 2004 3 
http://www .cardtech. f au] knergra v .com/more. htm 
48 Schlumberger 1999 SitCom quotes Schlumhergcr. Obtained from: 2005 3.75 
http://www.bit-inc .• :om/htrnlfilcs/overvicw.htm 
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Before disl:ussing this Table attention is drawn to tlu: following points. 
• The published forecasts often do not specifically distinguish between memory cards 
and true smart cards. The schedule attempts to show only true smart cards and, for 
cxo.unplc, if the application is known, the following have been assumed to be memory 
cards not smart cards. 
• Payphone cards 
• Games cards 
• Meter cards 
• Access control cards 
• Vending machine cards 
This may be an invalid assumption in some ways because, for example, some payphone 
cards are true smart cards that are being used in memory card mode. 
• The same assumption appears to have been made by the Gemplus forecast published 
by Cardshow in December, 1995. 
o Published information is usually either well dated or second-hand. This is probably 
because, when up-to-date, it is valuable. For example, Killen & Associates asked 
US$4,000 for a copy of their 1997 report, "Non-banks' smart card strategies". Other 
market researchers, DataQuest and DataMonitor, charge similar amounts, and figures 
attributed to these and similar organisations have been taken from the published 
material of authors who. it has been assumed, did have access to the original material. 
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ln an attempt to portray the situation more vividly, Figure n~ shows the information 
graphically. The circles in each row represent either a forecast or an estimated total of 
smart cards in use in the year given at the left of the row. The years in the bottom row 
show the years in which the forecasts or estimates were made. The size of the circles 
approximate to the relative size of the corresponding estimate or forcca:;t, whilst the 
number within or near each circle refers to the source in Table 9. The circles in Figure 18 
are not to scale and attempt merely to give an impression of the relative sizes of the 
corresponding estimates or forecasts. As may be seen, forecasts, represented by circles 
above and to the left of the dotted line, have tended to be optimistic and it would be 
prudent, therefore, to presume that this is still the case. There are sometimes wide 
variations between estimates: for example, Dataquest (in 1998) estimated there to be 0.3 
billion smart cards and Ovum more than twice that number. However, to some extent 
confidence in the figures is restored by the two most recent confirmable estimates (for 









LEGEND ~,~,,,o.a"·o o ,.,o 
(estimates in hillions) 
Figure 18: Graphical portrayal of smart card estimates and forecasts. 
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7.8 Perceived need for better vehicle management 
In chapter three it is concluded that a smart card vehicle management system has the 
potential to improve each of the vehicle management components: namely, traffic 
management, usage control, maintenance, and security. However, in chapter one it is 
argued that perceptions rather than reality will be crucial in determining whether a better 
or more personal system will be adopted. It is the authorities, rather than owners or 
drivers, that are concerned with traffic management and, as would be expected in 
democracies, the authorities' ambivalent attitude reflects that of the public. Most people 
would like better regulation of driving behaviour, and reductions in congestion and 
pollution, but only if it is others who must modify their behaviour. On balance, despite 
occasional calls for improvement, there seems to be no strong public perception of a need 
for change. To have determined objectively how individuals view the need for usage and 
maintenance control would have required a description of the perceived meaning of the 
term and a second questionnaire. Instead discussions with friends, and with a contact in 
the RAC, led to the tentative and unsubstantiated conclusion that most people see the 
existing arrangements as adequate. For the individual, usage control is subordinate to 
personal convenience, and maintenance control by windscreen stickers, supported by 
reminders from service stations, is familiar and satisfactory. Fleet managers view things 
differently, regarding these components as more important, and their main objection to 
the available automatic logging systems was cost. The managers that responded to the 
questionnaire at Appendix 6, would have welcomed a system obtainable at what they 
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regarded as a n:asonabic figun.:, but expressed misgivings about the pos!-.ihle reaction of 
employee drivers. In conversation, for a total system, including both usage control and 
security, one percent of vchidc cost was mentioned and, <b stated in chapter six, this 
would be about A$200 per vehicle. This modest figure suggests that there is no strong 
pet'ct:ption of any need for change. 
Unlike fleet owners, the main concern for owner~drivcrs is security. If a smart card 
security system could be provided at close to the same cost as an immobiliser, then it 
would probably be chosen because of the extra facilities it would provide. The resull of 
the questionnaire distributed in the University car park suggests that owner-drivers would 
like better security but would be prepared to pay only from A$1 00 to A$500 for it. 
It seems there is no great pressure for change. If the cost of a smart card system could be 
brought to within a range acceptable to owners, individual owners might install it to 
improve security. By contrast fleet owners might be motivated more by a wish to acquire, 
and have control of, the additional information that could be extracted and would be 
happy to improve their negotiating position with the oil companies. A possible 
development that could encourage adoption of in-vehicle smart card systems is robot 
refuelling ("Robot", 1997), 
If all the modifications listed in chapter six were required, the system would be expensive 
and would have aspects that not all owners would want. No one group of users perceives 
a need for all aspects, and a general conclusion, therefore, is that an acceptable vehicle 
smart card management system, should be flexible enough to enable owners to choose 
only the aspects that they perceive as necessary, and for which they arc prepared to pay. 
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7.9 Conclusion. 
The point has been made repeatedly that a probable precondition for sman cards to be 
used in vehicle management is their widespread usc. One day, smart cards may be w; 
ubiquitous as wristwatches and be not just a convenience but a necessity, cnabiing us to 
organise our immediate surroundings in at least two ways. First, we may be able to 
configure the smart card to suit our individual need, thm making each card as unique as 
its holder, and second. we may be able to personalise the devices around us. A wide 
range of devices (telephones, vehicles, TVs, dwellings, PCs and others) may be able to 
accept and read the smart card, and then operate according to our personal preference. 
Nevertheless, at present there is no clear business case for moving to smart card systems 
worldwide, because biometric identification cannot meet the more exacting financial 
institution requirements; and, the ongoing stmggle for competitive edge and the gaps in 
standardisation, until resolved, will prohibit acceptance of the multi-application card. 
Even outside the commercial world, no killer application has emerged, and forecasts of 
growth are conflicting and unconvincing. For the motoring world the technology is 
probably already adequate, but without either widespread use, which depends on the 
factors already mentioned, or pressure from the public or authorities, the development of 
smart card systems and their installation in vehicles 'Yould cost more than the benefits 
would justify. The obstacles may eventually be overcome, but the process is likely to be 
incremental, and a realistic conclusion is that smart cards will not be used to personalise 
vehicles within the postulated ten-year time frame. With regard to the opening fantasy 
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about summoning and dismissing a {;<If like a magic carpet, it should be noted th:tt the 
technology already exists. GM has ccmductcd a driverless test on a stretch of highway 
1-15 in San Diego. California and the French IN RIA has conducted a realistic experiment 
at Saint Quentin en Yvelines using driverless electric cars which the public arc able· to 
access using smart cards (Lc systeme Praxitelc, 1999). Notwithstanding the above, a felt 
need for the techr.ology does not exist. 
Future work should include further investigation of vehicle owner and/or operator 
attitudes to ~mart card assisted vehicle management and the investigation of the opinions 
of both fleet operators and r.~gulatory authorities using a larger, more representative 
sample. Researchers in a different study discipline could probably better address any 
follow-up study. Although pertinent, an investigation of possible shifts in commercial 
intentions might be fruitless, because of the commercial sensitivity of the information, but 
an investigation of the feasibility of developing a smart card supported vehicle tracking 
and locating system might be of interest and is planned. The problems of introducing an 
improved system are not new and it may be appropriate to give Machiavelli the last word. 
"There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, ... than to 
initiate a new order of things. The refonner has enemies in all those lvho profit by the old 
order and only lukewarm defenders in those who would profit by the new order. " 
(Machiavelli, 1513, Cit 6, paragraph 4/8). 
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ESTIMATE OF THE PROPORTION OF 
CARS AND LIGHT COMMERCIAL 
VEHICLES IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
THAT ARE FLEET OWNED 
This proved to br: a surprisingly difficult figure to estimate. Enquiries were made of the 
following organisations: 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 
Motor Trade Association of WA 
RAC 
but they were unable to help. 
There are about one million car~ and light commercial vehicles now registered in W A. 
New vehicle registrations of these vehicles are now about 50,000 each year. Since the 
total number of registrations for the last five years has increased by only 25,000 each year 
it seems that about 25,000 are taken out of use annually. 
Senior salesmen in various large dealerships had kept no figures but gave estimates of the 
proportion sold for fleet use as from 50 to 70 percent. If 60% of new registrations each 
year are for fleet owners this is 30,000 vehicles. If fleet vehicles are used for an average 
of three years only before being sold to private owners some 90,000 of WA's light 
vehicles are fleet vehicles. This amounts to about nine percent. A call to the Federal 
Chamber of Automotive Industries, Canberra, elicited the verbal opinion that of 
Australia's eight million vehicles, one million were fleet owned. Ten percent has 
therefore been adopted as a reasonable "ball park" figure. 
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Appendix 2 
THE CRIME ENVIRONMENT 
Efforts to improve vehicle security arc a small (perhaps, relatively unimportant) part 
of society's efforts to reduce crime generally. Crime statistics are capable of different 
interpretations and these interpretations depend on the weight given to various factors 
such as policing strategy, media attitudes and public perceptions. Trends in crime 
differ by categories. 
• In W A, total crime seems to be decreasing but crimes against the person are on the 
increase. (WA Yearbook. 1997, p. 108). For example, for the years 1992-96, total 
reported crime, excluding vehicle theft, fell: although, violent crimes such as 
robbery and assault rose (WA Yearbooks, 1995-7). While vehicle theft decreased 
from I 995 to 1996 over the longer tenn it has increased. (W A Yearbook, I 996, p. 
I 10). 
• Police strategy may distort the figures, although there appears to be little evidence 
to support that possibility. In the latest yearbook it is shown that for offences 
against the person the percentage of offences cleared is 82%, whereas for crimes 
against property it is 21%, but this outcome could be merely a consequence of the 
fact that there is nearly always a witness to a violent act. Even if suspicions about 
the statistics are well founded, the number of reported thefts of insured items 
would probably not be affected because the owner can only claim the insurance if 
the alleged offence is reported to the police. 
• However, it may be that the police, perhaps rightly, devote more resources to the 
prosecution of violent criminals and that a rise in such crimes, without a 
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compensating increase in police resources, may necessarily result m a rclativc 
neglect of crimes against property and a distortion of the statistics. 
• Those who support any such strategy argue that crimes against property (of which 
vehicle theft and theft from vehicles is a component) do not merit the same level 
of deterrent effort as crimes against the person. 
• The counter perception is that if minor cnmes rarely result in apprehension, 
criminals become bolder and commit more serious offences. Civic authorities in 
New York, where a vigorous campaign has been waged against minor offenders 
such as drunks, marijuana smokers and vandals, apparently take this view. 
According to a Time magazine report the campaign has led to a significant fall in 
all crime including major offences (Law and order, I 996, p. 50). In July 97 there 
were television news reports of the adoption in W A of a "zero tolerance" policy 
that appears to bear some resemblance to the New York campaign - although, 
equally, it could be merely lip service. 
• Press reports often point out that crime generally is decreasing but also usually 
emphasise the increase in crime against the person. Perhaps because of these 
reports, there is a public perception that overall crime is increasing although the 
greatest outrage is expressed about crimes against the person. 
At the least it can be argued that motorists should not be tolerant of vehicle theft 





Larger vchiclt.:s arc olicn pillagcd hut .sl!ldom stokn. Over tht: three year period 1993-
1996, in Western Au:;tralia. about 1.6% of registered whklr.:s or an avcragt.: of nearly 
19,000 vehicles each year were stolen at an estimated cost of over $100 million (WA 
Police Annual Crime Statistics Report 1995/96). In most years WA has the highest 
rate of vehicle theft in Australia. but figures published recently on the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics web site show a reduction in the rate. During 1999, the number of 
motor vehicle thefts in Australia declined by 1.3%, from 131,587 in 1998 to129,865 
in 1999. The largest percentage decrease was recorded in Western Australia, where 
the number of motor vehicle thefts decreased by 21%, from 16,115 in 1998 to 12,752 
in 1999 (Motor vehicle theft, 2000). Presumably the community would still welcome 
any measures to reduce the loss. 
Other points obtained from an earlier study by Devery follow (Devery, 1993). Any 
figures related to car thieves must be regarded with caution since most thefts do not 
result in the thief being apprehended. In 1988, in NSW, the clearing-up rate (thief 
apprehended) was 2.74% (Geason & Wilson, 1990). Devery states that only about 5% 
of car thieves are apprehended (Devcry, 1993). In WA, in 1994 - 1995 the rate was 
15.9% and in 1995- 1996, 17.5%. A statistical report from the Comprehensive Auto-
theft Research Scheme (CARS) of South Australia, implies a 10% apprehension rate 
(about 10,000 cars stolen each year and about 1 ,000 persons apprehended) (Motor 
vehicle theft in SA, 1995). Finally, a recently published report from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics has a table for motor vehicle theft 'Outcome of investigation' 
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which shows the proportion of offcmh.:rs procc~:dcd against. The figurcs range from 
Tasmania 2.6% to Queensland 15.2%. Figures were not available fOr WA (Recorded 
crime in Australia. 1996, ABS Catalogue Number 451 0.0). Mindful that figures arc 
drawn from the small ··selected" sample of appn:hcndcd offenders, there is still some 
evidence that car thieves fall into two broad categories: 




The profile of a typical car thief is that of a male, aged 14 to 25 and with the mode at 
age 16. It may be that older thieves have become more cunning and are apprehended 
less frequently. The situation seems to be long standing, since as far back as 1984 
only 15% of car thefts were cleared (Biles & Willing, 1987, p. t,2). 
In SA about 80% to 90% of stolen cars are recovered within a week (Motor vehicle 
theft in SA, 1995). This, according to local industry opinion is similar to the situation 
in W A. Recovery rates in the eastern states are less, varying from 65% to 76% (Car 
theft, 1997). Probably, therefore, in WA, no more than 20% of those stolen are stolen 
for resale, either as complete vehicles or as parts. A few ( 18.7% in SA in 1995) of the 
proportion quickly recovered will have been stolen to use in the commission of 
another crime; for example, as a getaway car or for "ram-raid" use. Of the remainder, 
most are likely to have been taken for joy-riding or for instant temporary transport. 
One may speculate that for some young people, car theft is a crime much as apple 
stealing used to be some years ago. Mostly, it is not for profit but is exciting and not 
particularly risky. It may be a training ground and recruitment area for more serious 
criminals, but there is no hard evidence to support this. The joy-riding may be on the 
increase because, in 1993, Devcry estimated: 
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• Short-term usc. (e.g. joy-ritling, a dH.:ap taxi or to filcilitatc a more scriou:-i 
crime) 50-60% 
• Pro lit (t.:.g. !'or n:~alc or salt: as parts} 
• Fraud (e.g. to collect the insurance) 
30-40% 
4-12% 
Similar figures arc givt.:n by Genson (Gcason & Wilson, 1990, p. 6). 
Older vehicles are more commonly stolen. Devcry gives figures that put the average 
age of stolen cars as between 5 and 15 years with the peak at about ten years (Devery, 
1993 ). The CARS study, however, gives the highest rates of theft for vehicles in the 
15 to 18 years age group (Motor vehicle theft in SA, 1995). Popular makes appear to 
be the most commonly stolen, the five with the highest theft rate per ten thousand 
vehicles being, in descending order, Holden, Chrysler, Ford, Mazda and Toyota. 
There is a bias towards bigger. more powerful models. Although statistics show that 
older vehicles are more often stolen, there have been recent thefts of newer cars that 
use fairly sophisticated, transponder-supported locking. About 300 such vehicles 
were stolen in Victoria in latel995, which may have been a transitory anomaly 
(Thieves beat car giants, 1996). Nevertheless, It would seem highly desirable to 
develop devices that can be fitted as a kit to an older vehicle. The average age of 
registered vehicles is also about ten years (Yearbook Australia, 1997, p. 526). 
Both Devery and Geason estimate that from I 0 to 15% of stolen vehicles were left 
unlocked. Gcason reports that about 5% had the keys left in them. Actual figures 
quoted by different investigators vary, but it seems that in up to 30% of car thefts the 
vehicle was either left unlocked or the thief had access to the key or a duplicate 
I 
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(Motor vehicle, 1995, p.75). In Australia, in about 5% of thclls the keys were left in 
the car (Oeason & Wilson, 1990). In SA in 1995, in 15.4% of vehicle thefts the thief' 
had access to a key and in 14.3% the vehicle was unlocked. Clearly a device that 
compensates for human carelessness would be useful. According to the CARS study, 
when thieves forced access, in 43.8% of known cases the lock was manipulated 
(presumably by driving a sharp instrument through the door panel) and in 19.3% of 
cases a window was broken (Motor vehicle, 1995, p.75). The most recent study, the 
NRMA report on Car Theft in Eastern Australia, 1996, does not record the means of 
entry (Car Theft, 1997). The matter is summarised by Livermore of the UK Police 
Science Development Branch who writes, "Cars are stolen not because thieves posses 
fine engineering skills but because they exploit weaknesses in the system. Their 
approach is ... based on familiarity and brute force methods. (They) ... rely on the fact 
that when they lay hands on a car it is known to them, they know exactly where the 
weaknesses are: success is certain because they have done it before." (Livennore, 
1993). 
Statistics are available showing the places from which cars are most commonly stolen 
but, unfortunately, there are no comparative statistics to show where vehicles are 
commonly parked. About 30 cars each year are stolen from the Mount Lawley 
campus car park. With 1500 parking spaces, this is in line with the State average. 
One gains the impression that unattended, parked cars are stolen impartially from 





GLOBAL MONETARY FLOWS 
Cash payments. Within finance there arc at least two areas in which smart cards 
might have a major impact. of which one is the small change, or cash transaction 
market. already de tined. There are varying estimates of its size. 
• Choice magazine estimates that, worldwide, the small change market of private 
expenditure, the market for the electronic purse, (that is, transactions below 
US$15 in value) is worth an estimated US$1.8t each year (Smartcards, 1996). 
• Allied, an organisation conducting market surveys, estimate the total as US$8.1 t 
(Prusa & Reed, 1996). 
• Jean McKenna, vice president of Visa International, cited research that, "in the top 
29 countries in 1995, more than US$8.1 t was spent in cash. 22% for transactions 
of ten dollars or less" (Myers. 1996). Since 22% of US$8.1 t is US$1.782t, 
McKenna appears to confirm the Choice Magazine estimate. 
• An article in the Australian Personal Computer stated that Mastercard believed 
that money stored on smart cards could one day be worth US$2t (Yiacoumi, 
1997). 
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• A web page quotes a paper by Jack M. Kaplan that, "cash transactions under 
US$20 arc valued at US$2t each year ami represent 80 percent of cash 
transactions." (Kaplan, 1996 ). 
• A recent report to Congress from the US Federal Reserve board on the subject of 
stored-value cards, stated that transactions of Jess than US$20, for things like fast 
food and Siurpecs, amount to more than US$500b annually. Credit card 
companies have already largely exhausted Americans' ability to buy US$75 items 
on credit cards, but issuing stored-value cards would allow the companies to 
become involved in the high volume, low price transaction business ("Changing", 
1997). 
• According to the Bank for International Settlement, the number of consumer cash 
transactions in the U.S. alone exceeds 300 billion per year. By contrast, bank-
facilitated consumer transactions, such as credit and debit cards, cheques, and wire 
transfers, total only 60 billion per year. The worldwide market for automating 
cash transactions remains virtually untapped. 
Clearly, although there is room for dispute about market size, the figure is substantial. 
This is an area in which electronic money, possibly facilitated by smart cards, might 
gain some acceptance. In New Zealand it is estimated that 70% by volume of all 
transactions are by cash, although cash accounts for only 30% of their value, because 
the average value of cash payments is less than NZ$10 (NZ Bankers Association 
Annual Report, 1996; Butler, 1996). By contrast, in Australia, 90% by volume of 
transactions arc still by cash (Mair, 1996). The forgoing figures give an indication of 
the potential market in which the purse, or other form of electronic money, might be 
sold. After allowing for growth, the current total might be US$! Ot. 
I 
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E-commcrcc. Stcintidd, writing in the Lansing State Journal, 26 Dcccmhcr, 19CJ5 
claims that in 1994, a consulting firm, Euromonitor, noted that the "global shopping" 
market was approximately US$166b, and contrasted this with "electronic shopping" 
that was a mere US$300m (Stcinficld, 1996). The terms were not defined. In 1997, 
an Australian Internet services company, Camtcch. asserted that c-commcrcc was 
currently A$2b annually, but would grow to A$50b annually by the year 2000 
("Camtech", 1997). In 1998, researchers at the University of Texas, estimated 
Internet commerce to be US$102b (Barua. Pinnell, Shutter & Whinston, 1998). The 
figure probably includes Internet shopping. In the same year, Tom Benemann, of 
Forbes ASAP, estimated the market, exclusive of Internet shopping, to be US$43b 
(Benemann, 1998). In 1999, Ernst & Young, in a presentation to an OECD 
conference in April, quoted estimates of e-commL:rce from various market surveyors 
that varied from US$9.9b to US$97.2b (Simcoe, 1999). Finally, in a White Paper 
dated 7 December, 1999, the UK InterForum quoted the !DC, a leading international 
research organisation, as predicting that e-commerce would rise to US$600b in 2001 
and to US$1. It the foliowing year (Electronic signatures, 1999). These figures. 
although not always so defined, are assumed to be annual and are summarised in the 
following table. 
I 
Table I: E.-commerce markt.:t :-;ize 
Source Estimated Actual Forecast-~ 
-- --------
Year Amount Year Amount 
----~--- -
Euromonitor 1994 US$ 300m 
Cam tech 1997 A$2b 2000 A$5~Jb 
University of Texas 1998 US$102b 
1999 US$170b 
Forbes ASAP 1998 US$43b 
Gold linger 1998 2002 US$300b 
Ernst & Young 1999 US$9.9 to 
97.2b 
InterForum 1999 2001 L'S$600b 
2002 US$ I. It 
The estimates of its size are increasing, and a reasonable guess at its present size 
might be US$210b. 
E-shopping. In the liS, in 1994, the 3.5 million people connected to the Internet 
sp~nt an average of under 60 cents each via their PCs, compared to US$94 through 
traditional mail ordering (Steinfield, 1996), but, surprisingly, in 1999 this may have 
risen. According to Gaw and Utting, writing in the West Australian and quoting the 
Boston Consulting Group, the per capita global e-tail expenditure in that year was 
US$60 (Gaw & Utting, 2000). Brislen, writing in Unlimited Magazine in May, 2000, 
also quoting the Boston Group, gives the figure for the US alone as US$134.20 
(Brislen, 2000). The Boston Group cannot be quoted directly because they release 
their findings only to subscribers. In 1994, according to Steinfield, electronic 
shopping, including CD-ROMS, accounted for just US$300m in sales, or less than 
0.02% of total shopping. Verifone estimated e-shopping in !994 as a mere US$ 100m 
(Hansen, 1996). Gaw and Utting, in the article already quoted, gave the total as 
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US$40b. 1-lmvcvt.:r, even discounting the ligurc from Gaw and Utting, there arc hopes 
for the future. For example. Mondcx, in its Decem her, 1996 magazine, stated that 
pnymt.!nts over the lntcnu:t amounted to US$500m, but cstimak:d that by the year 
2000 the figure would be in billions. According to the Smart card Forum, Killen and 
Associates sa~.' there were 250 million transactions in I 996 and that this will grow to 
25 billion by 2005 (Smart Card Fuctoids, 1996). A Forrester Research study on 
Internet commerce, claimed worldwide revenues from interactive, online sales 
increased from US$240m in 1994 to US$350m in 1996, and could reach US$6.9b by 
2000 (Rupley, 1996). In an article in the Economist, Christopher Anderson wrote, 
" ... analysts reckoned that consumer Internet transaction in 1996 were worth 
... US$500 - 600m" (Anderson, 1997). He did not identify the analysts, but quoted 
International Data as forecasting that by the year 2000 consumer online shopping 
would amount to US$16.1 b. These disjointed estimates of the shopping market are 
summarised in the following table. 
Table 2: E-shopping market size 
Source Source date Sales Estimates Forecasts 
1-· Year· Amount Year Amount 
Steinfie1d 1996 1994 US$300m 
Verifone 1996 1994 US$ 100m 
Mondex 1996 1995 US$500m 2000 Billions 
Forrester 1996 1994 US$240m 
1996 US$350m 2000 US$6.9b 
Anderson 1997 1996 US$500-
600m 
Internatio 1997 2000 US$16.1b 
na1 Data 
Gaw& 2000 1999 US$30-
Utting 40b 
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Fon:casting is not an exact science! The larger ligures arc hardly believable since, if 
true, they indicate that individual purchases could be equal to one third of business-
to-business commerce, and not all forccustcrs arc completely optimistic. For 
example, Brislcn quotes Forrester Research as predicting that "many c-tailing 
ventures will fail and most will disappear by 2001" (Brislcn, 2000). A plausible guess 






















































memory required to 
store code 
(no storage required-
process carried out using 












Get Owner /\uthSup 
Get OwncrEnrolAuthData 
If OwncrAuthSup in OwncrEnrolAuthData then 
Store Li~.·cnseDctails + DrivcrDetails +OwneriD 
Encrypt DrivcrEnrolAuthData 
Store DriverEnroiAuthData 
Enro I External Au tho ri ties 
Get ExtAuthDctai1s 
Get OwnerAuthSup /*(BioiP1NIPassword]*/ 
Get OwnerEnrolAuthData /*[BioiPINIPassword]*/ 
If Ov·merAuthSup in OwnerEnroiAuthData then 
Store ExtAuthDetails /*a matrix that assigns queries to authorities*/ 
Note: Above processes would be carried out at an enrolment workstation. 
ldentifyQueryingAuthority 
Get ExtemalAuthCode + Extcrna1AuthQuery 
{from transceiver} 
If Externa1AuthCode in ExternalAuthDctail then 
Get ResponseDefinition 
If ExtemalAuthQuery in ResponseDefinition then 
RespondToExterna\Authority (ResponseDefinition ) 
RespondT a External Authority ( ResponscDefinition) 
If LicenseDetails in ResponseDefinition then 
Get LicenseDetai!s 
Send LicenscDetails to transceiver 
If Sensor Readings in ResponscDefinition then 
Get SensorReadings 
Send SensorReadings to transceiver 
If Payment in ResponseDefinition then 
PurseBalance := PurseBalance - TransactionAmount 
Send TransactionAmount to transceiver 
Note: Above two processes initiated by transceiver signal 
200 bytes 
600 bytes 
3.3 Pay F orltems 400 bytes 
Get payment from reader 
Purse Balance := Purse Balance- Payment 






Get Cashlnput /* from ATM dispenser*/ 
PurscBalancc := PurscBalancc ·I· Cashlnput 
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400 bytes 




Note: This process pl!rformcd at each pulse 
400 bytes 




/* Process not claL.loratcd. Some items would be overwritten at each pulse. 
Some would be stored at specified event. For example, time of start, at 
start, in a queue of, say, ten. Speed and deceleration might be stored in a 
queue of. say. 60 items at one second intervals */ 
2000 bytes 
Comparison required for 
each item 
ValidatcDriver 
Get DriverAuthSupplied /*[BioiPINIPassword]*/ 
Get UsageCode 
Store DriverAuthSupplied /* record last attempt*/ 
Store UsageCode in DriverRecord 
Get DriverAccess 
Decrypt DriverEnro\AuthData 
If DriverAuthSupplied in DriverEnro!AuthData then 
Ann VehicleSystems(Driver!D) 
Ann V ehic\eSystems(Driver!D) 
Get AnningCode (*from ArmingCose store*) 
Decrypt ArmingCode 
Send ArmingCode to vehicle microcontrollers 
Get Time (*internally generated*) 
LastS tart Time :=Time 
Store DriveriD + LastStartTime in DriverRecord 
600 bytes 
400 bytes 
5.3 Set ValetMode 400 bytes 
5.4 
Get ValetSetSupplied (*as chosen by owner from ValetCodes- can be 
ValetSet or ValetReset*) 
Get OwnerEnro\AuthData /* [BioiPINIPassword]*/ 
If OwnerEnrolAuthData = DriverAuthSupplied and then 









I r ValctOpConditions incluJe Rc:;ct or ValctOpConditions less than 
ScnsorReadings then 
Get ValctDisarmingCodc 
Issue ValctDisarmingCodc to microcontrollcrs 
Else.: Get ValctAnningCodc 
Issue ValetArmingCodc to microcontrollcrs 
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ValidatcQuerycr 600 bytes 
Get OwncrQucry 
Get Ov .. ·ncrAuthSupplied 
If OwncrAuthSupplied in OwncrEnrolAuthData then 
Get DataRequircd 
ExtractData (DataRcquircd, RequiredData) 
ExtractData (DataRcquired, RequiredData) 
If Sensor Readings in RequiredData then 
Get SensorReadings 
Display SensorReadings 
Search and comparison 
required for each item 
2000 bytes 
7.1 ManageEngine 400 bytes 
Get EngineManagementCriteria 
Get Sensor Readings I* Power and rpm *I 
If SensorReadings <> EngineManagementCriteria then 
AdjustThrottleSetting /* Process not elaborated*/ 
7.2 PersonaliseSeating&Mirrors 600 bytes 
Get Persona! Settings I* Required seat and mirror setting *I 
Get Sensor Readings I* Actual seat and mirror setting * i 
If Sensor Readings <> PersonalSettings then 
AdjustSeat&Mirror I* Process not elaborated *I 
Total storage required for code 9600 bytes 
Data flows 
Data structure Components 
Acceleration/deceleration *sensor report* 
ActualEngineReadings - *Sensor reports ofEngineRevs, Temperature, 
Oi!Prcssure, IntakcManifoldPressure, 
ThrottleSetting* 
ActuaiPersonalSettings *alias Pcrsona!Settings* 
AppropriateSensorReadings - *readings S(;]ectcd for report to external authorfly* 
Appropriate Vehicle Details - *details selected for report to external authority* 
Arming Code *Code to activate designated microcontrollers* 
A uthenticationfrom Driver ~~ *alias DrivcrAuthSupplied* 
AuthorisedData - *data that may be supplied in response to a query* 
BloodGroup *driver's blood group 











Cashin put .. *sum added !0 purse baluncc* 2 ·---------
Category ~cc l,iccnscDctails)* 10 -------- -
Conditions .. *{sec LiccnscDctails)* 2 
- '[!JrivcrData I LiccnscJJittal* 
----·--
Datu InA ccun.lancc With A ppropr - 256 
iatcDcl1nitiun r-- *(alias QucryDtli'U/{C{jUirclllcnt or Owncrf)ucry- ------DataRcquircd '" 256 
I-· 
Data as specified fly the owner)* 
Date {Valet ~ct) *(scl' ValctOpCorlJitions)* 6 ----
D ispla ycd D i rcct ions . *May not involve srnartcard* 
Distance (Valet set) *(sec ValctOpConditions)* 2 
DOB ~(sec LiccnscDctails)* 6 ' -
Driver Access - Drivcr!D + DrivcrEnrolAuthData 
Driver AuthSupplied [PIN I TranspondcrSignal I BioTcmplatcJ 8-256 
DriverDatalnAccordancc *Data that owner has authorised for release to 
WithAppropriateDefinition external authorities* 
DriverDctail Driver Access+ DriverName + 
DriverPublicHealthDctails + LicenseNo I 
DriverEnrolAuthData - [PIN I TranspondcrSignall BioTemplatc] 8 - 256 
DriverlD *(sec DriverDctail)* 2 
DrivcrJoumey DriverlD + UsageCode + LastStartTime 
DrivcrName - *(see DriverDctail)* 30 
DriverPublicHealthDetail - BloodGroup + 4'Medica1Wamings 
DriverRecord DriveriD + LastStartTime + UsageCodc 
EngineManagementCriteria MaxRevsAtThrottleSetting + 20 
MaxThrottlcSettingAtRevs 
Engine No *(see VehicleDetails)* 20 
EngineRevs *(see EngineSettings)* 2 
EngineSettings - Engine Revs+ Temperature+ Oil Pressure 
+lntakeManifoldPressure + ThrottleSetting 
Expiry Date *(see LicenseDetails)* 6 
ExtAuthDetail - •a matrix 8 X I 0 each 2 bytes (ExtcmalAuthCode by 
Response Definition)* 
ExtemaiAuthCode *identities external authority• 2 I 
ExtemalAuthorityQuery ExtemaiAuthCode + ExtemalAuthQuery 
ExtemalAuthQuery - *Some vehicle details (FrameNo, Engine No), some 
owner details, some driver detai!s, some license 
details and some sensor readings* 
Frame No *(see VehicleDetails)* 20 
lntakeManifoldPressure - *(see EngineSettings)* 10 
lssueAuthority *(see LicenseDetails)* 10 
LastStartTime *(see SensorReadings)* 10 
LicenseDatalnAccordanceWith License data that owner has authorised for release to 
AppropriateDefinition external authorities 
LicenseDetails LicenseNo + 008 + Expiry Date+ Category+ 
Condition + JssueAuthority 
LicenseNo - *(see LiccnseDetails)* 10 
Make - *(see VehicleDctails)* 20 
MedicaiWaming •a code to identify allergies etc • 2 
MirrorSetting *(see PersonalSettings)* 50 
Model *(see VehiclcDetails)* 20 
Oi!Pressure *(see ScnsorReadings)* 2 
Owner Access OwnerlD + OwnerEnrotAuthData 
Owner AuthSupplied - [PIN 1 TranspondcrSignall BioTemplate] 8 ~ 256 
OwnerDetails - Owner Access+ OwnerNamc 
OwnerEnroiAuthData [PIN I TransponderSignall BioTemplate] 8 ~ 256 
OwnerlD *(sec OwnerDetails)* 2 
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---- --·~-----
Owner Name "(sec O~vncrDctails)~ 30 - -----·-· 
OwncrQucry - Owncrcr!D + OwncrAuthSupplicd -1· Data~~.:_quir~-----
Payment •sum deduCted rrorn purse balance• 2 
---
Pcrsonu l is11t ion Data - EngincManagcmcntCritcria +· Pcrsona]Scttings ------
Personal Sctti ng,s ScatSctting 1- MirrorSctting --
PrcviousMaxmia -- •Jato items potentially updatcablc• ---
Previous Readings -- •data items potentially_ updatcablc• 
Previous Read Time •data items potentially updatcablc• 
Prcvi0usSartTimc *datn items potentially updatcablc* 
Pulse •an event initiated by the engine• 
Purse Balance •cash available to the driver• IU 
Readings - •updated previous readings• 
Registration *(see VehicleDctails)* 7 
Response Definition •defines what response may be made to an external 
enquiry* 
ResponseToExtAuth *Authorised data as specified* 
ResponseToOwner * Data as specified by the owner( Alias 
RequircdData)* 
Road Use Directions ~ *provided by external authority* 
·-
SeatSetting ~ *(sec PersonalSettings)* 50 
SemsorReadingsAsAppropriate - *alias Readings* 
SensorReadings Ace/deceleration +Engine Revs+ 







MaxSpeedSinceLastRead + OdometerReading + 
SpeedKPH +Temperature+ ThrottleSetting + 
TimeLastRead +Time (Date-time group) 
Actua\PersonalSettings 
Speed (Valet set) *(see ValetOpConditions)* 2 
StorableReadings ~ *alias Readings* 
Temperature - *(see EngineSettings)* 2 
ThrottleSetting - *(sre EngineSettings)* \0 
TransactionAmount - *(sec TransactionDetail)* \0 
Transaction Date *(see Transaction Detail)* 6 
TransactionDetail - Transaction Date + TransactionAmount 
UsageCode - *indicates purpose of journey* 2 
UseCode *alias UsagcCode* 
ValetAnning/DisanningCode - *activates microcontrollcrs ifValetOpConditions are 
met* 
ValetCodes - *codes potentially selectable by the owner* 
ValetOpConditions Date + Speed + Distance 
ValetReset *removes constraint imposed by ValetSet* 
ValetSet *causes the microcontrollers to enforce confommncc 
to the ValetOpConditions* 
ValetSetSupplied - [ValetReset 1 (ValetSet + ValetOpConditions)] 
VehicleDetail - Make+ Model+ Registration + EngineNo + 
Frame No+ YearOtManufacture 





A fleet manager needs data upon which to base his decisions. 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to get your advice as to what data your organisatiuon 
collects, how it is collected. stored and retrieved, and whether, in your opinion, the process 
could be improved using modern technology. 
1. What data is recorded: 










There are several ways of collecting data: 
A. By the driver, or other person, keeping a diary or fog sheet manually with a 
pen/pencil 
B. By a fuel station automatically reading the driver's fuel card and the pump 
dispensing meter. This is supplemented by the keyboard entry of the odometer 
reading as advised by the driver. These data are periodically passed to the fleet 
owner, either electronically or by a paper report. 
C. By a repair or service workshop providing documents such as quotes and 
invoices whose details are entered into the fleet owner's database, either by filing the 
documents or by keyboard. 
D. Other. 
2. How is the data collected? 










Data can also be stored in different ways. 
A. In paper files? 
B. Digitally? (e.g. in a database) 
C. Other. 
3. How is the data stored: 










4. Do you feel your current system is satisfactory 
or do you have eventual changes in mind? 
5. Do you feel users and others co-operate 
satisfactorily? 
6. Assuming the price was right , would you 
consider a system that automated most 
data collection? 
7. If not, what would be your objection? 
8. If so, what do you think would be an 
acceptable price for the in-vehicle unit 





PASCAL CODE TO MANIPULATE SMARTCARD READER 
(* This program accesses seas based on the Intel 8051 chip in the 
smartca.rd reader, reads a codeword from a smartcard via ComPort2, and 
passes it to ComPortl for reception by the HCll microcontroller. In 










{Standard Turbo Pascal unit} 
{standard Turbo Pascal unit} 
{Unit obtained from Chris Barrett} 
{Unit obtained from Chris Barrett} 
{unit obtained from Chris Barrett} 
{Unit obtained from Rising Edge Technology} 
ComPortl = l; 
ComPort2 = 2; 
{The port used to communicate with the HCll} 
{The port used to communicate with the reader} 
var 
SaveExit : pointer; 
Status : integer; 
StatusStr : String; 
BufStr String; 
Buffer BufType; {Type defined in unit IO} 
I Byte; 
{-------------------------------------------------------------------) 
procedure CloseDown; Far; 
begin 
WriteLn (···Now in Closedown ') ; 
ExitProc := SaveExit; 
{ Attempt to close down the Communications Port (IO. PAS 4)} 
lf CloseCommPort(ComPort2) then 
Writeln ('COM', ComPort2, ' closed successfully!') 
else 
begin 
Wri teln ( 'Unable to close COM' , ComPort2) ; 
Halt; 
end; 
If CloseCommPort(ComPortl) then 
Writeln ('COM' ,ComPortl,' closed successfully!'} 
else 
begin 
Writeln( 'Unable to close COM' ,ComPortl}; 
Exit; 
end; 
end; { CloseDown} 
{----------------------------------------------------------------) 
I 
,, \ .-.-, 
~- _: _' ..... , :., •' 
procedure SendArmingCode; 
begin {SendArmingCode} 
{Inst:all exit procedure to close down the communication port} 
SaveExit := ExitProc; 
ExitProc := ®Closedown; 
{ Att:empt to open the Communications Port (IO.PAS JJ} 
If OpenCommPort(ComPortl) then 
Writeln ('COM', ComPortl, ' opened successfully! ') 
else 
begin 
Writeln('Unable to open COM' ,ComPort!); 
Halt; 
end; 
writeln ('Ready to Write CODEWORD 
ComWrite (ComPortl, BufStr); 
Cornportl} 
writeln ('Codeword sent'); 
readln; 
end; {SendArmingCode} 
to ComPort 1') ; 
{ASYNC19 writes BufStr to 
252 
{-----------------------------------------------------------------} 
begin {PassCode main program} 
ClrScr; 
if not Initialise_SCAM{ComPort2) then { Uses unit CtrlCmds } 
begin 




if not Initialise_scos then { uses unit Scos } 
begin 




Write('Select Directory #4 - '); 




Write ('Open File #1 - •); 




if Status = File_Not_Found then 
(* Selects card directory 
containing codeword *) 
(* Opens the card file 
containing codeword *) 
Writeln('File not found. Must create File '); 






BufStr[O) := #8; 





(* Reads the codeword 




































A program to pass a codeword to the HCll 
microcontroller, compare it 
to the codeword already stored in RAM in 
the microcontroller and, 
if the two are the same, output a small 
current 
switch 
and voltage to 
on a thyristor, 
by 
H<. .· ry Jones 
File: ARMCARV.ASM version for RAM 
19th JULY I 1998 












































































NUMCHAH. . EQU 


























;Supplied code stored 
;here 
;On-board code stored 
;here 
;Register base address 
; parameters 




;Select Port pin 
;Baud register offset 
;Data register offset 
;Port D data direction 
;reg 
;Number of chars in 
;CODEWORD 
;Twice number of 
; flashes 
; Port D offset 
;SCI con reg 1 offset 
; SCI con reg 2 offset 




























































;**********H*RECEIVE SUPPLIED CODEI'IORD '***** 
; This program will receive characters from 
;the PC if it is installed in RAt-1 on the hell 
;microcontroller and the command GO cOOO in 
:; issued 0000 
0000 
0000 








.org ~8600 ; For EEPROM use 8600 
;*************PREPARE TO RECEIVE CODEWORD************ 
Set up the parameters for serial Communication 
; Interface reception. 
...... ~t************************************************ 
' 
8600 CE 10 00 START: ldx #REGBASE ; Sets index to regstr 
;base. 
8603 lC 08 20 
8606 
8606 86 30 
8608 A7 28 
860A 
860A 86 00 
860C A7 2C 
860E 86 OC 
8610 A7 2D 
8612 
8612 86 20 
8614 A7 09 
8616 










PORTD,x,SELPIN ;Ensures pin 
; DS set on start. 
;Inverter acts on it. 
#BJl.UDDAT ; (sets baud to 5600 by 
BAUD, x setting bits SCPl SCPO) 
(bits 4 & 5 in baud register) 
#CONFl ; (1 start bit, 8 data 
SCCR1,X ; bits & 1 stop bit) 
#CONF2 ; (transmit & receive 
; enables TE = RE = 1 in 
SCCR2,x ; SCCR2) 
; (bits 2 & 3 are set by $0C) 
#SELPIN ;(Sets data direction 
for Port DS to become 
staa DDRD,x ; output for LED & 
; thyristor) 





; * ** * *********RECEIVE CODEWORD CHARACTERS*************** 
; The program will cycle at this point until a character 
; is received, 
;***************************************************** 
B61A A6 2E 
B61C 84 20 
RECVCHAR: ldaa STATUS,x 
anda #SEI,PIN 
(Proceed if RDRF = 1 




B61E 27 FA 
8620 A6 2E 
8622 A6 2F 
8624 
8624 18 A7 00 
8627 18 08 
86:.>.9 18 ac DO 08 
862D 26 EB 
B62F 
; results in $00 
if RDRF bit is not 
;set. It will be set 
; when data arrives & show 




RECVCHAR If so, loop) 
STATUS,x (Read SCSR & data char 





Para 5-9 of HC11 manual 
Store char at ADDRESS. 
(Inc index until all 
chars (8) received) 






;**********COMPARE STORED TO SUPPLIED CODEWORD******** 
NOTE: BUFFAT~O Memory Modify HAS BEEN used to put the 
stored code at CODES POT IN E2PROM. If the supplied 
code matches the stored code an LED flashes 
































































862F CE 87 00 
8632 18 CE DO 00 




jjCODBS PO'!' ; Stored CODEWORD here 
HADDRESS ; Reset y to addr 
#NUMCIIAR ; CODE\o'IOf{D is 8 chars 
8638 18 1\.6 00 LOOP!: ldaa 
8638 
$00, y ; Ace loaded with 
suppld char from ADDRESS 
8638 Al 00 
8630 





8640 18 08 
8642 SA 







$OO,x Compares to stored 
char from CODESPOT 
RESTORE If no match then 
error RESTORE resets all 
values and then returns to 
; the waiting loop RECVCHAR. 
bne LOOP! 
; Set-up for next char 






;*************OPEN GATE & FLASH LED 
Routine puts eight pulses on Port 
; the thyrister gate and causes the 
****************** 
DS. This activates 
LED to flash on 
; sixteen times . 
·***************************************************** ' 
8645 
8645 CE 10 00 
8648 C6 20 
B64A 
864A 86 20 
864C 88 20 LOOP3: 
B64E A7 08 
86SO 80 20 
8652 SA 




ldx #REG8ASE ; restored from CODESPOT 
ldab #NUMFLASH ; Number of LED changes. 
;Flashes half the number of changes. 
ldaa #SELPIN Selects bit 5 










enables LED to be seen 
after 16 flashes = 0 
repeat until count is 0 





;*********PREPARE TO RETURN TO WAIT LOOP************** 
; routine to restore loop waiting for supplied code 
·***************************************************** ' 
8655 CE 10 00 RESTORE: ldx #REGBASE ; Only needed in 
;restoring from ERROR 
(Restored from CODESPOT) 
ldy #ADDRESS ; location of supplied code 
(Restored after DELAY routine) 
8658 
8658 18 CE DO 00 
865C 
B65C 86 FF NEXT: ldaa #$ff Overwrites a supplied code 
B65E 18 A7 00 staa O,y : character with ff 
8661 18 08 
8663 18 8C DO 08 
8667 26 F3 
8669 1C 08 20 
B66C 
B66C 
B66C 18 CE DO 00 







; Then next code character 
#$d008 ; until 8 chars. 
NEXT ; Overwrite next char 
PORTD,x,SELPIN ;Ensures pin D5 set ON 
; at each RESTORE. Inverter acts to 
; make it OFF until ON in LOOP 3, 
#ADDRESS After 8 chars reset the 
; index & 





; a delay routine to enable flashes to be seen 
;****************************~*****w****************** 
8672 18 3C DELAY: pshy 
257 
0156 8674 18 CE FF FF ldy II$FFFF Contaminates Y 
0157 8678 18 09 LOOP2: dey 
0158 B67A 26 FC bne LOOP2 
0159 B67C 18 38 puly 
0160 B67E 39 r::s 
0161 B67F 
0162 867F 
0163 B67F .end 
tasm: Number of errors = 0 
258 
Appendix 9 
VEHICLE SECURITY SURVEY 
No pen needed. Just prick six holes and drop it. 
QUESTIONS 
The following five qul!stions arc intended 
to get your opinion as to what a motorist 
might pay for security. Some reasons 
why you might respond------+ 
Cltimate sccuri£y that would defeat 
almost any thief can be installed t\n 
• almost :my vt=hicle. For details --+ 
Ql What would you be prepared to 
pny for ultimate security? 
moreiS5001SlOOISSOI$25ISlOIIess 
{Pril.:k your choice with the toothpick) 
Pretty good security that would defeat 
most joyriders and impulse thieves is 
installed on some modem vehicles. 
For details------------. 
Q2 What would you be prepared to 
pay for pretty good security? 
moreiS500ISlOOIS50IS251SlOiless 
(Prick your choice with the toothpick) 
Standard security is fitted to most older 
vehicles. -----------+ 
Q3 Do you think this is enough? 
yes I no 
(Prick your choice with the toothpick) 
Q4 Do you think alarms or 
immobilisers are worth fitting? 
yes I no 
(Prick your choice with the toothpick) 
QS If YES. haw much would you be 
prepared to pay for one? 
more!S500I$100!S501$251SI011ess 
{Prick ~our choice with the toothpick) 
FURTHER INFOR.~IA TION FOR THOSE I:"'TERESTED 
In Western Australia almosl 20.000 vehicles are stolen every year and the number is 
rising. You can help 10 change that. For most people a car is their second most 
v~luable asset and it is the easiest to steal. Your answer. by indicating just five choices, 
Will help a study of the options for making vehicle theft harder. Security is often 
defined as the preservation of one's assets. Therefore. the cost of security must be 
b~lanced against the possibility of loss. The purpose of this questionnaire is to get your 
v1ews on what kind of balance motorists might choose. 
The ultimate vehicle 5ecurity system is one that requires the presentation by the 
legitimate driver of a personal feature such as a fingerprint. eye retina or back-of-hand 
for scanning. Only when the presented feature matches its de:;cription stored in the 
vehicle will the doors. bonnet and boot open, ignit1on and fuel systems work and 
steering, brakes and gearbox be released. Also, if the engine is switched off and no one 
is in the vehicle, then after a short period the doors will be locked and the other systems 
deactivated 
A pretty good vehicle security system is one that requires the pres'!ntation of a device 
that responds to a radio challenge from the vehicle with J code that causes the vehicle 
doors to open 3nd, on entry of a PIN using a keypad within the veh1cle, enables the 
ignition and bonnet catch to work and unlocks the steering. The device presented is no 
bigger than a key tag. 
A standard security system is one that requires a key to unlock the doors. bonnet and 
steering and activate the ignition. 
Do you have any suggestions or comments? 
······························· ·································································· 
································ ············································································ 
... ······················ ........................................... ············ .......... . 
............................................................................................................. 
WHAT TO DO WITH COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE 
Drop it on the ground for facer collection. (the weight will prevent 
it blowing awa .. v) or 
put it in any of the boxes at the exits from rhe car park. or 
drop it in the Building 13. Computer Science assignment box. or 
give it to the Secretary. Computer Sciem.:e Department 
25? 
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